Metascience as Self-Knowledge by Bar, Roi
  
Metascience as Self-Knowledge: 
Hegel’s Philosophy of Science 
in Light of the Question of Naturalism 
 
von der Fakultät für Sozialwissenschaften und Philosophie 
der Universität Leipzig 
genehmigte 
D I S S E R T A T I O N 
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades 
 
Doktor der Philosophie 
Dr. phil. 
 
vorgelegt 
von 
 
M.A. Roi Bar 
 
geboren am 28.05.1978 in Aschkelon, Israel 
 
Gutachter:  Prof. Dr. Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer 
      Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Neuser 
 
Tag der Verleihung: 21.07.2017 
 
  
  
 3 
 
Contents 
Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................... 6 
 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 7 
 
1. IS THERE A PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE IN HEGEL’S ‘SYSTEM’? .............. 18 
1.1 The formal hermeneutical problem ......................................................................... 19 
1.1.1 The absence of an explicit ‘philosophy of science’ .......................................... 19 
1.1.2 Two meanings of philosophy of science ........................................................... 21 
1.2 The conceptual-historical problem .......................................................................... 26 
1.2.1 The pseudoproblem of anachronism ................................................................. 26 
1.2.2 The anti-Hegelian philosophy of science .......................................................... 29 
1.3 The concrete research problem ............................................................................... 38 
1.3.1 The young ‘anti-scientific’ Hegel ..................................................................... 39 
1.3.2 Phenomenology of Spirit does not seem to be philosophy of science .............. 43 
1.3.3 The Logic does not seem to be philosophy of science ...................................... 48 
1.4. Transition: Hegel’s “theory of knowledge” and “science theory” ....................... 49 
 
2. THE DEBATE ON HEGEL’S NATURALISM ....................................................... 54 
2.1 Hegel’s ‘naturalistic turn’ ........................................................................................ 55 
2.2 Hegel as a naturalist: nature lover and natural historian ..................................... 56 
2.3 Refutation of naturalism in Hegel ........................................................................... 57 
2.3.1 Ontological naturalism ...................................................................................... 58 
2.3.2 Methodological naturalism ............................................................................... 62 
2.3.3 Epistemological naturalism ............................................................................... 66 
2.3.3.1 The psychologistic approach: science as a natural phenomenon (Quine) . 68 
2.3.3.2 The behaviorist approach: knowledge as a natural kind (Kornblith) ........ 76 
2.4 Naturalistic readings of Hegel and their deficiencies............................................. 84 
2.4.1 Naturalism about the mental ............................................................................. 84 
2.4.1.1 Spirit as “powers within nature” (Beiser) ................................................. 84 
2.4.1.2 The “biological needs” of self-consciousness (Westphal) ........................ 88 
 4 
 
2.4.1.3 “Disenchanted” naturalism: natural freedom of natural mind (Pinkard) .. 93 
2.4.2 Social naturalism (Tesla) .................................................................................. 98 
2.4.3 A note on Husserl’s critique of Hegel ............................................................. 102 
2.5 Hegel’s non-naturalistic concept of nature ........................................................... 104 
2.5.1 Nature as the idea ............................................................................................ 105 
2.5.2 The natural as the initial and the common ...................................................... 110 
2.5.3 Nature as a riddle ............................................................................................ 112 
2.6 In between conclusions ........................................................................................... 115 
2.7 What is not science? Transition to Hegel’s non-naturalistic concept of science   
through his critique of physiognomy and phrenology ............................................... 117 
 
3. APPROACHING HEGEL’S CONCEPT OF SCIENCE ...................................... 120 
3.1 What science is not .................................................................................................. 120 
3.1.1 Science is not knowledge by acquaintance: the case of anatomy ................... 120 
3.1.2 Science is not purely empirical: against Baconian and Humean empiricism . 127 
3.1.3 Science is not rationalizing: alteration in Hegel’s concept of science ............ 131 
3.2 Overcoming the Kantian concept of science ......................................................... 133 
3.3 Science as Geist ........................................................................................................ 140 
3.3.1 Science as the “crown of a world of Spirit” .................................................... 140 
3.3.2 The twofold meaning of the science of Geist ................................................. 144 
3.3.3 On the translation of Geist .............................................................................. 147 
3.4 On the translation of Wissenschaft ........................................................................ 149 
3.4.1 A preliminary note on the problem of translating Wissenschaft as science .... 149 
3.4.2 The translation of Wissenschaft as Science in upper case............................... 151 
3.4.3 The synecdoche of science: from ‘knowledge’ to ‘natural knowledge’ ......... 153 
3.5 What is science? ...................................................................................................... 156 
3.5.1 Self-knowledge ............................................................................................... 156 
3.5.2 System ............................................................................................................. 160 
3.5.3 Becoming ........................................................................................................ 162 
3.5.4 Truth................................................................................................................ 166 
3.5.5 Form of concept .............................................................................................. 169 
3.5.6 Science of god? ............................................................................................... 174 
3.6 How to begin in science? ......................................................................................... 177 
 5 
 
3.6.1 No fear ............................................................................................................ 178 
3.6.1 Antifoundationalism ....................................................................................... 183 
3.6.3 The ladder ....................................................................................................... 190 
3.7 On Hegel’s realism .................................................................................................. 193 
3.8  Hegel’s possible response to Kuhn’s concept of science ..................................... 198 
 
4. HEGEL’S TASK OF SCIENTIFYING PHILOSOPHY ....................................... 206 
4.1 Hegel’s task: scientism? .......................................................................................... 206 
4.2 On the origin of Hegel’s task: episteme as noesis noeseos .................................... 213 
4.2.1 Scientifying philosophy begins in Plato ......................................................... 213 
4.2.2 Scientifying philosophy is completed in Aristotle .......................................... 217 
4.3 The triggers for the task ......................................................................................... 221 
4.3.1 Fichte’s unsatisfactory “doctrine of science” .................................................. 224 
4.3.2 Two romantic conceptions of knowledge ....................................................... 229 
4.3.2.1 Jacobi’s faith in “immediate knowledge” ............................................... 229 
4.3.2.2 Schelling’s “intellectual intuition” and his “Sunday’s children” ............ 234 
4.4 On the realization of the task ................................................................................. 241 
4.4.1 First realization: the renewed concept of phenomenology ............................. 241 
4.4.2 Second realization: “pure” and “real” science ................................................ 247 
4.5 Criticisms of Hegel’s task ....................................................................................... 249 
4.5.1 Philosophy is not science ................................................................................ 250 
4.5.2 Humanities is not science ................................................................................ 255 
4.5.3 Some philosophers are not professors ............................................................. 258 
4.5.4 Hegel’s Eurocentrism...................................................................................... 259 
4.5.5 The death of philosophy.................................................................................. 262 
 
5. FINAL THOUGHTS .................................................................................................. 265 
 
References ..................................................................................................................... 270 
 6 
 
Acknowledgements 
It is customary to open a scientific monograph with thanking the dearest 
people who helped to make this work possible, because the author thinks 
that this matter of honor deserves the best place: right at the beginning of 
the work. Although the acknowledgments seem to be a private personal 
issue, as they contain a list of persons close to the author, they are more 
than that, for they express the recognition of the inter- and transpersonal 
character of thought. This recognition is essential to the development of the 
human mind from a single individual to a self-conscious thinker. There is 
no genuine knowledge without the acknowledgement of other co-knowers. 
I would thus like to thank all those who have supported my work in 
various ways, first and foremost, Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer for his great 
accuracy in thought and open-mindedness, Wolfgang Neuser, for his 
evaluation, Elad Lapidot, my co-translator of Hegel’s Phenomenology of 
Spirit into Hebrew, for his continuous encouragement, and Veronica 
O’Neill for her linguistic remarks. Special thanks go to my family, for 
instilling in me the love of learning, and to my friends, Gerd Holzwarth, 
Gundel Schümer, Roy Kovalio, Johanna von Stülpnagel, Udo Bottländer, 
for their support and love all along the way. This work is dedicated to the 
memory of my sister, Neta Bar.  
 7 
 
Introduction 
“We forget too easily that a thinker is more essentially effective where he is 
opposed than where he finds agreement”.1 What Martin Heidegger thought 
of the thinker also holds, besides for himself, for Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 
Hegel: one forgets too easily that Hegel is more essentially effective where 
he is opposed, and one of the fields in which Hegel is constantly opposed is 
the so-called philosophy of science. Philosophers of science tend to reject 
Hegel’s notion of science so vehemently that it has become common to 
deny any kind of philosophy of science in Hegel’s system. Even some of 
the most dedicated of Hegel’s recent commentators who do identify a truly 
epistemological discourse in Hegel misunderstand the core ideas of Hegel’s 
philosophy of science or dismiss them. Due to the naturalistic conception 
of science which dominates recent Hegelian scholarship as well as 
philosophy of science, it seems impossible to consider Hegel as a proper 
philosopher of science. Where science only means first-order empirical 
natural science, Hegel’s conception of metascience as the analysis of 
generic forms of self-knowledge seems to have no validity and even to be 
an ‘inverted’ false conception. To a certain degree, Hegel still remains a 
persona non grata in philosophy of science. In this field, the old belief 
about Hegel still seems to hold, namely that Hegel is nothing but a mad 
philosopher of history who “confused himself with god”, like other 
“genies”, believing that he was standing at the “end of history”.2 
Hegel himself conceptualizes his first major work Phenomenology of 
Spirit as “science”, namely the science of spirit’s self-experience. The task 
                                           
1 In “What Is Called Thinking?”, Heidegger, 1968, pp. 39f. 
2 Rosen S., 1974, p. 130. 
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of this scientific project is to scientify philosophy. In the broad sense of the 
term, Hegel can thus be considered the ‘philosopher of science’ par 
excellence: his conception of philosophy of science is a version of noesis 
noeseos, in the form of ‘conceptual realism’, as Robert Brandom put it, 
which makes explicit that any metascience yet to come is only possible as 
the non-formalistic logic of self-cognition. Whether Hegel develops a 
philosophy of science, and indeed which one, depends on the meaning we 
attribute to the term ‘philosophy of science’. The positivistic historiography 
of philosophy of science commonly begins with Auguste Comte or William 
Whewell, moves forward to Bertrand Russell, Moritz Schlick and the 
Vienna Circle, and on to Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn – all self-
appointed anti-Hegelian philosophers of science. Not only does this 
common historiography not begin with Hegel, it also forgets that Hegelian 
thought had a crucial effect on the development of this tradition of 
philosophy of science. Hegel can be read, as I suggest in this work, as one 
of the grounding fathers of the project of modern philosophy of science. 
The naturalistic-positivistic approach fears that Hegel’s ‘speculative’ 
philosophy aims at increasing the extension of the term ‘science’ or at 
widening its scope to include all disciplines of the humanities without 
preconditions. Hegel himself, however, already notices the still-pertinent 
confusion about the demarcation of science in his younger years, as he 
ironically notes concerning the status of technical knowledge: “What isn’t 
called science nowadays! ‘The terrace gardener or everything about the 
terrace art’. The same goes for peat mining, chimney construction, cattle 
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breeding etc. All considered as science”.3 Just like we ask whether 
neuroscience is a science in the strict sense, Hegel also wonders whether 
anatomy deserves to be called science. He raises arguments against the 
naturalistic doxa of science that takes science to be empirical-taxonomical 
knowledge oriented at external objects of perception. The naturalistic 
philosophy of science contains a self-destructive, skeptical thought about 
thought. It thus runs the risk of scoring an ‘own goal’. In order to go 
beyond this self-defeating doxa and to be able to come to think about 
science in its fundamental meaning as a universal self-relational concept, it 
is advisable to question Hegel’s conception of science in view of the claims 
of the naturalist theory of science. 
This work deals therefore with the question of whether Hegel holds any 
kind of philosophy of science, and if so, how it can be characterized and 
what its position is towards naturalism. The merit of the naturalism 
question will show itself to consist in tackling, among other things, the 
basic questions about the nature of nature and the nature of mind. In the 
following, the question of naturalism in Hegel shall be elaborated through a 
more concrete description of the background from which the debate on 
Hegel’s philosophy of science has emerged.  
It is observable that, since Richard Taylor’s Hegel (1975), there is an 
ongoing renewal of Hegel’s thought within post-analytic Anglophone 
philosophy, a renewal which amounts to more than just an expression of 
interest in Hegel, more than a mere ‘Back to Hegel’ movement. After 
Taylor, who has become known, along with Ralf-Peter Horstman, as the 
                                           
3 In Hegel’s Wastebook from 1803-1806 (2/541). Hegel alludes to the book of Friedrich 
Meinert from 1803: Der Terrassierer oder die Kunst, Terrassen und andere abgedachte 
Erdwände mit Erde, Rasen und mit trockenem Mauerwerke zu bekleiden (ed. M. Amati, 
Weimar: Gädicke). Meinert himself, however, does not use the word ‘science’ but 
rather speaks of “art” (Kunst) in the sense of craft and skill. Hegel also targets Albrecht 
Daniel Thaer’s conception of agronomy as Agrarwissenschaft, ‘agricultural science’. 
 10 
 
representative of the rather traditional-metaphysical reading of spirit 
monism in Hegel, it was the so-called non-metaphysical interpretations of 
Terry Pinkard, Robert Pippin and Paul Redding, among others, as well as 
the revised-metaphysical interpretations of Robert Stern and Stephen 
Holugate, which essentially contributed to new forms of the Hegelian 
renaissance. This revival, reflected in the works of John McDowell and 
Robert Brandom, is striking, because the self-declared analytic philosophy 
has essentially begun as an anti-Hegelian movement with the strong anti-
idealist critique of Bertrand Russell and George Edward Moore concerning 
what they regarded as Hegel’s untenable metaphysical claims about the 
human mind. Hegel’s revival can be understood as the result of an enduring 
self-correcting movement of analytic philosophy away from itself, away 
from positivism and the belief in immediate knowledge by acquaintance. 
The consciously self-improving move from a total negation of Hegel’s 
epistemology to an intense occupation with it can be conceived as one 
more critical step in the Selbstaufhebung of analytic philosophy towards a 
post-analytic phase that should lead to new non-positivistic and non-
naturalistic readings of Hegel. 
This disenchanting and still incomplete movement towards Hegel began 
with the gradual softening of the claims of ‘logical positivism’ to ‘logical 
empiricism’, a critical act that laid the ground for the three-headed 
rebellion against positivism led by Popper, Kuhn and Quine. It is the latter 
who, surprisingly, helped to awaken initial Hegelian thoughts in the 
pragmatist-naturalist heads of Richard Rorty and Wilfrid Sellars, who both 
inspired the ‘Pittsburgh Hegelians’, Brandom and McDowell. Sellars was 
touched by Quine’s half-Hegelian holistic spirit, as he criticized the 
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Carnapian “myth of the given”.4 Sellars was the first to praise Hegel 
publicly as the best adversary of the notion of “non-mediation” within 
epistemology, and he was also the first to name his project explicitly 
“incipient Méditations Hegeliènnes”.5 In the spirit of Hegel’s argument 
against the presumed Unmittelbarkeit of knowledge, Sellars claims that 
“one couldn't have observational knowledge of any fact unless one knew 
many other things as well. [...] the point is specifically that observational 
knowledge of any particular fact, e.g. that this is green, presupposes that 
one knows general facts of the form X is a reliable symptom of Y”.6 In a 
similar way to Hegel, Sellars concluded that acknowledging this problem 
of the illusory given “requires an abandonment of the traditional empiricist 
idea that observational knowledge ‘stands on its own feet’”7 and that the 
traditional empiricists merely “presuppose knowledge of general facts of 
the form X is a reliable symptom of Y”,8 even before they really come to 
prove it. Famously, McDowell also acknowledges that human perception is 
conceptually informed. Yet it was Hegel who laid the ground for this idea 
of the theory-ladenness of experience. 
The attack on the mere givenness of observational knowledge, which 
was in fact an analytical reformulation of Hegel’s argument against the idea 
of epistemological Unmittelbarkeit, has thus prepared the ground for Hegel 
to become an acknowledged thinker in Anglophone philosophy. It is a 
debatable issue, however, whether the principal of reliability is completely 
sufficient for a theory of science, because, as is well-known, a thermostat 
can be reliable as well, and yet has no concept of its work and hence no 
                                           
4 In Sellars’ Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind from 1956 (1997, p. 13). 
5 Ibid., p. 45. 
6 Ibid., p. 75. 
7 Ibid., pp. 75f. 
8 Ibid., p. 76. 
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normative free realm of making rules. This point is only emphasized by the 
very latest Hegel scholarship which has just begun to deal with the role of 
the collectively evolving norms-giving Geist within philosophy of science. 
The post-analytic neo-Hegelianism does not mirror a complete return – or 
rather progress – to Hegel, since it still downplays some of Hegel’s ideas 
concerning Geist and the possibility of truly self-reflective Wissenschaft to 
an agreeable level. Redding rightly argues that “Hegel’s critical response to 
‘metaphysics’ qua critique of metaphysical positivism differs from those 
responses to traditional metaphysics that have been more common in 
analytic philosophy – ‘naturalism’ and ‘quietism’ – and that are reflected in 
the Sellarsian neo-Hegelians”.9 It is thus worth keeping in mind that the 
Anglophone Hegel-renaissance is particularly interesting with regard to the 
progress achieved in the understanding of Hegel’s philosophy of science, 
yet it remains partly open to suspicion due to its strong tendency towards 
formal logic, on the one hand, and its strong positivistic-naturalistic 
tradition that clings to a behavioristic conception of knowledge, on the 
other hand. Human knowledge, properly understood, is not reached just by 
“enactive perception”, which constitutes in effect only animal cognition, as 
Alva Noë has recently suggested, but rather by a phenomenological and 
logical training of consciousness, which produces self-conscious forms of 
knowledge, as Hegel understands it. 
When dealing with Hegel, it is necessary to say something about the 
understanding of old philosophical texts. It is trivial to claim that the 
understanding of philosophy is affected by the prevailing views of a certain 
time, which also implies that the judgment of the merit of a philosopher is 
subjected to the philosophical zeitgeist of the judge. But this does not mean 
that the merit of any philosophy is positive only if it matches the current 
                                           
9 Redding, 2007, p. 20. 
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views. The same holds for Hegel’s philosophy of science: in order to 
understand it, one ought not just to historicize or analyze it with ‘old’ 
categories, just as one ought not to domesticate or decline it according to 
dominant contemporary schools of thought. The non-historicist Hegel 
commentator does not envisage the time that has passed since Hegel’s 
death, the Zeitabstand, as a “yawning abyss” that has to be overcome, but 
rather, as Hans-Georg Gadamer says, as “a positive and productive 
possibility of understanding”.10 Gadamer’s hermeneutics can supply here 
guidelines to the heart of the matter. Exploring Hegel’s philosophy of 
science can show us, not only the way Hegel as one person comprehends 
the desirable scientific quality of philosophizing, but also the potential 
horizon for understanding the current endeavor of so-called ‘philosophy of 
science’ and its origins. 
Concerning the method of interpretation, it is worth noting that, in non-
immanent Hegel research, the positions of Kant and the so-called German 
idealists are considered too often, and are too much at the forefront. The 
reason for this is that, methodologically, it is both common and easier to 
explain Hegel’s ideas purely historically in light of his predecessors and in 
terms of how their ideas are retroactively configured in Hegel’s allegedly 
all-comprehensive system. Such inquiries tend to begin with descriptions of 
Hegel as post-Kantian, post-Fichtean etc. The whole discussion is 
sometimes stuffed with chains of endless comparisons. In this tradition of 
interpretation, it has already become commonplace to claim that almost 
none of Hegel’s ideas are original insofar as they all stem directly from his 
predecessors, and that Hegel has only “summarized and integrated” them 
into one system, quasi synthesized them into one incompressible 
                                           
10 Gadamer, 1990, p. 302 (1960, p. 281). 
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logocentric whole.11 One should note, however, that Hegel shows himself 
to be quite aware of such reproach when he complains about the plagiarism 
accusation against the history-aware Plato: “Plato’s philosophy often seems 
to be merely a clearer statement of the doctrines of the older philosophers, 
and hence it draws upon itself the reproach of plagiarism”.12 Through 
careful examination of Hegel’s writings, one realizes that Hegel does not 
simply redescribe previous philosophers and so the main question of the 
systematical inquiry is not only what Hegel borrows from others, but what 
exactly is being negated or modified, and why or how. 
Finally, the purpose of my inquiry, and this must be stressed from the 
outset, is not the discussion of every detail in Hegel’s philosophy of science 
as this would exceed the scope of this work. Furthermore, the space does 
not allow for the presentation of the whole reception of Hegel or to explore 
all the views in philosophy of science. The literature about Hegel’s 
conception of science is chosen in light of the guide question, as the state of 
the art, as the “appearing knowledge” about Hegel. 
The investigation will proceed thus as follows: 
In order not to begin with presupposing the theme and begging the 
question, we shall begin chapter 1 with questioning the very existence of a 
genuine ‘philosophy of science’ in Hegel. We will have to deal with 
hermeneutical and historicist arguments against the existence of Hegel’s 
philosophy of science in order to pave the way for our object of inquiry. 
                                           
11 Beiser, 2002, p. 10. This is what Beiser argues, while listing all the Hegelian ‘stolen’ 
themes: “There is not a single Hegelian theme that cannot be traced back to his 
predecessors in Jena, [...]. So many ideas that are seen as uniquely Hegelian—the 
dialectic, immanent critique, the synthesis of Fichte and Spinoza, the absolute as the 
identity of identity and nonidentity, the importance of history within philosophy, self-
positing spirit, alienation, the unity of community and individual liberty—were all 
commonplaces in Jena before Hegel came there in 1801”. 
12 Hegel, 1995, p. 166; 18/190. 
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These arguments range from the absence of the explicit title ‘philosophy of 
science’ to the reproaches that to ascribe to Hegel ‘philosophy of science’ 
is a mere anachronism, for the whole history of modern philosophy of 
science seems to be nothing but ‘anti-Hegelian’. The motive behind such 
arguments is a common and insufficient conception of science as an 
objects-oriented empirical endeavor directed at a particular realm of beings. 
This anti-speculative view blocks out another alternative conception of 
science as a self-relational and self-critical project of metaindividual socio-
historical knowledge. The aim of our phenomenological-systematic 
exposition is to discuss the differences between these two conceptions of 
philosophy of science and to prepare the ground for the debate on Hegel’s 
naturalism. The naturalistic reading of Hegel is itself unconsciously 
affected by the positivistic understanding of science as natural science. 
Therefore, chapter 2 outlines the recent debate about Hegel’s naturalism 
by presenting the fundamental views alongside their queries. The 
discussion of the naturalistic arguments is not designed to be an external 
reflection on them merely from the outside, but an immanent process of 
making sense of them through gradually integrating the different 
naturalistic points of views – together with their deficiencies – into one 
coherent system of thought, as much as is possible. The inquiry shall begin 
with clarifying the key features of scientific naturalism and then move 
towards Hegel’s possible response to naturalism. The naturalism debate 
reflects a problematic position at the intersection between philosophy of 
science and philosophy of mind, namely the naturalization of the mind, 
which is supposed to explain the ‘natural limits’ of epistemology. The 
naturalistic discourse that informs some readings of Hegel exposes the 
absence of hermeneutical and dialogical methods of commentary as well as 
the insistence on the trivial understanding of Hegelian key concepts. 
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Chapter 3 then contains the analysis of Hegel’s concept of science, 
beginning with the views Hegel rejects: science as descriptive knowledge 
by acquaintance, science as a purely empirical enterprise, science as formal 
rationalizing and the Kantian conception of science. We will proceed with 
the interpretation of Hegel’s notion of science as the process of a self-
knowing spirit directed at truth and ‘coming back to itself’. We will dwell 
on the difficulties stemming from the translations of Geist and 
Wissenschaft, as well as on the problems that Hegel’s conception raises, 
such as the problem of how to begin with a scientific system and the 
question of realism. We will end by analyzing Hegel’s possible response to 
a naturalistic-Darwinist concept of science, the Kuhnian, which is 
essentially paradigmatic to the postmodern philosophy of science. 
In chapter 4 we will present Hegel’s task of scientifying philosophy, its 
origins and several main criticisms. In order to better understand this task, 
we will consider its romantic and idealist triggers, namely Jacobi, Fichte, 
and Schelling, as well as some of its systematical Greek origins in Plato 
and Aristotle. Again, this is not a historical inquiry, since these thinkers are 
not understood solely as the chronological predecessors of Hegel in such a 
way that it is only the aspect of time that matters to the logic of the 
argumentation, but they are actually taken as cooperative contributors to 
Hegel’s concept of science, as cofounders. Such investigation does not 
merely reconstruct the arguments of theses authors as some kind of distant 
‘background’ to Hegel. Rather, what matters is the disclosure of the logical 
space wherein their arguments subsist and of how they relate to Hegel’s 
thought. We will thus confront contradictions, corrections, affirmations and 
negations of positions. On this final path, we will arrive at some significant 
post-Hegelian criticisms of Hegel’s task: on the one hand, the declaration 
that ‘philosophy is not science’, and on the other that ‘philosophy is dead’. 
The serious doubt about philosophy as science can reveal the conceptual 
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origin of the humanity crisis reflected in the seemingly absolute dichotomy 
between science and the humanities and the total rejection of any 
‘scientificity’ in philosophy. It can be shown that philosophy of science, 
correctly understood, more than being directed at some ideal scientists, is a 
self-critical praxis of philosophers and hence a possible form of doing 
philosophy of philosophy, a methodological reflection on generic 
theoretical and practical forms of self-thinking. 
 1. Is there a philosophy of science in Hegel’s ‘system’? 
The question of whether it is possible to count Hegel as a proper 
philosopher of science, and in what sense, has become more and more 
relevant in recent decades because in our times philosophy of science has 
attained the status of ‘first philosophy’, competing perhaps only with 
philosophy of language. In the following, I will argue that the common 
claim that Hegel’s system lacks any kind of philosophy of science does not 
do justice to Hegel’s philosophy, and that he can even be read as one of the 
pioneers of critical continental philosophy of science. Hegel’s unique 
notion of science and his dialectical thinking gave inspiration to the 
development of the modern humanities, the Geisteswissenschaften, 
including the social sciences and political sciences, as well as the later 
critical theory of science advocated by the Frankfurt School and the 
feminist philosophy. Our investigation is not supposed to beg the question 
by presupposing the content of what it explicates, and so, before discussing 
the main features of Hegelian philosophy of science, the inquiry is 
confronted with the question of the very existence of philosophy of science 
in Hegel: does he develop a philosophy of science? 
The first chapter therefore analyzes three obstacles that seem to rule out 
a philosophy of science in Hegel. The first is the total absence of the 
explicit term ‘philosophy of science’ in Hegel’s writings, which seems to 
cause a formal hermeneutical problem. Secondly, even if one were to 
ignore this problem, the question remains as to what kind of philosophy of 
science we mean. There are at least two distinguished forms of philosophy 
of science: the more prevailing positivistic-descriptive, and the less 
considered genuinely metascientific and hence philosophic. The first, at 
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least, appears to be absent in Hegel, and so to talk about his philosophy of 
science would seem to some to be nothing but anachronism. Finally, this 
problem is compounded by a sophisticated kind of historically motivated 
skepticism, which receives concrete intensification through sporadic 
arguments about why Hegel’s particular works do not seem to contain 
‘proper’ philosophy of science. 
 
1.1 The formal hermeneutical problem 
1.1.1 The absence of an explicit ‘philosophy of science’ 
Hegel does not seem to have an ‘official’ philosophy of science. He never 
uses this term explicitly. He never writes the three words philosophy-of-
science one after the other in this order. He never mentions the expressions 
Philosophie der Wissenschaft or Wissenschaftsphilosophie.1 Neither does 
he ever mention the related terms ‘theory of science’ 
(Wissenschaftstheorie) or ‘theory of knowledge’ (Theorie des Wissens). 
Evidently, Hegel did not coin the term ‘philosophy of science’, and as is 
well known, this term was not in use in his time in this form.  
However, things can exist before their names. The coining of terms 
does not simply create the things named by them. There are many reasons 
to think that Hegel could have synthesized the concept ‘philosophy of 
science’: he has no hesitation in making use of concepts in the form 
‘philosophy of x’. His works have titles like Philosophy of Right and 
subtitles like “Philosophy of Nature” and “Philosophy of Spirit”. His 
lectures were entitled “Philosophy of History”, “Philosophy of Art” and 
“Philosophy of Religion”. In Lectures on the History of Philosophy there 
                                           
1 I will use the translation of Wissenschaft as ‘science’, but I will arrive at its 
problematization in 3.3.1. 
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are titles such as “Philosophy of Plato” and of other persons,2 “Philosophy 
of Stoicism” and of other epochs,3 and such concepts as “philosophy of 
theology”4 and “philosophy of consciousness”.5 In view of so many 
philosophies – the many “circles” within the “one circle” – ‘philosophy of 
science’ is indeed absent, but not impossible. Furthermore, Hegel does not 
hesitate in using the word ‘science’ and its derivations in the titles of his 
three major published works: System of Science, Science of Logic and 
Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences. Science is one of Hegel’s 
main themes, and he especially expands on his conception of science in the 
“Preface” and “Introduction” to the Phenomenology of Spirit, the Science 
of Logic as “pure science”, and the Encyclopaedia as the presentation of the 
various sciences. 
These observations suggest that ‘philosophy of science’ could have at 
least potentially existed in Hegel’s world of thoughts as he frequently uses 
the concepts ‘philosophy of x’ and ‘science’. After all, the mere fact that a 
specific expression is not mentioned by an author does not necessarily 
mean that the author does not express thought on this topic in different 
terms, or that we cannot know anything about his thought on the topic. For 
this reason, one can also reasonably speak of “Hegel’s philosophy of 
language” or “Hegel’s philosophy of action”, although he obviously did not 
coin these terms.6 
The formal absence of the term ‘philosophy of science’ in Hegel’s time 
can be further questioned, because, contrary to common thought, certain 
                                           
2 19/11. 
3 19/255. 
4 20/40. 
5 18/214. 
6 Cf. Vernon, J., Hegel’s Philosophy of Language (London: Continuum International 
Publishing Group, 2007) and Stepelevich, L., Hegel’s Philosophy of Action (Atlantic 
Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1983). 
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theoretical roots of the future discipline ‘philosophy of science’ already 
existed. The term “la philosophie des sciences” is used for the first time by 
Denis Diderot in the entry “philosophy” in his Encyclopedia (1765), where 
he states that all particular sciences and arts have their own philosophy 
which supplies them with foundations.7 Similarly, Auguste Comte would 
speak of the “necessity of philosophy of the sciences in general” (1819), 
focusing however on the particular natural sciences and sociology.8 In the 
German scholarship, Carl Christian Erhard Schmid was the first to present 
the outlines of an a priori science of the “rules of the sciences” in his 1794 
Kantian essay Erste Linien einer reinen Theorie der Wissenschaft.9 
Famously, and more significantly to Hegel, Johann Gottlieb Fichte 
published in this year his “doctrine of science” (Wissenschaftslehre), the 
“science of science”. Hegel has perhaps deliberately refrained from using 
this term in order to keep some distance from Fichte.  
Although Hegel himself does not adopt any of these designations, he 
does use the concepts of “science of philosophy” and “philosophical 
science”. Thus, in order to decide if Hegel has something like philosophy 
of science, we should consider the general meaning of the term. In the next 
section we will discuss two possible meanings. 
 
1.1.2 Two meanings of philosophy of science 
As previously mentioned, the fact that Hegel does not explicitly mention 
the words ‘philosophy of science’ does not necessarily mean that he does 
not deliberate on science. Whether Hegel’s system contains ‘philosophy of 
                                           
7 Cf. Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, vol. 12, p. 974. 
8 In Essais sur la philosophie des mathématique, 1819/20 (cf. Historisches Wörterbuch 
der Philosophie, vol. 12, p. 979).  
9 Originally in Philosophisches Journal für Moralität, Religion und Menschenwohl 3 
(cf. Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, vol. 12, pp. 973f). 
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science’ depends on what ‘philosophy of science’ means. The meaning of 
the term ‘philosophy of science’, like other terms in the general form of ‘x 
of y’, can be understood in various ways, contingent on how one 
understands philosophy and science, as well as on how the semantics of the 
‘of’ determines the relation of philosophy to science each time. Even if, for 
now, ‘philosophy’ and ‘science’ cannot be fully determined, I would like to 
suggest two main meanings of which Hegel negates the first and approves 
the second; namely a theory about object-oriented science and a theory 
about self-knowledge. Let us examine how each meaning depends on a 
different conception of science. 
The first way of understanding ‘philosophy of science’ is the more 
popular: it takes ‘science’ to be a system of ‘particular sciences’. It is 
therefore an object-oriented inquiry into the nature of the particular objects 
which are, by definition, other than ‘us’ as subjects. So understood, the 
objective objects are ‘external’ to us. This view leads to a philosophy of 
science that emphasizes the term ‘science’ by using the genitivus obiectivus 
to refer to science as a given object of a philosophical inquiry. 
Accordingly, such a philosophy of science designates a subdiscipline 
within philosophy, and its endeavor is equivalent to constructing a general 
theory of the particualr sciences. Commonly, it designates the theoretical 
reflection on the definition of science by setting a criterion of 
“demarcation”, as Karl Popper called it. Such a theory is an attempt to 
reflect on the foundations that justify science, and it deals with the 
scientific method and the purpose of science regarding truth. 
 The second way of understanding ‘philosophy of science’ has become 
rare: it takes science to be the knowledge of oneself about oneself as a 
whole, i.e. self-knowledge, the knowledge about what knowledge is. This 
view leads to a philosophy of science that emphasizes the term 
‘philosophy’ by using the genitivus subjectivus to refer to a philosophical 
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inquiry that science performs with itself and does to itself, a ‘philosophical 
science’. Such a version of philosophy of science exists at least since the 
Aristotelian conception of nóêsis noêseôs, the self-thinking thought. It also 
corresponds to Fichte’s designation of pure philosophy as “science of 
science” and, mutatis mutandis, to Hegel’s idea of the self-knowing spirit. 
In contrast with common theory of science, this project takes philosophy to 
be the superlabel for all the sciences and can be understood as philosophy 
of philosophy. Hegel gives expression to this in his epochal task of making 
philosophy more scientific. The endeavor of philosophy of science is to 
develop an appropriate version of scientific philosophy. 
It is worth noting that, in any event, the form ‘philosophy of x’, if it is 
meaningful, indicates a certain semantic gap between philosophy and x: 
philosophy is not identical with x, so that there is an ontological difference 
between philosophy and x. The suspicion arises that Hegel presupposes an 
identity between philosophy and science, an identity which existed before 
his time and which he would have liked to reconstruct and restore. It is 
probably for this reason that Hegel could not use the term ‘philosophy of 
science’, as he ultimately believed that philosophy is to some extent 
science. Hegel’s ‘absolute’ philosophy of science is the attempt to conflate 
the two different perspectives of theory of science and self-knowledge into 
a fundamentum inconcussum, one that is not merely a theory of animal 
cognition, but a real epistemology, a self-conscious science. 
So in what sense can we speak of Hegelian philosophy of science? This 
question will accompany our investigation. For now, we can be reminded 
that Hegel does speak of “science of philosophy”. He begins to make 
intensive use of this term in the “Introduction” to the first volume of his 
and Schelling’s Critical Journal of Philosophy (1802), where he describes 
the proper “science of philosophy” as acknowledging that “the absolute” is 
the “highest idea” and that such “infinity” exists in thought, while 
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transcending the dualism between the finite being and infiniteness.10 In his 
essay on skepticism in the second volume of this journal, Hegel argues that 
the “science of philosophy”, as the science of “the infinite” that contains 
truth, would be the reasonable answer to dogmatic skepticism à la Kant.11 
Such science should be the departure point for all other sciences.12 Hegel 
mentions in his curriculum vita that he dedicates his life to the “science of 
philosophy”13 and describes the Phenomenology of Spirit as the “new, 
interesting and first science of philosophy”,14 lamenting the “contempt” for 
any “science of philosophy” in his time.15 Concerning the history of 
philosophy, a central Hegelian thought is that the “science of philosophy” 
as a whole is a “circle” in which each part has its “predecessors and 
successors”.16 Therefore, the very existence of “science of philosophy” is 
historically conditioned by the “manifoldness of the many philosophies”.17 
The uniqueness of such science is that it seeks to reach an “understanding” 
(Verstehen) of previous philosophical works. Nonetheless, Hegel 
emphasizes that such science should not presuppose the concept of 
philosophy at the beginning of the investigation, because it only reaches it 
fully at the end.18 All this shows that the plan of developing a kind of 
scientific philosophy was in his mind all along. 
Hegel uses the term “philosophical science” to refer to non-formalistic, 
self-conscious science which is divided into three encyclopedic domains: 
the science of logic as “pure science”, including metamathematics, and the 
                                           
10 Cf. 2/181. 
11 Cf. 2/252. 
12 Cf. 2/435. 
13 2/583 (from 1804). 
14 3/593 (in the Anzeige). 
15 8/12 (In “Preface to the first Edition” of the Encyclopaedia from 1817). 
16 9/10. 
17 18/37. 
18 Cf. 18/16ff. 
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two “sciences of the real” (Realwissenschaften), namely the science of 
nature, including the theories of mechanics, physics, biology, meteorology, 
and geology and the science of spirit, including anthropology, 
phenomenology, psychology and other subdisciplines, like the non-
positivistic science of natural law, along with the sciences of state, art and 
religion. In the same semantic field, Hegel uses interchangeably, but more 
rarely, the term “philosophical knowledge”.19 
Science as theoretically organized knowledge is thus not just one theme 
among others for Hegel, but rather a quality that he thinks philosophy, at 
the time of the Phenomenology of Spirit, does not, but should have. 
Evidently, a Hegelian philosophy of science would not separate the region 
of science as a specific field of inquiry within philosophy, for in this 
manner the term ‘philosophy of science’ would suggest that philosophy 
itself is definitively not a science, a thought with which Hegel would not 
reconcile. 
With this in mind, philosophy of science can attain the meaning it 
deserves: its task is to take the methodological transformative step from 
‘philosophy is not science’ to ‘philosophy is science’. Although sometimes 
it can seem as if Hegel tries to do the other way around, namely to turn 
science into philosophy, he is actually occupied with turning philosophy 
into science with the help of the “science of the experience of 
consciousness” that shows the way to the “science of spirit”. Consequently, 
a Hegelian philosophy of science would fall under the metacategory of 
‘science’ and mean both philosophical science and scientific philosophy. 
The Hegelian self-reflection of science can be designated as the speculative 
phenomenological ‘science of science’ (Wissenschaftswissenschaft). 
                                           
19 2/54; 2/238; 8/13; 8/92; 8/190. 
 26 
 
Obviously, the word ‘science’ has changed its meaning over time, and we 
shall come back to this point later. 
What is not so clear, however, is whether the contemporary discipline 
called ‘philosophy of science’ falls under the Hegelian category of 
‘science’. Philosophers who treat epistemology as natural-empirical science 
do not treat it as phenomenological science. Hegel’s epistemology does not 
conceive of itself as a specific isolated region of knowledge claims, but 
rather as a “philosophical science” insofar as it refers, within a given 
language, to concepts which are, and are as expressible real beings. As a 
constituent of the “system of science”, epistemo-logy is a special mode of 
the “pure” logos that produces the logos of logos, the self-reflecting 
thought. 
Nonetheless, there is a skeptical view that denies both meanings in 
Hegel. It claims that the historical project of philosophy of science is 
essentially post-Hegelian, for it supposedly emerged only after Hegel, and 
even anti-Hegelian, as Russell and his followers were. Therefore, this view 
believes that the very search for philosophy of science in Hegel is merely 
anachronistic. We will deal with this view in the next section. 
 
1.2 The conceptual-historical problem 
1.2.1 The pseudoproblem of anachronism 
Without being called ‘philosophy of science’, systematic reflections on the 
nature of science are continually evident in the history of theoretical 
philosophy and can be traced back to the treatment of ἐπιστήμη in Plato’s 
Theaetetus and Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. In early modern times, the 
anti-Aristotelian empiricist philosophy of science can be said to begin with 
Francis Bacon’s Novum Organum Scientiarum (1620). Nevertheless, a 
skeptical historicist view would hold that, since the explicit idea of 
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‘philosophy of science’ chronologically appears after Hegel’s lifetime and 
only gains popularity in the middle of the twentieth century with Popper, it 
means something essentially different from anything Hegel or his 
precedents thought of science. Searching for Hegel’s philosophy of science 
is then regarded as anachronism, i.e. an inconsistent juxtaposition of views 
and times. This is exactly the case with the positivistic historiography of 
philosophy of science. 
Traditionally, positivistic historians of philosophy of science take 
Comte to be the father of modern philosophy of science.20 Comte’s 
classification of natural sciences in The Course in Positivist Philosophy 
(1830), which is more or less successful until today, has contributed to the 
development of the various philosophies of the particular sciences. This 
work, which is the execution of Comte’s Plan of Scientific Studies 
Necessary for the Reorganization of Society (1822), celebrates the success 
of natural science by deifying its abilities. It aspires to resolve the post-
revolutionary social crisis with the help of what is believed to be society’s 
new redemptive spirit: empirical sociology. Comtean sociology aims at 
analyzing social and political phenomena, mainly with quantitative 
methods of natural science like analysis and evaluation of observable facts 
and empirical data. Later, in the spirit of Comte, Ampère used the term 
“philosophy of the sciences” in his essay Essai sur la philosophie des 
sciences, ou Exposition analytique d'une classification naturelle de toutes 
les connaissances humaines (1834). In this essay, he presents a “natural 
classification” of the “cosmological sciences”, i.e. natural sciences, and the 
                                           
20 Cf. Bourdeau, M., “Auguste Comte”, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
ed. E.N. Zalta (www. plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/comte, 2014). 
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“noological sciences”, focusing, like Comte, mainly on the natural 
sciences.21 
Sociological positivism à la Comte, however, is not so much a general 
philosophy of science as it is a naturalistic approach to the study of modern 
society. Therefore, the next typical candidate for the founding father of 
modern philosophy of science is commonly considered to be William 
Whewell, with his seminal work, The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences 
(1840). The approach of this metascientific theory mostly emphasizes the 
natural sciences, and is thus highly significant for the future development 
of the predominant conception of philosophy of science. The explicit term 
Wissenschaftstheorie, along with Carnap’s Wissenschaftslogik, was indeed 
only used later by the Vienna Circle and the analytic school to designate a 
logical-linguistic analysis of scientific sentences. Apparently, the term 
‘philosophy of science’ was first used by Popper in Philosophy of Science: 
A Personal Report (1957)22 and became popular in his time. In The Logic 
of Scientific Discovery (1959) in the preface to the English version, Popper 
expressly warns that “philosophy of science” is “threatening to become a 
fashion, a specialism, yet philosophers should not be specialists”.23 
Only from a non-systematic point of view can the search for Hegel’s 
philosophy of science count as mere anachronism. Since this philosophical 
subdiscipline does not seem to have existed in Hegel’s time, and hence to 
be able to assign to Hegel the same conceptual independent field of inquiry 
it came to be, the purely historicist view immediately negates the question 
of the existence of Hegel’s philosophy of science. In what follows, I 
attempt to show why the whole idea of philosophy of science, as the primal 
                                           
21 Cf. Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, vol. 12, p. 979. 
22 Ibid., p. 980. 
23 Popper, 2002, p. xxvi. 
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project of ‘analytic philosophy’, may appear to some to be, from its start, 
essentially ‘anti-Hegelian’.  
 
1.2.2 The anti-Hegelian philosophy of science 
This inquiry is not concerned with a comprehensive description of the 
history of modern philosophy of science; instead, it is concerned with 
reading it in terms of its relation to Hegel’s philosophy, that is, as the 
history of the negative reaction to Hegel’s system. Over time, this reaction 
has become more and more aware of itself as an attack on Hegel that was 
unjustly too sharp. It therefore decreased at a certain point, and since then it 
has lessened more and more, although it has not subsided completely. The 
attack was against what was taken to be, each time in a different form, 
Hegel’s ‘idealistic-holistic’ conception of the absolute as an infinite spirit 
moving forward in time by some necessary contradictions in knowledge. 
Hegel seemed to lack a proper philosophy of science and even to serve as a 
good example of an antipode of an acknowledged philosopher of science. 
Despite this, at some point, there is evidence of a slow approximation to 
Hegel. The following is an outline of the main points in this course of 
events. 
The roots of the anti-Hegelian stream in philosophy of science lie in the 
efforts towards a positivistic wissenschaftliche Philosophie in the aftermath 
of Hegel.24 Comte can be considered as the opposite pole to Hegel since 
they disagreed philosophically and did not think highly of each other. For 
Comte, Hegel was “too metaphysical”; his conception of spirit played a too 
                                           
24 Michael Friedman claims that the modern “scientific philosophy” was developed “as 
a reaction against what was viewed as the excessively speculative and metaphysical 
character of post-Kantian German idealism” (2012, p. 1). 
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“singular role”25 and his belief in the supremacy of the absolute was 
“dogmatic”.26 As we are informed by Gustave d’Eichtal’s letter to Comte 
of January 12, 1825, Hegel had severely attacked the general conception of 
Comte’s Plan of Scientific Studies Necessary for the Reorganization of 
Society, in particular the method of “observation”, as being inappropriate in 
political science.27 After receiving a copy of Comte’s work from d’Eichtal 
in 1824, Hegel met with d’Eichtal to discuss Comte’s ideas. In this 
meeting, Hegel rejected the idea of an alliance with Comte’s “positive 
philosophy”, and he never mentioned Comte in his writings. 
In the face of this relationship, it is striking that Comte’s formulation of 
a dialectical law of three historical stages28 was apparently influenced by 
Hegel’s analysis of historical phenomena after reading several translated 
manuscripts. According to recent findings by Comte’s Biographer, Mary 
Pickering, d’Eichtal translated several pieces of Hegel’s Lectures on the 
Philosophy of History for Comte.29 Despite Comte’s criticism, he referred 
to Hegel as “without a doubt a man of merit” and found “a great number of 
points of contact”30 between them as he shared with Hegel the positive 
relation to the dialectical method,31 the unity of synthesis,32 and other 
issues.33 
                                           
25 Cf. Pickering, 1993, p. 299. Comte writes this to Gustave d’Eichtal, December 10, 
1824. 
26 Cf. Pickering, 1993, p. 299. In The Course of Positive Philosophy Comte claims the 
same in respect of other Kant successors. 
27 Cf. Pickering, 1993, pp. 297f. 
28 Cf. Comte, 1975, p. 71. In the first chapter of The Course of Positive Philosophy, 
Comte describes three incompatible stages of men’s history: the theological-fictitious, 
the metaphysical-abstract and the scientific-positive. 
29 Cf. Pickering, 1993, p. 298. 
30 Pickering, 1993, p. 299. 
31 ibid., p. 211. 
32 Ibid., p. 224. 
33 Ibid., pp. 300f. 
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Unlike Comte, who has never published any criticism of Hegel, and in 
this sense does not fully represent an intended anti-Hegelianism, Whewell 
openly condemned Hegel’s philosophy at a meeting of the Cambridge 
Philosophical Society in 1848 as “premature” and “precarious”.34 Whewell 
believed that Hegel’s project was “to construct physical science a priori”,35 
and hence it was only “rash and blind attempts” resulting from Hegel’s 
incorrect assumption of an object-subject identity. Instead of this identity, 
Whewell speaks of “antithesis of knowledge”, the persistent bipolarism of 
“ideas” and “facts”, “theories” and “things”.36 At another meeting in 
Cambridge the next year, Whewell presented a total refutation of Hegel’s 
criticism of Newton.37 In this way, Whewell became one of the main 
impulses for the new analytic philosophy of science. 
 On the German side, it was Hermann von Helmholtz who promoted a 
new concept of scientific philosophy. In 1855, at the dedication of a 
monument to Kant in Königsberg, Helmholtz lamented Hegel’s speculative 
system of Naturphilosophie as creating an unbridgeable gap between 
natural science and philosophy, causing mutual distrust.38 Helmholtz 
recommended the same natural-scientific fundamental principles for all 
fields of science and, parallel to this, the replacement of all metaphysics 
with Erkenntnistheorie. This was the beginning of the ‘back to Kant’ 
movement,39 which has not yet completely subsided today. In spite of the 
blossoming Hegel research, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Science refers 
                                           
34 Whewell, 1860, p. 314. 
35 Ibid., p. 311. 
36 Ibid., p. 312. 
37 Ibid., pp. 504–512: “On Hegel’s Criticism of Newton’s Principia”. 
38 Cf. Friedman, 2012, pp. 1f. Helmholtz mentioned Schelling as well. 
39 The neo-Kantianism of the Marburg School emphasizes epistemology and logic at the 
expense of ontology and metaphysics. It begins with Hermann Cohen’s Kant’s Theory 
of Experience (1871) and continues with Paul Natorp’s The Logical Foundations of the 
Exact Sciences (1910) and Ernst Cassirer’s Substance and Function (1910). 
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only to “Kant’s philosophy of science”, not to Hegel’s, and he does not 
appear on the Wikipedia list of the 120 leading philosophers of science. 
The next distinct phase of anti-Hegelianism was already conscious of 
itself as such, as it went against British Idealism which was a form of neo-
Hegelianism, albeit not a unified doctrine. This also took place in 
Cambridge: in a patricidal act, in his dissertation (1898), the young George 
Edward Moore attacked the prevailing neo-Hegelian monist-holist view 
according to which the experience is a homogenous whole. This view was 
held by Francis Herbert Bradely in Cambridge and John McTaggart in 
Oxford, the main proponents of the movement of British Idealism, which 
began roughly in 1865 with James Hutchinson Stirling and continued with 
Thomas Hill Green and Edward Caird. As Bertrand Russell would later 
state, this momentous event belongs to the foundation mythos of the “new 
philosophy” of the analytic movement.40 In The Refutation of Idealism 
(1903), Moore argued that Hegel’s influential dialectic elevated “the 
practice of holding both of two contradictory propositions” to a 
philosophical principle, and that therefore it is no wonder “he has followers 
and admirers”.41 In the same year, Moore gave his final verdict on Hegel’s 
contextualism in Principia Ethica: Hegel’s “organic” way of thinking “that 
a part can have no meaning or significance apart from its whole must be 
utterly rejected”.42 
                                           
40 Moore’s dissertation appeared in 1899 under the name The Nature of Judgement in 
Mind. Russell wrote: “I think that the first published account of the new philosophy was 
Moore’s article in Mind on ‘The Nature of Judgement’” (Russell, 1993, p. 42). 
41 Moore, 1993, p. 34: “The principle of organic unities, like that of combined analysis 
and synthesis, is mainly used to defend the practice of holding both of two contradictory 
propositions, wherever this may seem convenient. In this, as in other matters, Hegel's 
main service to philosophy has consisted in giving a name to and erecting into a 
principle, a type of fallacy to which experience had shown philosophers along with the 
rest of mankind to be addicted. No wonder that he has followers and admirers”. 
42 Moore, 1993, p. 85. 
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Armed with his analytic program, later to be specified as “logical 
atomism”, Russell immediately joined the battle against “the notion of an 
organic whole” which “must be attributed to defective analysis and cannot 
be used to explain things”.43 Based on Frege’s formal logic of 
analyzability, Russell went explicitly against Hegel’s position regarding the 
internal character of the predicates, which is responsible to the logical 
interdependence of all particular finite things, their “ideality”, in Hegelian 
terms.44 Russell argued that “the existence of the complex depends on the 
existence of the simple” and that “the self-identical particular things do not 
depend on the relations between them, which are external to them, not 
internal, as for Hegel”.45 Russell’s naively realistic arguments were an 
attempt to refute the dialectic method by claiming that the phenomena of 
reality can be directly grasped through sense data. This view led Russell to 
believe that knowledge is not gained by mediation of concepts, but by 
acquaintance. This idea of immediate knowledge had long since been the 
focus of Hegel’s critique. In fact, Russell returns to pre-Kantian and pre-
Hegelian positions. By intentionally defining their own philosophical 
territory as having its end at the border with what they regarded as Hegel’s, 
Moore and Russell actually declared themselves to be the ‘other’ of Hegel. 
Still, we ought not to forget that both Moore and Russell began as 
enthusiastic Hegelians. While visiting Berlin as a young man in 1895, 
Russell planned to write a book series containing a dialectical “Hegelian 
synthesis” of various natural and social sciences.46 Furthermore, later in his 
career, in “Hegel and the Common Sense” (1912), Russell considered 
Hegel’s philosophy to be at least worthy of study, and he suggested that it 
                                           
43 Russell, 1903, p. 466. 
44 Cf. Welsch, 2003, pp. 13, 29. 
45 Russel, 1992, p. 133. 
46 Russell reports about it in “My Mental Development” from 1943 (2009, p. 15). 
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was a “disgrace to English philosophy that the task of translating the 
Greater Logic should still remain to be done”.47 In My Philosophical 
Development from 1959, he recalls that, in his earlier thought, he was 
definitely on the side of Hegel, and not Kant.48 Likewise, in his 
autobiography, Moore praised “the constant insistence on clearness”49 of 
his Hegelian teacher, John McTaggart, as well as his “eminently clear” 
lectures. Thus, one can even say, as Peter Hylton writes, that: “Under the 
influence of McTaggart and others at Cambridge, Russell and Moore 
became idealists in their student days, more indebted to Hegel, as they 
interpreted him, than to any other dominant figure”.50 
At the same time that Moore’s and Russell’s atomistic-analytic school 
of thought was spreading, another front of anti-Hegelian philosophy of 
science was emerging: the Vienna Circle. 
Moritz Schlick, the father of the Vienna Circle, is said to have become 
“the very first professional scientific philosopher”51 in 1922 on assuming 
the chair in Naturphilosophie that was created for Ernst Mach in 1895 and 
called “Philosophy, especially the history of the inductive sciences” 
(Philosophie, insbesondere Geschichte der induktiven Wissenschaften). 
Schlick, who proclaimed the end of what he considered the idealistic 
“hostile opposition” between philosophy and science “fomented by 
Schelling and Hegel”,52 states in his magnum opus Allgemeine 
                                           
47 Russell, 1999, p. 365. 
48 Russell, 1993, p. 32. 
49 Moore, 1942, pp. 18f. 
50 Hylton, 1993, p. 448. 
51 Cf. Friedman, 2012, p. 2. 
52 In “Is there intuitive knowledge?” from 1913 (Schlick, 1979, p. 141). 
 35 
 
Erkenntnislehre (1918), translated as General Theory of Knowledge,53 that 
scientific philosophy consists only in meaning analysis.54 By this he also 
made way for a radicalized new form of declared anti-Hegelianism: Rudolf 
Carnap’s logical positivism. Yet, in contrast to the common point of view, 
Schlick’s insight into the rigorously conceptual character of knowledge 
bears a resemblance to Hegel’s critique of non-conceptual knowledge-
claims. We will come back to Carnap, but we will first show that Schlick 
shares a basic thought with Hegel. 
Like Hegel in “Sensual Certainty”, Schlick differentiates between 
intuitive acquaintance and conceptual knowledge, claiming that mere 
acquaintance with intuitive images or contents, if lacking any symbolism, 
mathematics, inference or proof, does not constitute knowledge. Like 
Hegel, he argues that the attempt to identify intuition as a form of 
knowledge is, at most, a conflation of conceptual knowledge in the form of 
cognition (Erkenntnis) with unelaborated, directly perceived sensation in 
the form of acquaintance (Kenntnis).55 Schlick’s point of departure, a rather 
Hegelian critique of the Kantian doubt about the knowability of the ‘thing 
in itself’, led him – again like Hegel – to reject the rather Schellingian idea 
of Erkenntnis through intellektuelle Anschauung. Schlick’s position 
diverges thus from stereotypical positivism or empiricism.56 
                                           
53 Previous seminal works in this area in Germany that could influence Schlick were: 
Eisler, R., Einführung in die Erkenntnistheorie. Darstellung und Kritik der 
erkenntnistheoretischen Richtungen (Leipzig: Verlag von Johann Ambrosius Barth, 
1907); Messer, A., Einführung in die Erkenntnistheorie (Leipzig: Verlag von Felix 
Meiner, 1909); Störring, G., Einführung in die Erkenntnistheorie: Eine 
Auseinandersetzung mit dem Positivismus und dem erkenntnistheoretischen Idealismus 
(Leipzig: Verlag von Wilhelm Engelmann, 1909); Dürr, G. E., Erkenntnislehre 
(Leipzig: Verlag von Quell and Meyer, 1910). 
54 Schlick claims this also in “The Turning Point in Philosophy” (1930). 
55 Cf. Schlick, 1974, p. 83. 
56 Cf. Friedmann, 2012, pp. 2ff. 
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Partially following Schlick, Carnap explicitly attacks Hegel’s 
philosophy in his programmatic essay The Old and the New Logic (1930), 
not only as being false in terms of content, but also as “logically untenable 
and therefore meaningless”57 due to it being an “attempt to base 
metaphysics on pure logic”.58 Carnap instead presents his own post-
Fregean Wissenschaftslogik, a view of philosophy as a logical analysis of 
the language of science, more precisely: as a branch of applied 
mathematical logic.59 The idea of Carnap’s “protocol sentences”, i.e. the 
examinable elementary sentences that describe observations in physical-
objective language, correlates to Russell’s sensualist account of knowledge. 
In the “protocol sentences” there are atomistic unanalyzable unities, which 
are now called “elemantry experiences” (Elementarerlebnisse) and are 
totally reducible to the immediately given.60 In the German preface to the 
second edition of Der logische Aufbau der Welt (1961) Carnap affirmed 
                                           
57 Carnap, 1959, p. 134: “Before the inexorable judgment of the new logic, all 
philosophy in the old sense, whether it is connected with Plato, Thomas Aquinas, Kant, 
Schelling or Hegel, or whether it constructs a new ‘metaphysic of Being’ or a 
‘philosophy of spirit’, proves itself to be not merely materially false, as earlier critics 
maintained, but logically untenable and therefore meaningless”. “Materially false” is 
here the translation for inhaltlich falsch, meaning that the content of such philosophy 
was false. Sinnlos is translated here as “meaningless”, not in the sense of not being 
important, but because such philosophy would not make any sense. 
58 Ibid., p. 143: “Since the sentences of logic are tautological and devoid of content, we 
cannot draw inferences from them about what was necessary or impossible in reality. 
Thus the attempt to base metaphysics on pure logic which is chiefly characteristic of 
such a system as Hegel’s, is shown to be unwarranted”. 
59 In Logical Syntax of Language (1934); cf. Friedmann, 2012, p. 3. 
60 In The Old and the New Logic Carnap argues: “Every sentence of science must be 
proved to be meaningful by logical analysis. If it is discovered that this sentence in 
question is either a tautology or a contradiction (negation of a tautology), the statement 
belongs to the domain of logic including mathematics. Alternatively, the sentence has 
factual content, i.e., it is neither tautological nor contradictory; it is then an empirical 
sentence. It is reducible to the given and can, therefore, be discovered, in principle, to be 
either true or false” (1959, p. 145). 
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retrospectively: “My book is about the [...] thesis that is it principally 
possible to reduce all concepts to the immediately given”.61 
In an even more condemning tone, Hans Reichenbach, the leader of 
logical empiricism in Berlin, dedicates his work The Rise of Scientific 
Philosophy (1951) to a final battle with Hegel’s conception of knowledge, 
declaring that “more than any other philosophy, Hegel’s system has 
contributed to the division between scientists and philosophers. It has made 
philosophy an object of derision [Verachtung] from which the scientist 
wishes to keep his course clear”.62 Popper, who formulated the criterion of 
fallibility by experience, was also very hostile to Hegel’s philosophy, 
which he considered in 1945 as nothing less than “totalitarianism” and the 
obstacle to the “open society”. He described Hegel’s philosophy in general 
as “devious” (abwegig).63 However, Popper has articulated criticism of 
naturalistic theory of science,64 which echoes Hegel’s criticisms in some 
points, and which we will discuss later.65 
At this stage in the development of philosophy of science, it seems that, 
on the one hand, the major heads of modern philosophy of science have 
bitterly rejected Hegel without having really read Hegel, while creating an 
anti-Hegelian sky over this field in which no horizon existed from which it 
made sense to consider Hegel as a proper philosopher of science. Hegel’s 
concept of science seems to vanish into oblivion, and its investigation 
threatens to become stuck. On the other hand, the situation that makes the 
                                           
61 Carnap, 1961, p. XVIII. The Original text: “In meinem Buch handelte es sich um die 
[...] These, daß es grundsätzlich möglich sei, alle Begriffe auf das unmittelbar 
Gegebene zurückzuführen”. 
62 Reichenbach, 1951, pp. 72f. 
63 In the second preface for the German second edition of Die Logik der Forschung 
from 1963. 
64  Cf. Popper, 2002, pp. 29ff. 
65 In “2.3.2 Methodological naturalism”. 
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question on Hegel’s forgotten philosophy of science even more urgent is 
that most of the philosophers mentioned above have expressed some 
interest in Hegel’s ideas and have held some positive picture of him. It is 
not just by chance that counter-Hegelian philosophy of science was at the 
same time so inspired by Hegel himself. In light of the previous 
observations, although some post-Hegelian critics diametrically negated 
Hegel’s conception of science and ‘turned it on its head’, it is possible to 
trace in their positions the voice of one thought criticizing itself.66 The 
analytic stream has indeed reviewed its position towards Hegel through 
Willard Van Orman Quine’s critique of Carnap’s logical positivism, of 
Russell’s atomism, as well as of Popper’s falsificationism. In another act of 
patricide within the tragedy of analytic philosophy, Quine’s critique of 
positivistic empiricism made it possible, despite all the significant 
differences to Hegel to be later discussed, to shed some light on the way 
back to Hegel. Thus, the course of modern philosophy of science can be 
conceived as the result of an intense dialogue with Hegel that promoted a 
gradual turning back to his ideas, or rather towards them. The Quinean 
view of science will be presented in Chapter 2. 
In order to examine Hegel’s philosophy of science more closely, it is 
appropriate to consider concrete objections to the claim that philosophy of 
science is indeed to be found in Hegel’s works. 
 
1.3 The concrete research problem 
Given that Hegel’s nonuse of the phrase ‘philosophy of science’ cannot be 
a proof of the lack of philosophy of science in Hegel’s system, and that to 
                                           
66 Roughly, this is also what Wolfgang Welsch suggests in his inaugural lecture in Jena 
“Hegel und die analytische Philosophie: Über einige Kongruenzen in Grundfragen der 
Philosophie” (1999). 
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speak of Hegel’s version of philosophy of science is not necessarily 
anachronistic, we face a more concrete objection to the existence of 
something like philosophy of science in Hegel: the claim that none of 
Hegel’s works contain themes similar to those of philosophy of science. 
This problematic claim seems to attain confirmation in Hegel’s early 
theological manuscripts. It seems that from the beginning of his career, 
Hegel does not just ignore ‘normal’ philosophy of science, but even argues 
against the very project of science. We will thus begin by examining the 
claims that the young Hegel was ‘anti-scientific’. We will go on to deal 
with the claim that his later published works do not contain philosophy of 
science and show to which extent this is only prima facie the case. 
 
1.3.1 The young ‘anti-scientific’ Hegel 
Although in his first productive years until the Phenomenology of Spirit 
(1793-1807) Hegel does not explicitly deal with the question of science, he 
does refer to science more than once. On closer examination of Hegel’s use 
of the term ‘science’, two distinct periods become evident: the young Hegel 
(1793-1801) and the Jena writings (1802-1807). In the latter, Hegel begins 
to discuss issues that will later be relevant for his philosophy of science. In 
“Faith and Knowledge” (1802), he deals with the question of knowledge in 
the light of the objectivity-subjectivity dualism problem. In a book review 
“Gerstäcker’s Deduction of the Concept of Right” (1802), he makes a clear 
distinction between science and the empirical method. Furthermore, in the 
last publication before Phenomenology of Spirit, “The Scientific Ways of 
Treating Natural Law, Its Place in Moral Philosophy, and Its Relation to 
the Positive Sciences of Law” (1802–3), he criticizes both the empirical 
Humean approach as well as the purely formal-transcendental Kantian-
Fichtean approach, claiming that they both miss the right definition of the 
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absolute point of view. Whereas in the second period, Hegel gradually 
begins to approach the issue of science in a rather affirming way, in the 
first period, he mostly deals with the topics of religion, morals, state and 
law; and in the rare occurrences of ‘science’, he seems to be very critical 
about it. In order to clarify what may seem to be Hegel’s peculiar relation 
to science, we shall focus on the first period, which can shed light on the 
development of Hegel’s conception of science. 
The first significant reference to ‘science’ appears in Hegel’s earliest 
essay known to us, “The Tübingen Essay” (1793),67 which reflects on the 
value and necessity of religion to morality. Hegel argues that true religion 
is essentially not a “mere science of God” (bloße Wissenschaft von Gott), 
i.e. not a given set of theological dogmas, something he calls “objective 
religion”. Whereas religion is treated charitably from the first sentence of 
the essay as “one of our greatest concerns in life”, science is presented to us 
in the diminishing phrase: “a mere science”. But in fact, Hegel is criticizing 
a certain conception of science. He argues that if science means to have an 
external object, then religion cannot be such a science since god cannot be 
investigated as such an external object. Still under the influence of leaving 
the Tübingen Seminary, Hegel suggests that theology, the “science of 
God”, ought not to be treated as science about god like in the old 
metaphysics. Rather, he holds that, in contrast to such pseudo-scientific 
theology, only “subjective religion” really matters to the determination of 
the true essence of religion because it has an indispensable value to 
significant issues such as moral sense. True science of religion must be 
                                           
67 This unpublished, unfinished and untitled essay appears in the German edition under 
Fragmente über Volksreligion und Christentum, in English: On the Prospects for a Folk 
Religion, in: Three Essays, 1793–1795. The Tübingen Essay, Berne Fragments, The Life 
of Jesus, ed. and trans. with an Introduction and Notes by P. Fuss and J. Dobbins (Notre 
Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), pp. 30–58. 
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science of the subject, and not of god as a sensual object. Only “subjective 
religion”, which Hegel describes as that which successfully encourages the 
suppression of the sensual desires and so helps to obstruct mere sensuality, 
is capable of entering the “heart” of humans and affecting the morality of 
their actions. Later in his career, Hegel would draw back from this 
overvaluing of the subjective side of morality and criticize the idea of the 
“law of the heart” as clashing with the public dimension of Wirklichkeit. 
Hegel would then emphasize the institutional side of “objective spirit”. 
Parallel to this, he would also withdraw from his undervaluing of science 
and suggest an alternative conception of science. 
As far as we can extract from the rest of this manuscript, science is for 
the young Hegel that which we obtain by naked reason, by “mere reason” 
(bloße Vernunft), for it is nothing more than a “mere historical or deduced 
knowledge” (eine bloße historische oder räsonierte Kenntnis). The 
objectivist concept of science, ‘science about an object’, is in the realm of 
theology a derogatory example of secondary knowledge with lower value 
in comparison to the positive power of religion. In agreement with this, 
Hegel goes on to claim that true wisdom speaks from the “depths of its 
heart” and hence is not such a simple science about an external object. He 
also adds that wisdom is not exactly “enlightenment”, hinting at his critique 
of the problematic interrelation between modern science and 
enlightenment.68 At this point, Hegel grasps the work of such object-
oriented “mere science” as being chiefly about rationalizing through 
proceeding with the mathematical method, which means, commencing with 
concepts, but then continuing only with formal-logical inferences. He 
mockingly mentions the famous scholastic modes of basic inferences 
                                           
68 This critique takes place in the part of this essay entitled “Enlightenment: the will to 
actualize by means of the understanding” (Aufklärung – Wirkenwollen durch Verstand). 
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“Barbara and Barocco” as that which one already learns at elementary 
school. Here it is obvious too that wisdom is of course on the good side, 
whereas the discussed kind of science is on the bad side. Hegel would soon 
develop the possibility to understand science and its purportedly rational 
construction in a completely different way, not based on the mathematical 
method or purely formal inferential schemes, as they both lack any 
substantial relation to the world. 
One significant result of our analysis of Hegel’s initial relation to 
science is the possibility of reading his later discussion on science as his 
critical response to the problematic verständig object-oriented concept of 
science that scholastic theology has promoted. Hegel’s argument is that this 
kind of rationalist theology has blocked the true way towards a vernünftig 
subject-oriented science of god. 
Beyond what seems to be the disparaging use of the term science in the 
early Hegel, there is a difficulty with the example of science he alleges in 
this period. In the essay “Germany’s Constitution” (1799-1801), where 
Hegel refers to the logical-rational structure of science in a more positive 
voice, the science he means is not physics or mathematics, as might be 
expected, but rather Staatsrechtslehre, i.e. the juridical-political “doctrine 
of state law”.69 Since the idea of Staatsrecht (‘state law’), the part of 
Öffentliches Recht (‘public law’) that settles issues between the individual 
and the state, is characteristic of continental law but not common law, it 
can lead to the misinterpretation of the origin of Hegel’s concept of 
science. For Hegel, Staatsrecht embodies an excellent example for a 
rigorously scientific system because it is based on the precise 
Begriffsjurisprudenz and contains one reasonable idea, not just a mere 
                                           
69 Hegel uses the Staatsrecht as a scientific proof for the refutation of the official status 
of Germany as a state in the aftermath of Napoleon’s victory over Prussia, thereby 
deriving conceptual conditions to be fulfilled in order to be designated as a state. 
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empirical description of so-called observational facts. However, with this, 
Hegel still grasps systematic science as syllogistically derived from 
principles, and not, as he would later claim, as categorical Darstellung of 
theoretical reflection on praxis forms. 
It follows that the young Hegel, who enthusiastically expresses ‘pro-
religious’ opinions, is not simply ‘anti-scientific’. Rather, he goes against 
one popular one-sided notion of ‘objective’ science that does not take into 
account the question of the subject of knowledge. In the next chapters we 
will discuss in detail how Hegel develops his concept of science. We turn 
now to the question whether Hegel’s later works contain philosophy of 
science. 
 
1.3.2 Phenomenology of Spirit does not seem to be philosophy of science 
Considering the literary genre and general content of the Phenomenology of 
Spirit, it may appear to have little to do with proper philosophy of science. 
Firstly, although it does not exactly resemble any known kind of fiction, 
poetry or drama, it brings belles-lettres to mind to some: “a very peculiar 
kind of Lesedrama”70, i.e. “closet drama”, a “novel”,71 “a ‘coming of age’ 
novel, a Bildungsroman”72 or “a new version of the divine comedy”.73 
Phenomenology of Spirit is certainly not written in an easily digestible 
language and its literary form is highly original, if not a novelty. It is thus 
difficult to determine whether it fits to any received scientific theory or 
scientific work. 
                                           
70 Dove, 1998, p. 60. 
71 Cf. Pippin, 1991, p. 72. 
72 As Pinkard reports (2002, p. 222). 
73 Ibid. 
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Jean Hyppolite anticipated this problem and contested the belle-lettres 
status of Phenomenology of Spirit, arguing that Hegel does not consider his 
own representation of the development of consciousness as a novel, but 
rather as a scientific work.74 In spite of this very good point, which I would 
like to take up here, Hyppolite does not himself hesitate to mention at least 
two novels as a prototype of Hegel’s text: Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Emile 
and Novalis’ Heinrich von Ofterdingen. His reception has thus continued to 
contribute to the interpretation of Phenomenology of Spirit as some kind of 
prose. In this, he follows the tradition of Georg Lukács who began with 
comparing Phenomenology of Spirit with Heinrich von Ofterdingen and 
Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister and is responsible for the reading of the 
Phenomenology of Spirit as a novel whose main figure is allegedly a 
“supernatural person, the world-spirit”.75 
The demand for any particular literary genre, however, cannot serve as 
an a priori absolute condition for the proper presentation of theoretical 
thought on a certain subject matter. Such thought can be realized in the 
dramatic form of dialogue, as in Plato’s Theaetetus. Like the figure of 
Socrates in the Platonic dialogues, “consciousness”, the main character in 
Phenomenology of Spirit, can be read as confronting others who happen to 
be other forms of itself, i.e. other forms of consciousness.76 Since the 
literary form of a text, in the case where it is indeed a meaningful text and 
not idle talk, cannot alone sufficiently and exclusively determine its 
philosophical topic, the problem of speaking about Hegel’s theory of 
                                           
74 Cf. Hyppolite, 1946, p. 15. 
75 Stekeler, 2014, p. 26. 
76 Stekeler’s dialogical interpretation of the Phenomenology of Spirit takes Hegel’s logic 
of speech acts to be a dialogue between “individual judgment and collective 
knowledge” (2014, p. 17). 
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science in the Phenomenology of Spirit cannot stem mainly from the 
literary aspect. 
Therefore, the second and greater difficulty is that, considering the long 
list of various issues Hegel addresses such as perception, pleasure, 
freedom, morals, religion and art, the project of Phenomenology of Spirit 
does not seem to be “merely epistemological”.77 The Phenomenology of 
Spirit does not seem to contain a “theory of epistemic justification”.78 It 
was argued that the Phenomenology of Spirit is not about epistemology, 
and that this work even goes directly against any epistemology. It attacks 
the very idea of “theory of knowledge” or “epistemology” as absurd, 
because this would be a theory about knowledge that precedes the 
knowledge itself.79 The “Introduction” to Phenomenology of Spirit was 
already read as Hegel’s revolutionary answer to the modern “dilemma of 
epistemology” because “Hegel‘s argument strikes at the heart, not just of 
Kantian epistemology, but of the whole traditional conception of 
epistemology referred to at the beginning of the introduction”.80 Terry 
Pinkard took this approach a step further and stated that, although the 
“Introduction” may look to the modern reader like some “kind” of 
epistemology, Hegel does not elaborate on the common themes of 
philosophy of science and does not deal with any of the usual “problems of 
the evidence of the sense or induction, whether the justifying evidence for 
epistemic claims is ‘internal’ or ‘external’ to consciousness, and similar 
issues”.81 Pinkard stresses that, even in the chapter “Observing Reason”, 
                                           
77 Pippin, 1993, p. 60. 
78 Heidemann, 2008, p. 19. 
79 Solomon, 1983, p. 294. 
80 Norman, 1976, p. 11. 
81 Pinkard, 1994, p. 4. 
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which Pinkard holds to be the main chapter on science, Hegel does not 
dwell on any of the typical themes of philosophy of science: 
 
“He does not discuss scientific method in any real detail, and he does 
not offer any extended philosophical treatment of the problems of 
induction, on questions of theory construction, on the role of theoretical 
terms versus observational terms in scientific theory, on the logic of 
discovery versus the logic of justification”.82 
 
Yet, Hegel does refer to these issues in his own way in the chapters 
“Sense Certainty”, “Observing Reason” and the “Introduction” 
respectively, to which we will turn later. The discussion of the “more 
contemporary” topics of logic of discovery and logic of justification is 
performed by Hegel with the terms “immediacy” and “mediation”; and 
generally, if logic is part of philosophy of science, as Pinkard suggests, 
then we can expect Hegel to deal with it at least in Science of Logic. 
Pinkard’s arguments raise the question of whether Hegel really did not 
address these topics or whether he did so using other possible terminology. 
In Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel obviously does not speak only about the 
concepts of science and knowledge, and so the Phenomenology of Spirit 
does not explicitly set only the question of the demarcation of science or 
the problem of induction. But if we wish to offer a more metascientific 
reading of Hegel, it would be more intelligible to claim that Hegel’s project 
is at least not concerned with the usual features of what is considered 
“contemporary” philosophy of science. 
According to Pinkard, Hegel does not deal with the scientific method 
because he does not want to “dictate” or “prescribe” any method. This is 
                                           
82 Ibid., p. 82. 
 47 
 
perhaps true with regard to the empirical method of natural science, but 
Pinkard adds that Hegel does not even consider the problem of method as a 
philosophical question, because it is something Hegel “leaves” to scientists: 
“the nature of scientific method is best left to the working scientists to 
determine for themselves”.83 This Feyerabendian thesis may sound 
convincing, but it is not clear if it is to be found in this form in Hegel. One 
can rather say that Hegel does not speak about scientific method in any 
conventional way, or as Pinkard says, in the “contemporary” way. In order 
to reinforce his argument, Pinkard argues that Hegel does not “dictate” the 
method or rules for painters in his philosophy of art either. However, one 
should note that Hegel never declared that his own project was to do art or 
to paint, but he did declare it to be scientific. Thus, if we find a claim about 
the scientific method in Hegel, we can say that he thought it as a ‘scientist’; 
and if not as dictation, for it is surely not, then at least in the form of self-
account or self-interpretation, and as such, perhaps as a recommendation. 
Even if one thinks that Hegel did not recommend any scientific method, it 
is not clear why to assert that the issue of scientific method was never an 
object of Hegel’s philosophical investigations. 
Finally, Pinkard claims that Hegel’s philosophy of nature, which 
explores the basic conception of nature “that underlies all scientific 
investigation in the first place”, has nothing to do with philosophy of 
science because it does not “explore the methods and rationality of natural 
science”.84 This is perhaps true in general, but it is very evident that 
Pinkard presupposes here a certain concept of philosophy of science as 
philosophy of empirical natural science which mainly questions the issue of 
“empirical methods”. Indeed, as Hans-Friedrich Fulda already noted, the 
                                           
83 Ibid., p. 83. 
84 Pinkard, 2000, p. 566. 
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legitimate question about Hegel’s epistemology remains confusing and 
unanswered: “To what kind of epistemological question did Hegel dedicate 
his introductory Phenomenology? It seems to me that a good answer to this 
question, one that clarifies the program of the work, requires a more 
complex approach than those that have been pursued so far.”85 
 
1.3.3 The Logic does not seem to be philosophy of science 
Commonly, logic is taken to be the science that questions categories of 
thinking, the essence of language, and the question of truth. It is not taken 
to be the same activity as theorizing science. Therefore, Hegel’s Logic, 
both the great one, Science of Logic, and the small one in the 
Encyclopaedia, does not seem to be sufficient for proper philosophy of 
science. This claim can be reinforced by the very term epistemology, which 
is, as the logic of the episteme, a more specific determination of logic and 
thereby formally counts only as one realm of logic. This is Popper’s basic 
perspective. According to it, any inquiry into the essence of science – be it 
methodological or epistemological – vastly differs from any pure logic 
such that “it would be hardly suitable to place an inquiry into method on 
the same level as a purely logical inquiry”.86 Popper regards the inquiry 
into science as altering and “without end”, unlike the logic which is “finally 
verified”, i.e. axiomatic. Also for Hegel logic is some kind of “ground” for 
the “real” sciences in his system in the Encylopaedia, but the logic is 
essentially an altering science, not simply axiomatic. Popper argues so 
because, unlike Hegel, he compares the idea of “inquiry” with that of 
“game” and so conceives of “method” as “rules of the game”, while 
                                           
85 Fulda, 2008, p. 23. 
86 Popper, 2002, p. 32. 
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speaking of the “rules of the game of science”.87 For Popper, hypotheses 
within the inquiry into science, unlike those within pure logic, must be 
“testable” and “falsifiable”. For our question, we can draw on the way he 
summarizes the difference between logic and philosophy of science – or in 
our context, between logic and Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit – as 
follows: “Although logic may perhaps set up criteria for deciding whether a 
statement is testable, it certainly is not concerned with the question whether 
anyone exerts himself to test it”.88 For Hegel, on the contrary, logic is the 
scientific method per se. 
In this vein, against the claim that Hegel’s Logic contains a general 
philosophy of science, one can argue that it only presents one science 
among others within Hegel’s greater system, next to the “sciences of the 
real” (Realwissenschaften): “science of nature” and “science of spirit”. In 
this way, the Logic seems to present only the “pure science” of 
Denkbestimmungen, based on the “pure knowledge” or “absolute 
knowledge”, which is the product of the Phenomenology of Spirit and is 
free of the subject-object dualism of consciousness. Leaving out the role of 
consciousness for science construction, Hegel’s Logic does not seem to be 
able to replace philosophy of science. 
 
1.4. Transition: Hegel’s “theory of knowledge” and “theory of science” 
In spite of the circumstances described in the last section that seem to 
impede the affirmation of philosophy of science in Hegel’s works, it is 
attestable that Hegel does not neglect the treatment of the notion of science. 
He does not see it as superfluous or preposterous. The Phenomenology of 
Spirit was envisioned by Hegel as the first part in the “System of Science”, 
                                           
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. 
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containing the outlines of his conception of science, mainly in its “Preface” 
and “Introduction”. As a result, there are several Hegel scholars who assert 
that he clearly develops a version of philosophy of science, including 
theory of knowledge, i.e. epistemology. We turn now our attention to them. 
To begin with, Pinkard, who generally negates that Hegel deals with the 
contemporary themes of philosophy of science, rightly holds that 
Phenomenology of Spirit is concerned with “theory of knowledge”, or as he 
puts it, “with how the kinds of knowledge-claims that we make can be said 
to match up with the objects that they purport to be about”.89 The task of 
such a theory is to find a ground for all knowledge in the form of a self-
certifying idea against skepticism. This task can be described as evaluating 
what “can count as authoritative reasons” and whether those reasons are 
truly authoritative.90 Some characterize Hegel’s epistemology as “non-
Cartesian”, i.e. as non-dualist,91 and as “circular”, i.e. as object-thought-
circular, or being-thought-circular.92 Kenneth Westphal describes Hegel’s 
forgotten and unrecognized theory of knowledge in the Phenomenology of 
Spirit as “socio-historically based epistemological realism”.93 He explains 
the reason for the doubt about the existence of such a thing as Hegel’s 
epistemology in the following way: “one reason Hegel's epistemology has 
gone unrecognized is that philosophers have too often supposed that 
combining realism with a social and historical epistemology is 
impossible”.94 Westphal’s useful insight is as follows: 
                                           
89 Pinkard, 1994, p. 3. 
90 Ibid., p. 5. 
91 Cf. Rockmore, 1986, vii; Westphal, 2003, pp. 4, 38: Limnatis, 2008, p. 1. 
92 Cf. Rockmore, 1986, vii: Limnatis, 2008, p. 1. 
93 Westphal, 2003, p. 64. Kenneth Westphal has already formulated this view in 
“Hegel’s Epistemological Realism: A Study of the Aim and Method of Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit” (1989). 
94 Westphal, 2003, p. 2; see also p. 51.  
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“So long as philosophers remain convinced that their thinking is sui 
generis, and not indebted to their intellectual inheritance, they will 
resist at any cost acknowledging the social dimensions of human 
knowledge, and also the value of Hegel's epistemology”.95 
 
The belief in a stark dichotomy between reason and tradition as in the 
Enlightenment, so Westphal, prevents an understanding of Hegel’s 
epistemology. At the same time, one has to be careful not to relapse, like 
Westphal almost does, into relativistic historicism, holding a mere identity 
between reason and tradition. As Westphal rightly argues, Hegel’s 
epistemology goes against the Kantian conception of the absolute a-
historicity of knowledge. The key thesis of Hegel’s epistemology is his 
idea of justification through internal critique of the opposed views,96 i.e. 
self-criticism of self-consciousness without escaping the conceptual 
scheme, which is corrigible.97 This is his solution to the dilemma of the 
criterion of truth; that is, his response to ancient skepticism as well as to 
Kantian skepticism.98 
In his latest Dialogical Commentary (2014), Pirmin Stekeler considers 
Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit as philosophy of science, reminding us 
that the framework of the Phenomenology of Spirit is Hegel’s preliminary 
work on his Wissenschaftslehre.99 Stekeler reads the Phenomenology of 
Spirit as an “analysis of the real-forms (Realformen) of knowledge”100 
                                           
95 Ibid., p. 90. 
96 Ibid., p. 91. 
97 Ibid., p. 75. 
98 Ibid., p. 38. 
99 Stekeler, 2014, p. 29: “Die Phänomenologie des Geistes entstand bekanntlich im 
Rahmen von Hegels Vorarbeiten zu einer Logik oder Wissenschaftslehre”. 
100 Stekeler, 2014, p. 19. 
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which aims at “the knowledge of what knowledge is”.101 He formulates the 
interrelation between Wissen and Wissenschaft in Hegel as follows: 
“Hegel’s analysis of consciousness leads thus to science through 
knowledge and aims at knowledge about knowledge. The guide question is 
how knowledge is differentiated from subjective certainty. The answer is: 
through the institution of scientific examination of the validity claims”.102 
In order to know what knowledge and science are, one needs to perform a 
kind of Hegelian “logical-phenomenological analysis of categorical forms 
of expression”.103 On this view, it is possible to attest that Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit is philosophy of science insofar as this work of 
dialectics aims at a progressive notion of science qua self-knowledge that 
refers to the subjecthood of the whole person as a possible object of 
knowledge.104 
Stekeler’s earlier interpretation of Hegel’s Logic as general theory of 
science in Hegel’s analytische Philosophie (1992) marks a turning point in 
the self-conscious reception of an explicit Hegelian philosophy of science, 
as he establishes: 
 
“Hegel’s ‘speculative’ logic, in distinction from the rules of the 
classical logic of the Aristotelian tradition and in certain respect from 
the post-Fregean tradition, is essentially metalogic, a kind of general 
                                           
101 Ibid., p. 31: “das Wissen darüber, was Wissen ist”. 
102 Ibid., p. 51: “Hegels Analyse des Bewusstseins führt also über das Wissen zur 
Wissenschaft und zielt auf ein Wissen über das Wissen. Leitfrage ist, wie sich Wissen 
von subjektiver Gewissheit unterscheidet. Antwort ist: durch die Institution 
wissenschaftlicher Prüfung der Geltungsansprüche”. 
103 Stekeler, 2014, p. 19: “Wenn wir [...] wirklich wissen wollen, was Wissen, 
Wissenschaft und Selbstbestimmung ist, dann bedarf es einer logisch-
phänomenologischen Analyse von kategorialen Ausdrucksformen”. 
104 Cf. ibid., p. 241: “Die Phänomenologie des Geistes ist eben damit auch 
Wissenschaftsphilosophie”. 
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metascience. It does not differ in its purpose from a modern general 
theory of science and critique of knowledge”.105 
 
In addition, he argues that Hegel’s “Philosophy of Nature” includes 
“science theory of natural science” (Wissenschaftstheorie der 
Naturwissenschaften) and that his “Philosophy of Spirit” includes “science 
doctrine of the humanities” (Wissenschaftslehre der 
Humanwissenschaften).106 As Stekeler explains, the difficulty in 
understanding Hegel’s speculative sentences is caused by the reifying 
subject-predicate structure of our sentences, which falsely tempts us to 
think that the categories are transcendental objects, whereas Hegel does not 
present us with laws of thought, but with analysis and critique of meaning, 
i.e. with Sinnanalyze and Sinnkritik. Hegel’s categories are not limited 
horoi, but “titles-like syntactic-semantic forms” whose ways of use are 
open and can be further developed.107 
In our investigation, we would like to take up the points that Stekeler, 
Westphal and Pinkard make about Hegel’s notion of science, along with 
the relevant epistemological considerations, and look for the basic features 
of Hegel’s general theory of science in its relation to contemporary 
thought. One of the most prevalent views in contemporary Hegelian 
research, and the main phenomenon in Hegel’s contemporary reception, is 
ascribing naturalism to Hegel’s philosophy of science. In the next chapter 
we will analyze this phenomenon, its roots, consequences and meaning. 
                                           
105 Stekeler, 1992, 40: “Hegel’s ‘spekulative’ Logik ist im Unterschied zu den Regeln 
der klassischen Logik der aristotelischen und in gewisser Weise auch der nach-
Fregeschen Tradition wesentlich Metalogik, ja allgemeine Metawissenschaft. Sie 
unterscheidet sich in ihrer Zielsetzung nicht von einer modernen allgemeinen 
Wissenschaftstheorie und Wissenskritik”. 
106 Ibid., p. 58. 
107 Ibid., pp. 40f. 
 2. The debate on Hegel’s naturalism 
After arriving at the conclusion that Hegel does indeed develop some kind 
of philosophy of science, we turn now to the question of whether his 
philosophy of science corresponds to naturalism. Given that naturalism is 
one of the most prevalent conceptions in philosophy of science, and even 
the official ideology of current Anglophone philosophy,1 as “nearly 
everybody nowadays wants to be a ‘naturalist’”,2 it is no wonder that there 
are already many Hegel scholars who ascribe naturalism to Hegel’s 
philosophy of science and epistemology.3 This chapter attempts to examine 
in what sense we can appropriately speak of Hegel’s naturalism by 
presenting the ongoing dialogue between Hegelian thought and the 
naturalistic approach. It includes an investigation of Hegel’s concept of 
nature that should shed some light on the question of Hegel’s relation to 
naturalistic epistemology. 
                                           
1 Cf. Kim, 2003, p. 84: “If current philosophy can be said to have a philosophical 
ideology, it is, unquestionably, naturalism. Philosophical naturalism has guided and 
constrained analytic philosophy as its reigning creed from much of the twentieth 
century”. As Jaegwon Kim shows, the trend of naturalism can be traced back to the 
American philosophers John Dewey, Sidney Hook and Ernest Nagel, who, among 
others, published in 1944 the manifesto Naturalism and the Human Spirit. 
2 Papineau, 1993, p. 1. 
3 The main works involved in the naturalism debate in the last three decades to be 
mentioned in the following are: DeVries, Hegel’s Theory of Mental Activity. An 
Introduction to Theoretical Spirit (1988); Beiser, “Introduction: Hegel and the Problem 
of Metaphysics” (1993), German Idealism: The Struggle against Subjectivism, 1781–
1801 (2002); Westphal, Hegel’s Epistemology: A Philosophical Introduction to the 
Phenomenology of Spirit (2003); Redding, Analytic Philosophy and the Return of the 
Hegelian Thought (2007); Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy: Rational Agency as 
Ethical Life (2008); Papazoglou, “Hegel and Naturalism” (2012); Pinkard, Hegel’s 
Naturalism: Mind, Nature and the Final Ends of Life (2012); Tesla, “Hegel's Naturalism 
or Soul and Body in the Encyclopaedia” (2013). 
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2.1 Hegel’s ‘naturalistic turn’ 
There is an observable increasing tendency to read Hegel “as a great 
naturalist”4 whose philosophy is generally consistent with certain kinds of 
naturalism. The naturalistic reading benevolently seeks to defend Hegel, 
notably his scientific soundness, from being diagnosed as metaphysical, 
religious or theistic, and hence from being seriously doubtable. It was thus 
argued that Hegel’s “apparent indulgence in metaphysics” is actually “a 
form of scientific naturalism”5 that involves “a much greater degree of 
naturalism” than, for example, Kant’s idealism.6 Hegel’s philosophy of 
spirit, in particular his psychology, was presented as “deeply naturalist”.7 
Even where “hard” or “bald” naturalism in Hegel was rejected, we still find 
assertions that his concept of nature “is that of disenchanted Aristotelian 
naturalism”8 and that his epistemology contains “naturalist elements”9 and 
a “naturalistic dimension”.10 
The preoccupation with Hegel’s naturalism is continuous and in full 
swing. The naturalistic turn in Hegel’s reception, which corresponds to the 
general intensification of naturalism, gives rise to the question of Hegel’s 
position towards naturalism. In this debate, everything depends on what is 
meant by “naturalism”. We will begin with a preliminary answer resulting 
from the wide semantic content of the term naturalist and then look more 
closely at other exemplary responses. 
 
                                           
4 DeVries, 1988, p. xii. 
5 Beiser, 1993, p. 8.  
6 Beiser, 2002, p. 3, 355. 
7 Westphal, 2003, p. 55. 
8 Pinkard, 2012, p. 19. 
9 Westphal, 2003, p. 52. 
10 Redding, 2007, p. 234. 
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2.2 Hegel as a naturalist: nature lover and natural historian 
If to be a naturalist means to be a scholar who is engaged in the study of 
nature, then, in some respects, Hegel can be considered a naturalist. Like 
most of the canonical modern philosophers, from Descartes to Spinoza, 
from Leibniz to Kant, Hegel extensively deals in his writings with the 
question of nature. Hegel’s occupation with nature culminates in the 
dedication of no less than one-third of the Encyclopaedia (1817) to 
“Philosophy of Nature”. His studies of nature are already presented in the 
early drafts in the Jenaer Systementwürfe (1803–6) as well as in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) where he develops conceptual issues 
regarding natural laws and natural powers. 
In the traditional sense of the term naturalist, this term indeed refers to a 
natural historian, a person who studies historia naturalis (Naturgeschichte), 
i.e. the observational study of plants and animals, a branch of the general 
natural study (Naturforschung). In this sense, Hegel was a naturalist, 
because for a period of time, as his Biographer notes, Hegel conducted 
empirical researches on nature: “In 1802 and 1803, Hegel began to 
assemble clippings concerning natural science from various journals and 
newspapers, and he returned intensively to one of his earlier interests as a 
schoolboy in Stuttgart, the study of physics and mathematics”.11 This old 
love had borne fruit: in 1804, the same year Hegel was elected to the 
Westphalia Society for Natural Research, he had become an assessor of the 
Jena Mineralogical Society, and due to that appointment, he was issued a 
pass for a trip to Göttingen and the Harz mountains for geological study.12 
Apparently as a consequence of this, Hegel identified himself in the title 
page of the Phenomenology of Spirit as a practicing mineralogist, namely 
                                           
11 Pinkard, 2000, p. 186. 
12 Cf. Verene, 1998, p. 209. 
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“Dr. and Professor of Philosophy in Jena, Member of the Ducal 
Mineralogical Society, Assessor to the Society and Member of other 
learned societies”. In this respect, Hegel was a dedicated lover of nature. 
Yet, perhaps since Hegel performed natural studies for only a few 
years, the authors involved in the naturalism debate do not consider Hegel 
as a naturalist because of his love of nature or his inquiry into natural 
history, but because of having certain naturalist views in his philosophy of 
science.13 Studying nature, irrespective of the method, is not a sufficient 
condition for subscribing to naturalism, and so a consideration of the 
versions of naturalism that can be ascribed to Hegel is necessary for our 
inquiry. Let us begin with naturalism in general and the versions of 
naturalism to which Hegel evidently is not inclined. 
 
2.3 Refutation of naturalism in Hegel 
One of the main problems in the naturalism debate is that it has become 
commonplace to claim that naturalism is an indefinable and vague term. 
Even among self-announced naturalists it looks like it became a rule not to 
define it, as Hilary Putnam ironicized it.14 In the following I will outline a 
preliminary definition for naturalism that will be later refined. In general, 
all sorts of naturalism stand for an approach in thought that gives priority to 
the natural, confines itself to it and concentrates on it depending each time 
on what it conceives as the natural. In Hegelian terms, naturalism would be 
a recurring default basic shape of an undeveloped consciousness that 
immediately takes its objects to be essentially other than itself. The 
                                           
13 Pinkard and Verene, who tell us about Hegel’s natural study, do not call him a 
‘naturalist’ on that account: Verene does not mention the term and Pinkard even argues 
that Hegel’s drafts from 1802–1806 rather show that Hegel “needed a non-reductionist 
and non-naturalist account of the genesis of spirit out of nature” (2002, p. 187).  
14 In his essay “The Content and Appeal of ‘Naturalism’” (Putnam, 2004, p. 59). 
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definition of naturalism in the glossary of The Philosophy of Science 
includes both the ontological and methodological aspects: naturalism is 
“the view that all phenomena are subject to natural laws, and/or that the 
methods of the natural sciences are applicable in every area of inquiry”.15 
One special case of methodological naturalism to be later discussed is the 
epistemological naturalism which regards science as grounded in natural 
phenomena and therefore epistemology as an empirical natural science. 
Our question is whether Hegel adopts ontological, methodological or 
epistemological naturalism. 
 
2.3.1 Ontological naturalism 
In its broadest sense, ontological naturalism – also called metaphysical, 
philosophical or classical naturalism – is descriptive and holds that all is 
nature; that is, the being as a whole is equivalent with nature and hence all 
entities are natural, including the human mind. The mitigated form of 
ontological naturalism articulates that the whole of reality, i.e. the whole 
cosmos or universe, is exhausted by what nature is and subjected to 
nature’s laws. Such monist pan-naturalism is at least as old as the moment 
Thales of Miletus formulated his principle of hydor, arguing that 
everything that exists consists out of the same moist natural substance. This 
widespread stance has been restored, upheld and renewed in modern times 
by David Hume and the French materialists around Paul-Henri Thiry 
D’Holbach. Several forms of this classical naturalism still enjoy popularity, 
for instance, in the works of Daniel Dennett and Paul Churchland under the 
title ‘eliminative materialism’. 
                                           
15 By Boyd, R., Gasper, P., and Trout, J. D.A. Cited by Putnam (2004, p. 60). 
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It is agreed among Hegel scholars, who take Hegel to be some kind of 
naturalist, that Hegel is “not a total naturalist”.16 Hegel cannot be said to 
subscribe to such reductive naturalism,17 as he rejects that “everything 
ideal, normative and formal is explicable according to laws of nature”.18 It 
is taken to be trivial that “Hegel pits himself against naturalistic approaches 
of a physicalist, reductionist or eliminativist type”.19 It is indeed plausible 
to claim that Hegel did not identify his philosophy with classical 
naturalism, which he saw as embodied in Spinozism. 
However, the negation of classical naturalism in Hegel has a rhetorical 
role in the naturalistic argumentation, namely to prepare the ground for the 
affirmation of other kinds of naturalism in Hegel. All the authors that 
suggest some kind of naturalism in Hegel open their argument with 
convincingly repudiating any kind of “hard” naturalism in Hegel. At the 
same time, no author in the Hegel debate provides us with references to 
Hegel’s own words on naturalism, let alone commentary on them. Hegel’s 
reaction against classical naturalism had sunk into oblivion to the extent 
that it seems that “Hegel never explicitly talks about naturalism in his 
writings”.20 It was forgotten that Hegel uses this term several times and 
even expands on it, always in a pejorative context and while clearly taking 
a stance against it. The significant cases that are of interest here will be 
shortly outlined. 
Hegel belittles naturalism for the first time in his withering assessment 
of Schulze’s philosophical system. The latter is nothing more than a “mere 
                                           
16 DeVries, 1988, p. xii. 
17 Cf. Pippin, 2008, p. 33. 
18 Beiser, 2002, p. 598, note 4. 
19 Tesla, 2013, p. 35. 
20 Papazoglou, 2012, p. 74. 
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naturalism [...] with artificially inlaid formulas”.21 In his empiricism 
critique in the Encyclopaedia Logic, Hegel supplies a still-pertinent basic 
determination of naturalism, arguing that “the consistent system of 
empiricism is materialism, or naturalism. – Kant’s philosophy sets the 
principle of thinking and of freedom in strict opposition to this 
empiricism”.22 Kant himself also disparages naturalism, namely as pre-
philosophical “pure misology”.23 Hegel defines classical naturalism more 
precisely in his interpretation of Vanini’s naturalism in the Lectures on 
History of Philosophy as the belief “that it is Nature that is the Deity, that 
all thing have a mechanical genesis”.24 Vanini “explained the whole 
universe in its connection by efficient causes alone, not by final causes”.25 
Hegel’s definition of Spinozistic naturalism may seem today to the reader 
to be irrelevant for the naturalism debate because one does not associate 
naturalism with pantheism, but this definition does expose one of the old 
roots of the still-existing logical problem in the very concept of naturalism: 
its totality-claim. To underline his objection to naturalism, Hegel derides 
the “superficial” and “dull” works of French materialists and naturalists, 
such as D’Holbach’s The System of Nature.26 It is difficult not to hear the 
anti-naturalistic critique and the mockery. 
In contrast to these clear reservations, there is only one place where 
Hegel seems to praise naturalism, claiming that it has overcome the 
                                           
21 In a book review in his and Schelling’s Critical Journal of Philosophy from 1802. 
The original text: “bloßer Naturalismus, mit [...] Formeln künstlich eingefaßt” (2/279). 
22 Hegel, 1991, p. 107, § 60; 8/145. 
23 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 883: “reine Misologie”. 
24 Hegel, 1995b, p. 139; 20/41. 
25 Ibid. 
26 20/294: “Die Gedanken sind sehr oberflächlich, le grand tout de la nature ist das 
Letzte; das ganze wiederholt sich auf allgemeine Weise, die Darstellung ist matt”. 
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“positive element in religion”.27 By “religion” Hegel means any dogmatic 
doctrine which is based on absolute faith, not on the “negative” element of 
thinking. Herewith, Hegel recognizes the value of historical naturalism as a 
possible cognitive stance within the wide system of philosophical attempts. 
However, immediately after his positive words, Hegel sharply denounces 
the same naturalism for its three mistakes: misidentifying the absolute as 
something present, denying natural and spiritual purposiveness, hence 
freedom, and only reaching to insufficient dead abstractions of “a nature 
undetermined in itself, to sensation, mechanism, self-seeking, and utility”.28 
The last reproach is undoubtedly Hegel’s most intensive attack on the basic 
view of naturalism. 
In view of such strident criticisms, a naturalistic reading that completely 
ignores Hegel’s own thoughts on naturalism paradoxically shows a much 
more historicist attitude than it would wish. This anti-philosophical gestalt 
of thought historicizes the meaning of the word ‘naturalism’ in Hegel’s 
time to the ridiculous degree that any judgment on Hegel’s relation to 
naturalism must ignore, from the beginning, Hegel’s words on the topic, or 
otherwise risk “anachronism”.29 But this would be absurd because any 
meaningful reading of older philosophical texts would be made almost 
impossible. The strongly historicizing view presumes that Hegel 
necessarily reflected on a historical variant concept of naturalism, allegedly 
totally different from ours and hence outmoded or obsolete. Fully 
disregarding, however, direct textual findings concerning Hegel’s words on 
naturalism would prevent us from scientifically reaching Hegel’s text as an 
object to which we can turn if we would like to prove or comment on what 
Hegel says. With the historicist objection in mind, and aiming at 
                                           
27 Hegel, 1995b, p. 384; 20/291. 
28 Ibid., p. 385; 20/291f. 
29 Cf. Papazoglou, 2012, p. 74. 
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minimizing the risk of anachronism, the further question arises as to what 
other kinds of naturalism Hegel would reject. 
 
2.3.2 Methodological naturalism 
Methodological naturalism is the result of the modern empiricist critique of 
scientific methodology: it regards the empirical methods of natural science, 
like observation, sense data analysis, experiments and statistics, as the only 
proper way to true knowledge. Methodological naturalism has thus a 
prescriptive character, not merely descriptive, and it is commonly 
considered to be an obligatory attitude in science: objects worthy of 
scientific investigation must be examinable by strictly empirical tools. 
It is generally evident that, besides in his short time as a natural 
historian, Hegel did not employ such empirical methods in his philosophy, 
perhaps with the exception of the phenomenological Zusehen, his own 
version of observation. In spite of this, there is one passage in the 
“Philosophy of Nature” which is brought forward as conclusive proof for 
the empirical naturalistic element in Hegel’s thought:30 “Not only must 
philosophy be in agreement with our empirical knowledge of Nature, but 
the origin and the formation of the Philosophy of Nature presupposes and 
is conditioned by physics”.31 Without any context, these words seem to 
incriminate Hegel as a confirmed methodological naturalist, as Pinkard 
rightly notes.32 However, as we understand from the rest of the text, this 
statement only goes to show that Hegel does not affirm a principal collision 
between “philosophy” and our “experience of nature”, our Naturerfahrung, 
which is somewhat mistakenly rendered in Miller’s translation as “our 
                                           
30 Cf. Westphal, 2003, p. 52. 
31 Hegel, 1970, p. 6, § 246 note; 9/15. 
32 Cf. Pinkard, 2012, p. 19. 
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empirical knowledge of Nature”. Hegel describes the process of human 
experience, and a fortiori the process of knowledge, as also involving 
conceptual rational elements, even if physicists are unaware of them as 
such. Therefore, Hegel’s main critique is that the empirical natural sciences 
are not as empirical as they maintain because they use a priori methods like 
mathematics and logic. He ironically comments: “the principal charge to be 
brought against physics is that it contains much more thought than it admits 
and is aware of, and that it is better than it supposes itself to be; or if, 
perhaps, all thought in physics is to be counted a defect, than it is worse 
than it supposes itself to be”.33 
Thus, in spite of the usual self-understanding of empirical knowledge as 
going beyond logical-philosophical knowledge, Stekeler argues that one of 
Hegel’s core insights into the status of science is that in effect “the sciences 
do not collect empirical facts, but rather develop the conceptual realm, the 
forms of demonstration and theories. They thus work on the verbalization 
and schematization of general knowledge, general – especially in regard of 
time”.34 Hegel does not think that the physicists or the mathematicians can 
fully explicate the general content of all the concepts used in their science. 
In this, Hegel brings to mind Aristotle, who integrates in his inquiry of the 
being as being the investigation of the axioms of the particular sciences, 
including mathematics, as the task of the “first philosophy”. Sensing the 
mereological fallacy resulting from the pretensions of natural sciences to 
answer what nature is, Aristotle argues: 
 
                                           
33 Hegel, 1970, p. 3 “Introduction”; 9/11. 
34 Stekeler, 2014, p. 50: “[D]ie Wissenschaften sammeln gar keine empirischen Fakten, 
sondern entwickeln eher das Begriffliche, die Darstellungsformen und Theorien. Sie 
arbeiten also an der Versprachlichung und Schematisierung von allgemeinen, 
insbesondere zeitallgemeinen Wissen”. 
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“For this reason no one who is pursuing a particular inquiry – neither a 
geometrician nor an arithmetician – attempts to state whether they are 
true or false; but some of the physicists did so, quite naturally; for they 
alone professed to investigate nature as a whole, and Being. But 
inasmuch as there is a more ultimate type of thinker than the natural 
philosopher (for nature is only a genus of Being), the investigation of 
these axioms too will belong to the universal thinker who studies the 
primary reality”.35 
 
Beyond this ancient criticism, but in connection herewith, Hegel argues 
that the “finite” nature depicted by natural sciences is not the whole or the 
absolute that one looks for, so that one ought not to accept the results of the 
natural sciences as the absolute idea.36 As Pinkard has shown in his 
excellent analysis, for Hegel, the philosophy of infinite spirit explicates the 
essence of nature even better than philosophy of nature.37 Before him, 
Brandom claimed something very similar and weighty in saying that: “[t]he 
deployment of the vocabulary of the natural sciences (like that of any other 
vocabulary) is itself a cultural phenomenon, something that becomes 
intelligible only within the conceptual horizon provided by the 
Geisteswissenschaften”.38 It was thus justly argued that Hegel only 
demands from philosophy some kind of compatibility with natural science, 
but certainly not identity, for natural science is just a presupposition in the 
                                           
35 Aristotle, Metaphysics, book 4, 1005 a40–50. 
36 Pinkard also claim this (Cf. Pinkard, 2012, pp. 19ff), only that he sets Hegel’s critique 
of natural science against Aristotle, whom he unquestioningly regards as the naturalist 
per se. Pinkard also argues that “Hegel has no quarrel with the natural sciences”, while 
Hegel, beyond stressing the use of concepts in empirical research, does attack scientific 
theories, e.g., Newton’s theory of gravitation and vulcanism vs. neptunism in geology. 
37 Cf. Pinkard, 2012, pp. 20f. 
38 Brandom, 2000, p. 33. 
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sense of a starting point for philosophy.39 Finally, Hegel considers the 
‘being on-the-way’ towards truth, i.e. the philosophical ‘meta-hodos’, to be 
neither natural-empirical nor mathematical, but purely logical, while 
describing in the Phenomenology of Spirit the knowledge from merely 
sensual experience as having “the most abstract and poorest truth”.40 In the 
Encyclopaedia Logic we find a similar formulation regarding the category 
of pure being as “the poorest and the most abstract one of all”.41 
There is a particular epistemological version of methodological 
naturalism which takes empirical natural science to be the only proper way 
to true knowledge of knowledge. This version is significant to our guide 
question concerning Hegelian philosophy of science and therefore I will 
dwell on it in the next section. As Popper rightly argues, methodological 
naturalism is “uncritical” insofar as it positivistically takes the human 
experience to be a “programme, not a problem”, while presupposing the 
meaning of the terms science and scientist.42 Such naturalism is thus led to 
regard epistemology itself as a “study of the actual behaviour of scientists” 
and so to become doxastic epistemological naturalism, and we would add, à 
la Quine. 
Quine is certainly one of the most influential philosophers in the 
twentieth century and some of his topics are related to Hegel’s. In fact, they 
                                           
39 Cf. Papazuglou, 2012, p. 23. Yet, citing Hegel directly from Pinkard while ignoring 
Pinkard's critique, Papazuglou reproaches Pinkard for not understanding the citation and 
falsely holding Hegel to be a Quinean naturalist – exactly what Pinkard rejects. 
40 Hegel, 1977, p. 58; 3/82. 
41 Hegel, 1991, p. 99, § 51; 8/136. 
42 Popper, 2002, pp. 30f. Popper criticizes the fact that positivistic naturalists “see 
empirical science as a system of statements which satisfy certain logical criteria, such 
as meaningfulness or verifiability” (ibid., p. 28), and in this sense, Hegel can be 
considered a naturalist too. Popper adds, though, that positivistic naturalists reject in 
empirical science the “susceptibility to revision”, i.e. criticizability, and regard non-
empirical science as “meaningless” or “nonsense”, a view which is certainly not 
Hegelian. 
 66 
 
opened a door to the renewed interest in Hegel’s philosophy for 
contemporary philosophy, namely through the critique of the myth of the 
given by Wilfrid Sellars, one of his students. This interest is reflected in the 
Pittsburgh School of John McDowell and Robert Brandom. I will attempt 
to show that some of Quine’s epistemological conceptions have found their 
way to some of the contemporary interpretations of Hegel’s philosophy of 
science. This influence of Quine’s naturalistic-pragmatic epistemology on 
some of Hegel’s interpreters remains veiled and inexplicit. The problem 
with ignoring this influence is that some of Quine’s theses represent, at the 
same time, a clear opposition to Hegel. We will therefore begin by 
clarifying the relations between the core ideas of Quinean naturalism and 
the main features of Hegelian philosophy of science. 
 
2.3.3 Epistemological naturalism 
It is worth comparing Quine’s approach to epistemology with Hegel’s as it 
was Quine who helped, in a certain sense, to make Hegel’s return possible 
in Anglophone philosophy in the twentieth century. Quine’s holism 
influenced the views of Richard Rorty and Wilfrid Sellars, who were the 
first to speak of Hegel with much respect in the tradition of analytic 
philosophy, thus bringing Hegelianism back to life once again. Before the 
analysis of Quinean naturalism and the discussion of whether Hegel 
promotes it or not, it is important to note that Quine’s philosophy does have 
some elements in common with Hegel’s. Quine’s essay “Two Dogmas of 
Empiricism” (1951) marks a turning point in the history of analytic 
philosophy, precisely because it goes against two clearly Anti-Hegelian 
projects: Russell’s logical atomism and Carnap’s logical positivism. In this 
essay, Quine explicitly aims at reaching “a blurring of the supposed 
 67 
 
boundary between speculative metaphysics and natural science”43 by 
suggesting what appeared to be Hegelian semantic holism: “The unit of 
empirical significance is the whole of science”.44 Quine, who was more 
informed in the foundations of logic than physics, broke with his teacher 
Carnap and his Kantian anti-metaphysical commitment to mathematics as a 
foundation for empirical science, while, in a way, turning Helmholtz on his 
head. The relation between Quine and Carnap can be thus roughly 
compared with that of Hegel and Kant. Quine himself acknowledged 
idealistic influences in his critical conception of the notion45 and mentioned 
Hegel’s conception of truth, embodied in his dictum “the true is the 
whole”, as a “message” he appreciates.46 Brandom even finds an explicit 
affinity between Hegel and Quine: “it was the young Hegel who first 
appreciated the line of reasoning, made familiar to us by Quine in ‘Two 
Dogmas’”.47 It is thus worth rethinking the relation of the two thinkers in 
order to achieve a deeper understanding of the question of knowledge of 
knowledge. In what follows, the relevant features of Quinean naturalism 
are presented along with Hegel’s possible response. 
 
                                           
43 Quine, 1951, p. 20. 
44 Ibid., p. 42. 
45 Cf. Quine, 1960, p. 67. 
46 Cf. Quine, 1987, p. 28; cited also in Welsch (2003, p. 15) who names Schuldenfrei’s 
essay “Quine in Perspective” as affirming an analogy between Hegel and Quine, as well 
as Quine’s mentor, Burton Dreben, who is mentioned by Schuldenfrei as someone who 
can reassert this connection. 
47 Brandom, 1994, p. 92. Cited by Welsch (2003, p. 15). Quine’s line of reasoning, 
however, does not lead directly to Hegel’s view of knowledge, as we shall see. 
 68 
 
2.3.3.1 The psychologistic approach: science as a natural phenomenon 
(Quine) 
Quine’s general argument is that the human knowing subject is naturally 
embodied, and for that reason, knowledge itself grounds in empirically 
examinable natural phenomena. His conclusion is that epistemology should 
be pursued as a natural empirical science. The question arises as to what 
epistemology is according to Quine, and whether Hegel shares this thought. 
Quine defines epistemology as the study of “the foundations of 
science”, i.e. of how to “reduce” science to a more evidential knowledge.48 
He suggests, however, that epistemology should ground “natural 
knowledge” on “sense experience”.49 While doing so, Quine merely 
presupposes that “sense experience” is nothing other than the observation-
enabling neural process of perception: “it is simply the stimulation of our 
sensory receptors that are best looked upon as input to our cognitive 
mechanism”.50 Furthermore, he does not draw any distinction between 
“natural knowledge” and “natural science” and uses them interchangeably. 
By “natural knowledge” he does not mean, like Hegel, a mere belief, an 
“immediately” given doxa, but rather real scientific knowledge of nature. 
Thus, the aim of “grounding natural science”51 only means to him 
“justifying our knowledge of truths of nature in sensory terms”,52 while 
strictly negating other foundations like “rational reconstruction”, proof “in 
a firmly logical way”,53 or any activity of “consciousness”.54 In this, Quine 
                                           
48 In Quine’s essays “Naturalized Epistemology” (1969, pp. 69ff). 
49 Ibid., p. 71: “Just as mathematics is to be reduced to logic or logic and set theory, so 
natural knowledge is to be based somehow on sense experience”. 
50 Ibid., p. 84. 
51 Ibid., p. 74. 
52 Ibid., p. 71. 
53 Ibid., p. 74. 
54 Ibid., p. 84. 
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echoes Aquin’s and Locke’s sensualist notion that nihil est in intellectu 
quod non prius fuerit in sensu, while ignoring the rationalist Leibnizean 
reply that nisi intellectus ipse. Even if the latter does not establish a 
complete opposition to the sensualist model of cognition, it is still a 
considerable supplement, if not correction. This supplement is exactly what 
Quine seems to ignore. 
Quine formulates his naturalist thesis in the following famous passage: 
“Epistemology [...] simply falls into place as a chapter of psychology and 
hence of natural science. It studies a natural phenomenon, viz., a physical 
human subject”.55 Both episteme and epistemology are ‘naturalized’ in one 
stroke as being based on biological sensory receptors. This ontifying 
biologization is a form of naturalization that grasps epistemology as the 
empirical study of natural phenomena, neither logical nor 
phenomenological. Even if Hegel roughly agrees with Quine that 
epistemology “falls into place as chapter of psychology”, namely as the 
highest part of “Subjective Spirit” in the Encyclopaedia, Hegel still thinks 
that to regard psychology only as natural science, as Quine does, is nothing 
but a bad form of empiricism and formalism. In fact, Quine’s argument 
implicitly goes against Husserl’s conception of non-psychologistic and 
non-biologistic epistemology, his transcendental phenomenology. Thus, 
Quine can be said to develop a kind of anti-transcendental-phenomenology 
which generates the psychologistic concept of science anew, based now, as 
Quine states, on more accessibility to recent results of empirical cognitive 
psychology.56 But in contrast to the old logical psychologism of John Stuart 
Mill’s System of Logic (1843), which has taken the foundations of science, 
i.e. the logical laws, like the contradiction law, to be naturally generated by 
                                           
55 Ibid., pp. 82f. 
56 Cf. ibid., p. 83. 
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common human experience, Quine’s sophisticated neo-empiricism defines 
science as a heritage that should be itself pragmatically “warped” to fit the 
sense data of our “sensory promptings”.57 
In this way, Quine’s “Naturalized Epistemology” is the result of a 
double back-inversion: from the old rational and anti-psychologistic 
epistemology of the Vienna Circle to his novel empirical and 
psychologistic epistemology. This movement of thought is significant to 
our science question because, in contrast to Hegel, “the conscious form” or 
“awareness” no longer has any meaning in Quine in so far as consciousness 
does not possess anymore any explanatory role.58 Quine’s view of nature as 
the stimulator of sensory receptors is in fact a mechanistic worldview. That 
which provides science with evidence is for him nature, and not 
consciousness, as it enables observation, which is his criterion for founded 
knowledge. Quine praises such a mechanistic relation between nature and 
evidence as the main feature of naturalist epistemology,59 while relapsing, 
like Russell, into a pre-Kantian and pre-Hegelian mechanistic worldview. 
Quine’s definition of epistemology presupposes several interrelating 
problematic assumptions which will be outlined here, combining Hegel’s 
relevant considerations. 
(1) Absolute physicalism of the subject. Quine assumes that sense 
experience corresponds exclusively to the physical aspect of the human 
subject: the neural sensory receptors. Purely logically, this implies that 
                                           
57 Quine, 1951, p. 46. 
58 Quine 1969, p. 83: “In the old epistemological context the conscious form had 
priority, for we were out to justify our knowledge of the external world by rational 
reconstruction, and that demands awareness. Awareness ceased to be demanded when 
we gave up trying to justify our knowledge of the external world by rational 
reconstruction. What to count as observation now can be settled in terms of the 
stimulation of sensory receptors, let consciousness falls where it may”. 
59 In his last work The Pursuit of Truth (1992, p. 19) Quine confirms this view, back to 
which Dennett’s philosophy of mind and the rise of cognitive science can be traced. 
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there is at least another possible aspect of the overall human subject, a non-
physical one, one that Quine himself, however, does not refer to, let alone 
acknowledge. Quine excludes the possibility that knowing is the act of a 
reasonable conscious being that is not only physical in its essence. In a 
way, Quine’s physicalism of the subject is skeptical about reasonability and 
can be called into question by arguing that the sensory receptors 
themselves, as particular biological cells, are not the subject itself in the 
sense of the knower, as they do not know that they are the knower. They 
are not the knower as a whole, for they are not the human being as such. 
Like Quine, Hegel acknowledges the existence of such a phenomenon 
of sense experience as well as its role in the grounding of knowledge. Yet, 
Hegel does not attach sense experience exclusively to the physical human 
subject, but also to the phenomena of the thinking spirit, the Geist. Hegel 
ascribes experience (Erfahrung) to consciousness: what consciousness 
experiences is the object as a certain shape of the concept. Hegel takes 
advantage of the German language and mobilizes the term “experience”, as 
he uses the verb erfahren to indicate the conceptual movements that 
consciousness performs between the subjectivitiy of the for-itself and the 
objectivity of the in-itself within its objects. As a matter of fact, Hegel does 
not consider any realm of knowledge, even the most simple, quotidian, and 
minimal as lacking a conceptual form. Even the most immediate contents 
of sensory reception consist, if they are to be comprehended by humans, in 
basal linguistic units such as “this”, “here”, “now”, or “I”. Even if the 
human knowing subject can be said to be naturally embodied, the very act 
of knowing, as with any other action, is performed by the subjective self-
conscious spirit, just as volition emerges due to the free work of such spirit. 
Such an action, per definition, does not happen causally, due to a physical-
objective reaction in the spatiotemporal realm. 
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Therefore, Paul Redding rightly argues that Hegel holds against Quine 
that “while we are each fundamentally limited and conditioned in our 
particular cognitive capacities, we are, nevertheless, in virtue of our 
rational natures, somehow capable of going beyond those limits”.60 
Redding has correctly identified the fact that Hegel grounds the cognitive 
capacity of human beings in nothing other than “the recognitively 
intersubjective structures of spirit to which we all belong”.61 
(2) An insufficient neuroscientific concept of nature. Quine defines 
nature as that which stimulates the sensory receptors and in this way 
enables sense experience, which in turn enables natural knowledge without 
any assistance from other sources. Quine’s subjectifying concept of nature 
qua knowledge-generator can be called into question by arguing that nature 
per se also exists as a sensory stimulator in the animal world. Non-human 
animals, however, do not generate natural science. Without the capacity of 
human recognition, there can be no science, because understanding nature 
as a whole consists in recognizing a conceptual scheme that needs to be 
recognized as such by the recognizer. 
In a similar way to Quine, Hegel also considers nature as sensually 
experiencable “externality” and as that which can stimulate the sensory 
receptors of some developed natural forms, like intelligent animals. Yet, 
Hegel goes beyond this and treats nature as the Idee, and more precisely, as 
the finite, non-thinking self-manifestation of the Idee, hence as a 
contradictory and questionable conceptual form. He argues that nature does 
not hold in itself the concept (Begriff) of itself as idea and hence is not self-
conscious, as spirit is. Moreover, it cannot cause knowledge, as spirit can, 
for knowledge is the result of the basic activity of spirit. We will examine 
                                           
60 Redding, 2007, p. 222. 
61 Ibid. 
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further aspects of Hegel’s non-naturalistic concept of nature in more detail 
in 2.5. 
(3) Psychology as natural science. Quine identifies the knowing subject 
as the human soul and therefore refers to the study of knowledge as 
“psychology”. Philosophically informed psychology, however, ought not to 
grasp the human soul only under the biological aspect of its natural life, as 
Quine does, but also under the intellectual aspect of its cognitive and 
linguistic abilities. Hegel would call it the geistige aspect. The human 
subject must not be only subjected to an empirical inquiry with natural-
scientific methods. 
Like Quine, Hegel identifies an initial “natural moment” in the soul. 
Yet, he analyzes the features of the knowing subject as “natural soul” in his 
“Anthropology”, not in his “Psychology”, which explicitly treats spirit as 
spirit, not as “natural soul”. Even though Hegel conceives, like someone 
who is naturalist about the mental, the first moment of spirit, the “life” of 
the “physical soul”, as part of the general “natural life”, that is, the soul as 
Naturgeist, he does not interpret the activity of spirit only in the context of 
natural life.62 In contrast to Quine, Hegel’s chapter on “Psychology” is not 
accommodated in “Philosophy of Nature”, but rather in “Philosophy of 
Spirit”, where the independent spirit goes beyond nature back to itself.63 
Spirit, which only has a vague clue of itself in nature and does not really 
find itself in it, clearly goes beyond mere natural life and becomes 
independent. This means that the spirit attains its own ‘self’ and is 
selbständig, ‘stands by itself’, while ruling the universe – in the broadest 
sense – with its power of thought. Hegel’s conclusion that “the general 
natural life” as a whole is “only a subordinated moment” in the spirit and 
                                           
62 10/53f, § 392, Zusatz. 
63 10/17, § 381. 
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that the spirit is exactly “this elevation above nature and natural 
determinacy”64 brings to distinctive expression the supremacy of spirit over 
nature, especially in the question of knowledge. It follows that, even if 
Hegel holds that epistemology can be indeed reduced to psychology, it is 
definitely not a natural science.  
(4) A leveling concept of science. By “science” Quine means only 
“mathematics and natural knowledge”, and does not take into consideration 
other realms of knowledge, such as the social, political or historical, which 
epistemology as a whole should account for. The naturalist concept of 
science takes the object of science to be always nature, but neither in the 
sense of the inborn character of things, i.e. how they are from their innate 
natus, nor in the sense of φύσις, as what germinates or what shows itself 
through itself. Rather, the naturalist concept of science usually takes the 
object of proper science to be the non-human world. If one agrees that 
science includes more than just mathematics and natural science, then 
Quine’s “naturalized epistemology” is nothing but an incomplete 
epistemology that focuses only on two spheres of scientific activity and so 
levels the concept of science. 
Hegel’s Geist, in contrast, is a generic subject, an institution, like 
science and the scientific community. As an epistemological agent, the 
Geist produces the sciences with the help of generic concepts, the products 
of its own work of thinking. Geist is what explains nature, but also other 
objects of inquiry. It does so by articulating the rules of law, state, society, 
art, culture and religion, and by interpreting the logical relations between 
them. 
                                           
64 Hegel, 2007, p. 165, § 440; 10/230. 
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Beside these problematic assumptions, it is also dubious whether 
Quine’s semantic holism has the same character as Hegel’s holism. As 
Brandom explains, Quine’s holism implies 
 
“that if the content of a claim must at least determine what follows 
from it (what else it commits one to), then since what a claim commits 
one to depends on what collateral commitments are available to serve 
as additional premises (‘auxiliary hypotheses’), the significance of 
undertaking any particular commitment cannot be determined without 
appeal to the contents of all those collateral commitments”.65 
 
Because of this claim, Quine is known as the ‘holist’ per se, the anti-
elementarist who dares to arrive at conclusions about the whole of science. 
Yet, for Hegel, Quine’s semantic holism would be just too little, for it 
would only mean a kind of theory-holism.66 The young Hegel did claim 
once that every part gets the “meaning and significance it has solely 
through its coherence with the whole”.67 But in Phenomenology of Spirit 
Hegel speaks about much more, namely about the correlations between the 
structures of self-cognition and the purported objects of cognition. Hegel’s 
conception of such ‘totality’ of knowledge is genuinely philosophical and 
not convenient or pragmatic, because it implies that there must always be 
another differentiation to take into account.68 Such a conception 
acknowledges that the most precise determination is only attained after the 
consideration of all other possible determinations. Hegel’s holism is thus 
not as pragmatic as Quine’s. Instead of recommending being pragmatical 
                                           
65 Brandom, 1998, p. 92. 
66 Cf. Welsch, 2003, p. 48. 
67 In the Difference essay (1977a, p. 98; 2/30). 
68 Cf. Welsch, 2003, p. 45. 
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about the empirical realm, Hegel analyzes a long series of forms of 
consciousness and shows how each time the consciousness and the object 
are correlated, how consciousness moves from one object to the other so 
that each object becomes a “moment” in the experience of consciousness. 
Each form solves a former contradiction through Aufhebung; but this does 
not mean that the former forms are lost, rather that they are contained in the 
new forms, just like Descartes’s mechanics is not completely contradicted 
by Newton’s dynamics, which makes some use of such mechanics, and like 
Einstein’s relativity theory does not wholly reject Newton’s dynamics. In 
this way, object and consciousness are for Hegel interdependent, not 
detached, and their conceptual “correlations” or “congruencies” 
(Entsprechungen) together make a whole. Hegel’s idea of totality ought 
thus not to be understood only as the multitude of objects in the world 
(objektive Totalität) or only that of concepts or consciousness (subjektive 
Totalität), but of both, in one logic of determinations. The Hegelian talk 
about the totality of the highest knowledge is just another formulation for 
the reflective situation of self-knowing. 
 
2.3.3.2 The behaviorist approach: knowledge as a natural kind (Kornblith) 
The difficulties with Quine’s conception of science did not prevent his 
adherers from attempting to complete his thought in a popular direction, 
one that led to a remarkable counter-Hegelian epistemological position: 
knowledge is a “natural kind”, just like water. This diagnosis results from a 
widespread materialistic view worth rethinking here because its core idea 
seems to have tacitly inspired some of the recent arguments of the 
naturalist interpreters of Hegel. In his work Knowledge and its Place in 
Nature (2002), Hilary Kornblith, one of Quine’s most loyal followers, 
outlines an ethologistic approach toward knowledge. Although such a 
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naturalistic epistemology is not being explicitly admitted by Hegel 
interpreters, one can detect its traces in some of them. The reconstruction 
of Kornblith’s behaviorist argument will help to understand Hegel’s 
response to epistemological naturalism. 
Kornblith postulates that human knowledge must somehow be 
intrinsically located in nature. Therefore he does not hesitate to recommend 
the “investigation of knowledge, and philosophical investigation generally, 
on the model of investigations of natural kinds”.69 Kornblith supposes in 
advance that phenomena of knowledge are “something outside of us”, 
while he himself recommends avoiding conceptual analysis of knowledge, 
the investigation of a priori truths about knowledge, of intuitions about it or 
reflections on it, because they all presuppose what knowledge is.70 
Kornblith’s quasi-phenomenological paradigm is nothing other than 
inductive gemology. That is, he compares analyzing phenomena of 
knowledge with making generalized inferences about stones from gathering 
different stones.71 By “phenomena” he understands only natural 
phenomena of animal life, and not, for example, phenomena of 
consciousnesses, so that as a result, he regards logic, like Mill before him, 
as “an empirical affair”.72 Kornblith ensures that he relies on the recent 
results of empirical research in cognitive ethology, the study of animal’s 
cognitive behavior, arguing that the literature of this research frequently 
employs the category of knowledge in regard to animal cognitive 
capacities.73 Daniel Dennett, another Quinean theorist of mind, 
recommends a similar behavioristic method to understand the mind, 
                                           
69 Kornblith, 2002, p. 11. 
70 Cf. ibid., p. 11. 
71 Cf. ibid., p. 10. 
72 Ibid., p. 22. 
73 Cf. ibid., pp. 28–32. 
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namely to analyze the language of computer scientists and cognitive 
neuroscientists.74 
Since ethologists say that ravens “know” how to distract when they 
“believe” they would get their prey and that birds “know” in which 
direction to fly when they “desire” to migrate again,75 Kornblith concludes 
that some animals have knowledge in the sense of “intentional states” like 
“beliefs and desires”, not just “a representational system of information-
bearing states”, as plants have,76 and not just mere “internal states that are 
bearer of information”, as thermostats have.77 Kornblith, who is a typical 
epistemological Darwinist, describes animal knowledge as “a product of 
natural selection” that helps animals to fit the world and survive their 
environment78 as well as to satisfy their needs and desires.79 He even goes 
so far to designate knowledge as a “natural kind”, i.e. a “homeostatically 
clustered property”, a “well-behaved” and “stable unit”, like water.80 He 
disagrees with Davidson’s claim that knowledge has to do with belonging 
to a lingual community or with Brandom’s claim that knowledge has to do 
with the social practice of offering and asking for reasons.81 Instead, he 
names the least common denominator: knowledge is a “feature” of the 
natural world.82 Kornblith insists that animals know even if they do not 
know that they know, that is, even if they do not possess an internalist 
concept of knowledge in the form of introspection or reflection. This raises 
                                           
74 Dennett, 2003, pp. 86ff. 
75 Kornblith, 2002, p. 38. 
76 Ibid., p. 42. 
77 Ibid., pp. 36f. 
78 Cf. ibid., pp. 58–62. 
79 Cf. ibid., pp. 160f. 
80 Ibid., p. 62. The term ‘natural kind’ is taken from Quine’s “Natural Kinds” (1969a). 
81 Cf. ibid, p. 64.  
82 Ibid., p. 165. 
 79 
 
the question as to what are the conceptual consequences of such a concept 
of knowledge. In other words, what does it mean to know in this sense? 
Following Kornblith, it is indeed plausible that intentional behavior of 
non-human animals evokes the impression that knowledge is natural, at 
least to some degree. Yet, Kornblith’s Darwinian-like line of thought 
grounds the general idea of knowledge neither in logic, nor ethics, nor 
history, nor phenomenology, but rather in animal ethology. A challenging 
consequence of this popular doxastic naturalism is that even science simply 
looks like a natural outcome of natural life. Kornblith’s argument presents 
us with deficiencies that we will demonstrate along with some Hegelian 
responses. 
(1) The unmet empirical claim: empirical research vs. text analysis. 
Kornblith does not only claim that animal knowledge is natural, but for him 
every form of knowledge is natural, as he claims: “Human beings do have 
cognitive abilities that other animals do not, but this does not show in any 
way that human knowledge is different in kind from the knowledge of 
other animals”.83 For Kornblith, the cognitive capacities of human beings 
differ only gradually from animal knowledge, neither qualitatively, nor 
essentially. His epistemological presumption is that no knowledge is non-
natural. 
Kornblith, however, only presents empirical research of animal 
knowledge, and none of human knowledge. When he comes to discuss 
human knowledge, he ‘naturally’ discusses, without justification, 
Descartes’, Davidson’s, and Brandom’s philosophical texts on the same 
issues. The question is, under Kornblith’s own premises, whether 
something like ‘Brandom’s knowledge of knowledge’ is necessary for the 
survival of Brandom in the physical world. Kornblith has not shown why 
                                           
83 Ibid., p. 135. 
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this philosophical knowledge, and not Brandom’s empirical knowledge of 
the physical environment, is necessary for proving his claim. What 
Kornblith does not explain is the identity he presumes between 
philosophical knowledge and animal belief. Is it really the same “kind” of 
“knowledge”? What is “kind” here? What is “knowledge” for Kornblith? 
Kornblith does not meet the self-appointed empirical task. Let us explain 
this typical fallacy of the empiricist approach towards epistemology. 
Even in the part on animal knowledge, Kornblith does not include any 
firsthand empirical research such as self-conducted experiments; rather, he 
investigates literature about the empirical research of others without 
repeating any of the experiments. An inquiry is certainly not subject to 
prohibition against relying on reliable inquiries; however, if all experiments 
remain unrepeated and old results are not reassessed, such research 
involves the previous upshots and conceptions of other researchers and is 
thereby not truly purely empirical. Of course, he could claim that the study 
of literature is a kind of empirical research, but then he would have to 
admit that conceptions are included in the inquiry, and as such, does not 
involve exclusively non-conceptual objects as he declares regarding his 
inquiry. It is therefore evident that Kornblith, like other standard empiricist 
theorists, does not follow his own methodological recommendations: he 
does not ground his own knowledge of animal knowledge exclusively in 
the behavior of the animals themselves, but rather on language-based 
human agents. Paradoxically and interestingly, nothing other than the 
purely textual source seems to Kornblith to be a sufficient evidentiary basis 
for proving his empiricist thesis regarding the study of human knowledge. 
In fact, Kornblith’s naturalist view corresponds to differential anthropology 
and denies the uniqueness of the production of scientific texts as a 
collective praxis of developing and maintaining knowledge over 
generations through written language, a knowledge which is not genetically 
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created. The other conception of science that one can call ‘transgenetical’ 
or ‘transgenerational’ refers to a cognitive capacity that is irreducible to a 
feature of animal knowledge. 
This naturalistic position seems to echo Hegel, as he also speaks of 
“natural consciousness” (natürliches Bewusstsein). However, for Hegel this 
term indicates the basic shape of the “sensual consciousness”, i.e. the 
vigilance through the five senses and through awareness and attention. This 
“natural consciousness” can at most be the owner of a “natural opinion” or 
“natural assumption” (natürliche Vorstellung). Only the departure point of 
the Hegelian concept of knowledge is thus natural; that is, the initial 
moment of its development before consciousness becomes conscious of 
itself and turns to a correct understanding of the ‘good infinity’ of the 
episteme, to self-knowledge. The mere naturality of knowledge signifies for 
Hegel the lowest stage of spirit’s development. In fact, Hegel does not tend 
to speak at all of “natural knowledge” or “animal knowledge”, as the 
naturalists do, because for Hegel, as we learn from the chapter on 
“Subjective Spirit”, animals lack spirit in the strict sense and hence the 
capacity to think. Animals possess a sensing soul, but lack consciousness 
and thus knowledge, and this, in turn, because they lack Vor-stellungen, 
that which enables intentional mental states in the first place and thereby 
representations of ob-jects. 
In order to come to conclusions regarding human knowledge, Hegel, in 
contrast to Kornblith and other behaviorists, does not insist on the need for 
empirical research on animal behavior, but rather on a detailed truth 
analysis of various Gestaltungen des Geistes corresponding to a set of 
existing general forms of knowledge, namely metascientific concepts. 
Hegel justifies the knowledge-claims of each shape of knowledge by 
transcending each time to a critical conceptual investigation of the relations 
between the consciousness and the object itself, not by stopping the 
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analysis after presenting the “natural assumptions” of each shape. Hegel 
thus denies the applicability of the methodology of natural sciences in 
philosophical epistemology. 
(2) The irrelevance of the question of consciousness. Like Quine, who 
explicitly excludes the discourse of consciousness from epistemology, 
Kornblith denies the role of the study of consciousness in the question of 
knowledge, rejecting that the interaction of the self-consciousness with the 
world as well as its intersubjective relations with other agents are 
constitutive conditions for the cognitive evolution of the human mind and 
so of knowledge. 
Like Quine and Kornblith, Hegel also declares that he investigates the 
pure categories of thought not as they appear to consciousness. This 
happens, however, in the Logic, not in his epistemology. In his undeclared 
epistemology, which explicates the foundations of knowledge and can be 
partly also deduced from the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel does not tear 
apart the idea of consciousness from the ideas of knowledge and science. It 
is evident that consciousness, as Bewusstsein, is conceptually interlaced 
with the terms Wissen and Wissenschaft. Bewusst-sein is a form of Sein, a 
form of being, which relates per definition to other beings through wissen, 
the act of knowing. Since Hegel explores the truth of the phenomena of 
knowledge by asking about the qualities of the relations between the object 
and concept in each given form of consciousness, Hegel’s critical 
epistemology does not, and cannot, belong only to natural science. As a 
matter of fact, in contrast to Quine and Kornblith, Hegel’s epistemological 
considerations, be it in the form “Phenomenology” or even “Psychology”, 
are never located in “Philosophy of Nature”, but in “Philosophy of Spirit”.  
Leaving the philosophical question of knowledge to the natural 
sciences, naturalistic epistemology loses the justification for its own 
existence, scores an ‘own goal’ and furthers its own demise. Epistemology, 
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if it is to be a self-determined endeavor, needs to ground the idea of 
knowledge in itself.84 The Quinean division between science and 
consciousness, that led to epistemology as a part of natural science, ends up 
by being a self-terminating concept of philosophy of science, and not a 
constructive form of self-determining philosophy of science. The 
naturalistic skeptical abandonment of the Geistige, i.e. the normative realm 
in which the orientation towards values in science takes place, is actually 
another form of gratuitous “self-animalization” of the human, which 
implies a “sacrificium intellectus” and a betrayal of the idea of self-
conscious science.85 One way to avoid such self-termination of thinking is 
reflected in Plato’s conception of coming from doxa to episteme by means 
of logos that let see and produce a self-aware dialectical doxology. In 
Hegel’s epistemology, in contrast to Quine’s, knowledge does not consist 
only in a ‘natural kind’, but also in what we may call a ‘logical kind’, in 
having logos, the conceptual element of a thinking language which makes 
it initially possible to acknowledge the intentional as intentional, to 
recognize reason as reason. 
Kenneth Westphal thus rightly claims that Hegel does not subscribe to 
naturalism “in one of its currently popular senses in epistemology, that the 
only genuine justification is natural-scientific justification”, but rather 
“accepts natural-scientific justification within scientific knowledge, while 
maintaining that other forms of justification are available in other domains 
of knowledge, and especially in philosophy”.86 The Hegelian immanent 
critique of scientific knowledge has nothing to do with the Quinean anti-
rationalist version of naturalism, because even though Hegel, like Quine, 
                                           
84 For further critique of ‘naturalized epistemology’ see Kim, J., “What is ‘Naturalized 
Epistemology’”? (2004). 
85 Cf. Stekeler, 2014, pp. 293f. 
86 Westphal, 2003, pp. 52f. 
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criticizes positivistic metaphysics, i.e. the old scholastic enterprise, he does 
not deny the possibility of consciousness to become a “concrete infinite”. 
In spite of all these evident negations of naturalism in Hegel, there are 
claims for Hegel’s idiosyncratic versions of naturalism. According to these 
claims, Hegel treats the spirit, construed sometimes as humanity or society, 
essentially as a natural phenomenon or as conditioned through natural 
phenomena. Let us examine these claims carefully. 
 
2.4 Naturalistic readings of Hegel and their deficiencies 
The commonality of arguments for Hegel’s own version of naturalism is 
reflected in the structure of first refuting ontological, methodological and 
Quinean naturalism, just as we did until now, and then, in order to ‘save’ 
Hegel’s scientific project, finding a weak or soft version of naturalism, 
mainly about the Geist, as the thinking spirit, but also about the normativity 
of human society. We will examine the exemplary naturalistic 
interpretations in order to reconstruct their arguments, offer questions, and 
share critical thoughts. 
 
2.4.1 Naturalism about the mental 
2.4.1.1 Spirit as “powers within nature” (Beiser) 
Frederick Beiser’s interpretation of Hegel is thoroughly committed to 
naturalism about the mental. Beiser suggests that, for Hegel, “spirit is only 
the highest degree of organization and development of the organic powers 
within nature”,87 and that, therefore, Hegel explains the “transcendental 
                                           
87 In his Introduction to The Cambridge Companion to Hegel entitled “Hegel and the 
Problem of Metaphysics” (Beiser, 1993, p. 9). 
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self-consciousness according to its place within nature”.88 Beiser designates 
Hegel’s view as nothing other than a “form of scientific naturalism”:89 
“everything subjective, mental, or conscious is explicable according to laws 
of nature”, not only “everything objective, physical, or material”.90 In a 
rhetorical fashion that exploits the ‘false dilemma’, Beiser only offers 
clearly bad alternatives to naturalism: determinist historicism, positivistic 
mysticism,91 or “a form of speculation about supernatural entities, such as 
God, Providence, and the soul”.92 He gives his own explanation for Hegel’s 
alleged ontological naturalism: “Schelling and Hegel also insist that their 
metaphysics has nothing to do with the supernatural. Their conception of 
metaphysics is indeed profoundly naturalistic. They banish all occult forces 
and the supernatural from the universe, explaining everything in terms of 
natural laws”.93 Here, Hegel sounds just like Stephen Hawking. Beiser then 
arrives at the conclusion that the “highest being”, which is at the heart of 
the metaphysical question and which Hegel calls “the absolute”, is 
according to Hegel “the universe as the whole” and that this is simply 
equivalent to nature.94 
But the question arises as to why, to Hegel, spirit should mean the 
highest degree of organization of the organic powers within nature and not, 
as he puts it, of the Idee, i.e. the ‘form’ or the ‘type’ of being. Beiser 
locates the knowing subject in the organic nature, and not in the world, i.e. 
the human world, or the world of thought. A theory of knowledge that 
                                           
88 Beiser, 2002, p. 355. 
89 Beiser, 1993, p. 8. 
90 Beiser, 2002, p. 598, note 4. For a slightly different view from Beiser see Stone, A., 
“Hegel, Naturalism and the Philosophy of Nature”, 2013. 
91 Cf. ibid., p. 2. 
92 Ibid., p. 5. 
93 Ibid., p. 2. 
94 Cf., Beiser, 1993, p. 8. 
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places the conscious being only ‘in’ nature performs a mystical 
animalization of consciousness. This constrained naturalization involves ab 
initio a vitalist indefensible assumption: it does not identify the noumenal 
element in the realm of pure thought or even in the intersubjective social 
realm, but only in naked animality. The imagined bearer of the obscure 
“powers within nature” becomes itself an indeterminate entity working 
somehow ‘in’ the things. 
Hegel, for his part, criticizes in Phenomenology of Spirit in the chapter 
“Observing Reason” the mystical use of the category Kraft as a rather 
problematic metaphysical construction. Although it may seem so, the 
essence of “force” or “power” is something that is not a purely natural 
given. Hegel interprets the search for powers in nature, as well as the very 
assumption of such powers, as rather an activity of “reason” (Vernunft). 
The faculty of reason determines these powers according to its own 
conceptual schema and its own power of thought. Thus, neither does Hegel 
conceive of spirit as a product of nature in the narrow sense, i.e. nature as a 
mere part of the whole world, because nature as such, as the object of a 
natural subject, cannot go beyond the limits of itself. Spirit is infinite by 
definition, whereas nature is finite. Everything in nature exists in time and 
dies. Hegel refers to both spirit and nature as products of the Idee, which 
“posits” itself and “returns” to itself. 
Furthermore, Hegel does not reduce spirit to only “powers within 
nature”, and this is because he believes that spirit is free in a way that 
nature is not. The belief that mistakenly takes the principle of spirit to be 
some kind of natural force is designated by him as Naturreligion. The 
“religions of nature” misidentify the divine as the natural, each time in 
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different ways.95 Hegel’s main point of critique in his analysis of the 
problem of “natural religion” is the following: as long as “natural religion” 
understands the spiritual only “immediately”, i.e. without conceptually 
mediated thinking, it still does not acknowledge that the spiritual implies a 
self-aware subjectivity. Hence, it does not reach a true concept of freedom, 
only a pantheistic one. Given Hegel’s own terms, Beiser’s interpretation – 
and generally, the whole conception of naturalism about the mental – is 
more likely to correspond to the belief of Naturreligion than to Hegel’s 
own thought. 
Surprisingly, Beiser understands that Hegel himself criticizes 
Schelling’s idea of the absolute as “excessive naturalism” that 
underestimates “the realm of spirit that consists in society, the state, and 
history”.96 The reason to insist on Hegel’s naturalism is thus unclear. And 
indeed, Beiser later noticed the need to revise and moderate his view. He 
began to attack Hegel’s scholarship for letting Hegel’s thought “appear 
more respectable to contemporary analytic philosophy”.97 By this he means 
the general positivistic reading, but he could also mean, for example, 
Kenneth Westphal, who describes the key theses of Hegel’s epistemology 
as “fallibilism, pragmatism and non-foundationalism”.98 Westphal’s biased 
view is that Hegel’s ideas are valuable only because they can be completely 
found in contemporary theory of knowledge. At some point, Beiser stopped 
speaking of Hegel’s naturalism and began to criticize scholars for flattening 
                                           
95 In Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, in the section “A. Immediate Religion, or 
Nature Religion” (1988, pp. 209–223; 16/259–278). In order not to confuse the terms, 
Hegel stresses that the unreasonable “nature religion” should not be mixed up with 
Rousseau’s or Kant’s enlightened idea of intellectual Vernunftreligion, which was also 
called “natural religion”. 
96 Beiser, 2002, pp. 9f. 
97 Ibid., p. 508. 
98 Westphal, 2003, p. 51. His reading will be presented in the next section. 
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Hegel’s claims with non-hermeneutical methods.99 He came to the 
remarkable conclusion that “the predominant concern of Anglophone 
scholarship on German idealism has been to emasculate, domesticate and 
sanitize it, to make it weak, safe and clean for home consumption”.100 The 
significance of his position consists in his self-critique and his upholding of 
the hermeneutic effort. He himself, however, has not provided the reader 
with hermeneutic investigation of Hegel’s original texts. Although he 
recognizes the problem of the “non-metaphysical”101 interpretation of 
Hegel as responsible for “dark days”, he still does not associate it explicitly 
with the problem of attributing naturalism to Hegel. 
 
2.4.1.2 The “biological needs” of self-consciousness (Westphal) 
Westphal believes that “Hegel’s naturalistic account of thought”102 is to be 
found in his discussion on “desire” in the chapter “Self-Consciousness” in 
Phenomenology of Spirit. According to Westphal, Hegel claims that the 
condition for the existence of self-consciousness is a law-like natural 
structure because “any world in which we human beings can be self-
conscious is one that has a natural structure unto itself that provides us with 
at least a minimum necessary degree of regularity and variety among the 
                                           
99 In “Dark Days: Anglophone Scholarship since the 1960s” (2007). Still, when he 
discusses again Hegel’s non-mechanical view of the organic nature, he offers a rather 
Schellingian model, according to which “the mental realm is only the highest degree of 
organization and development of the organic powers of nature; the mental and physical 
differ only in degree rather than kind: the mental is the invisible form of the physical, 
the physical the visible form of the mental” (Ibid., p. 83). Schelling’s idea of nature was 
indeed decisive for Hegel, but mostly to the extent that Hegel argues against it. 
100 Ibid., p. 70. 
101 This term was coined by Klaus Hartmann in his essay “Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical 
View” in Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. A. MacIntyre (Garden City: 
Doubleday, 1972). 
102 Westphal, 1989, p. 160. 
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contents of our sensations”.103 It seems trivial to Westphal that “regularity” 
and “variety” are properties of the given nature. He does not consider them 
as logical categories of reason. He elaborates his thesis, claiming that: 
 
“Naturalist elements appear in Hegel’s epistemology in his theses that 
biological needs (one root of consciousness) involve elementary 
classification of objects, that the contents of conscious awareness 
derive from a public world, and that classificatory thought presupposes 
natural structures in the world”.104 
 
Even though one may agree with the premise that self-consciousness 
classifies objects of desire in the public world, several objections to this 
argument as a whole arise. 
To begin with, Hegel himself does not speak of “biological needs” 
(biologische Bedürfnisse), at least not in the context of self-consciousness.  
He speaks of Begierde, which means “desire”, and which Westphal falsely 
translates as “need” (Bedürfnis). Desire is for Hegel not simply biological, 
but like volition, an intentional act of a self-conscious being. Even if it is 
true that Hegel refers to the desire of self-consciousness as directed towards 
objects of consumption, Westphal ignores the fact that Hegel clearly says 
that self-consciousness attains true satisfaction of its “desire” only by 
another self-conscious being, not just by a natural object.105 Hegel argues 
that self-consciousness reaches its satisfaction by Anerkennen, the act of 
mutual “recognition”, not by “classification”,106 the translation that 
Westphal seems to prefer for Anerkennen. To claim that consciousness 
                                           
103 Westphal, 2003, pp. 70f. 
104 Ibid., p. 52. 
105 Cf. Hegel, 1977, p. 110; 3/144. 
106 Cf. ibid., p. 112; 3/147. 
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consumes biological objects in order to physically exist in the living world 
is to show only one side of the coin, while hiding the other. The other side 
of this coin, which Hegel also highlights, if not even more strongly, is to 
claim that consciousness ‘consumes’ other kinds of objects, namely self-
conscious beings. It belongs to the heart of the Hegelian idea of self-
consciousness that it needs another self-consciousness in order to become 
truly self-conscious and so to reach its fully developed concept. Westphal 
seems to miss here the whole point. He insists on Hegel’s “naturalism” 
only because he believes that to acknowledge any interaction between 
nature and consciousness already means to be a naturalist. Yet it is not 
clear why such a premise should be an adequate interpretation of Hegel’s 
philosophical intentions. 
In fact, the problem with Westphal’s reading is that Westphal himself 
also confirms that self-consciousness ought not to be identified with a 
“biological organism”107 and that “Hegel argues that our capacity for 
classificatory thought is not merely a natural phenomenon”.108 He 
acknowledges that Hegel’s idea of absolute spirit corresponds to the “social 
whole” and the “human community”.109 But at the same time, he ignores 
the hard problem of Hegelian epistemology: the question of how to justify 
the intellectual possibility of an unconditioned point of view that enables 
true self-knowledge. In Westphal’s view, spirit remains overall “within its 
natural setting”110 and always presupposes a “natural environment”.111 
                                           
107 Westphal, 1989, p. 161. 
108 Westphal, 2003, p. 63. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid., p. 63. 
111 Ibid., p. 59. 
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Interestingly, Brandom introduced the same argument about Hegel’s 
account of “desire” as the “source of classification”112 in the animal realm, 
and he even calls it a “naturalized” version of the Kantian account. 
However, he emphasized that the crucial source of classification for 
consciousness is the “normative dimension”113 of the inferential rules 
which constitute “discursiveness”114 in the first place. To make this point 
clearer and not to sound too ambiguous about naturalism, Brandom would 
later drop the term “naturalized” in this context and justly claim that, 
although “cultural activities arise within the framework of a natural world” 
they “become explicit as such only by the use of normative vocabulary that 
is in principle not reducible to the vocabulary of the natural sciences”.115 In 
an acknowledging manner, he even clearly says that: “This is a picture and 
an aspiration that we owe to Hegel”.116 
Westphal’s naturalist reading may seem to attain confirmation from the 
following sentence in Hegel’s “Philosophy of Spirit”: “From our point of 
view Mind has for its presupposition Nature”.117 For Hegel, however, it 
would be only a common-sense view to think that mind needs nature in 
order to be, and that hence nature is quasi more ‘important’ than mind and 
comes ‘before’ it. Only naive realism grasps nature as something totally 
different from the mind and totally independent of it. Hegel’s theory of 
Reflexion at the beginning of the “Doctrine of Essence” maintains that the 
operative category of “presupposition” (Voraussetzung) does not articulate 
in any way that the “presupposed” (Vorausgesetzte) is a casual “reason” for 
that which presupposes it (Voraussetzende). On the contrary, for Hegel, the 
                                           
112 In Brandom’s Making It Explicit (1994, p. 86). 
113 Ibid., p. 87. 
114 Ibid. 
115 In Brandom’s Articulating Reasons (2000, p. 33). 
116 Ibid. 
117 Hegel, 2008, p. 6, § 381; 10/17. 
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presupposed is logically subordinate, an abstract essence whose content is 
less determined. In our case, this means concretely that nature is not the 
logical reason for spirit, but an entity less determined. Hegel’s sentence, 
thus, does not come to express the primacy of nature over spirit, but the 
opposite: only for us, the cognitive individual subjects, it seems that nature 
is nothing but a given reality. 
Furthermore, by examining Hegel’s words closely, we find that in the 
original not only the word “presupposition” is italicized, but also the words 
“nature” and “from our point of view”.118 William Wallace has dropped 
from the translation that which makes the significant difference: the 
function of highlighting “from our point of view”, which says in the 
original “for us” (für uns), is to indicate the state of mind that is still 
subjective and insufficient. Hegel stresses the supremacy of spirit over 
nature in the Encyclopaedia Logic when he claims that “nature is not just 
something fixed and complete on its own account, which could therefore 
subsist even without spirit; rather, it is only in spirit that nature attains to its 
goal and its truth”.119 
Westphal’s final verdict on Hegel’s “Psychology”, namely that 
“Hegel’s philosophical psychology is deeply naturalist”,120 is certainly 
consistent with his own naturalistic view; but it is perplexing because 
Hegel’s “Psychology” is located in “Philosophy of Spirit”, not “Philosophy 
of Nature”, and it explicitly treats spirit as spirit, and not as “natural soul”. 
The latter is conceived only as spirit’s initial default “natural moment” 
which Hegel discusses in his “Anthropology”, not “Psychology”. 
                                           
118 10/17. Michael Inwood has revised Wallace’s translation and improved it: “For us 
mind has nature as its presupposition” (2007, p. 9, § 381). 
119 Hegel, 1991, p. 153, § 96, Addition; 8/204.  
120 Westphal, 2003, p. 55. 
 93 
 
Pinkard’s reading stresses the same natural factor in the embodiment of 
the human knowing subject, yet with different arguments. In what follows I 
shall demonstrate Pinkard’s reasons for reading Hegel’s spirit through a 
naturalistic lens.  
 
2.4.1.3 “Disenchanted” naturalism: natural freedom of natural mind 
(Pinkard) 
Pinkard declares in Hegel’s name that: “We are embodied agents, bound by 
the limits of our organic nature and always working within a particular, 
bounded social space”.121 If this were in fact Hegel’s main thought 
regarding spirit or science, he could indeed have been considered as 
ascribing to a skeptical form of naturalism about the mental. Yet, Pinkard 
presents arguments in favor of Hegel’s naturalism which are problematic. I 
will thus analyze them in the following. 
(1) In a quite surprising manner, Pinkard explains Hegel’s alleged view 
concerning the natural character of human consciousness with a 
neuroscientific anecdote: 
 
“The human agent, by virtue of certain biological characteristics 
having to do with its brain and its nervous systems (among other 
things), actualizes something that is already in play in animal life but 
that, as put to work in that way, becomes fundamentally different from 
it”.122 
 
The question arises, however, as to whether the text in italics is also 
claimed by Hegel. Even if one agrees with the assumption that human life, 
                                           
121 Pinkard, 2012, pp. 104f. 
122 Ibid., p. 48 (my italics). 
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grasped as spiritual life, is in Hegel “fundamentally different” from animal 
life, Pinkard’s own explanation for the difference is essentially biological 
and based on the particularity of the human brain. The phrase “by virtue 
of” suggests a kind of causality that is rather in question. Pinkard locates 
the anthropological difference at the natural level instead of the cognitive 
level, although the capacity of thinking is for Hegel the most significant 
factor in the constitution of human self-consciousness. Pinkard appears to 
speak of animals and people, but in fact he only refers to the zoological 
characteristics of animals, believing that “Hegel holds that human agents, 
by virtue of thinking of themselves as animals, thereby become special 
animals, namely, self-interpreting ones”.123 Pinkard does not account for 
his own assimilationism dressed up as differentialism. In a contradictory 
manner, he actually endorses a view that relapses into naturalism à la 
Beiser: “Human subjectivity emerges as a kind of reflexive complication of 
this kind of organic, animal self-relation, not as something radically other 
than animal life”.124 
In this, Pinkard is not alone. A precedent was set by Willem DeVries 
who claimed that Hegel “saw man as arising out of and continuous with 
nature and capable of being understood only in this natural context”.125 But 
does Hegel really hold that man arises only in a natural context? In his 
“Preliminary Conception” of logic in the Encyclopaedia, we find the 
following thought: “Insofar as he is spirit, man is not a natural being”.126 
Likewise, at the outset of the “Philosophy of Spirit” we learn that spirit: 
“does not emerge in a natural manner from nature. [...] this emergence is 
not in the flesh but spiritual, it is not to be understood as a natural 
                                           
123 Ibid., p. 18. 
124 Ibid., p. 30. 
125 DeVries, 1988 p. xii. 
126 Hegel, 1991, p. 63, § 24, Addition 3; 8/90. 
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emergence but as a development of the concept”.127 After the transition 
from nature to spirit, spirit does not remain natural in its essence, and what 
“comes back to itself” is not nature, but rather the Idee in the form of the 
spirit. Hegel explicitly argues that, at some point in the transition from 
nature to spirit, “nature has vanished” and is only aufgehoben in spirit.128 In 
Pinkard’s interpretation, Hegel’s philosophy of spirit as a whole would 
seem to have evaporated.  
Pinkard’s epistemological naturalism corresponds to the assimilationist 
cognitive-ethologistic approach which we have explicated before. It misses 
a critical Hegelian argument in the Phenomenology of Spirit, according to 
which the intelligence of individuals is rather, as Stekeler articulates, an 
“effect of the collectively passed on general forms of human life”.129 Such 
tradition-making, i.e. passing-on-praxis, is not done by a single brain of an 
individual, no matter how developed, but by a “concepts-sharing 
community”,130 which is a universal transsubjective being. The evolution of 
the individual brains has a rather biological explanation: they evolve for the 
sake of species longevity.131 
(2) To further prove that Hegel banishes all “nonnatural powers”, 
Pinkard suggests that Hegel refutes a “dualist account of freedom as 
involving nonnatural powers”132 by referring to Hegel’s words on “law-like 
                                           
127 Hegel, 2007, p. 15, § 381, Zusatz; 10/25. 
128 Ibid., p. 9, § 381; 10/17. 
129 Stekeler, 2014, p. 38: “Effekt gemeinsam tradierter allgemeiner Formen 
menschlichen Lebens”. 
130 Ibid., p. 349: “Begriffsgemeinschaft” 
131 Cf. ibid., pp. 37f: “Zentral und fundamental ist dabei Hegels Kritik an der bis heute 
üblichen ‘empiristischen’ und ‘individualistischen’ Auffassung, die Intelligenz des 
Einzelnen und die geistige Welt überhaupt würde einfach hervorgebracht durch das 
Verhalten und die Gehirne der einzelnen Menschen, wie sie sich im Laufe der Evolution 
nach den aus der Biologie bekannten Weisen zum Zweck des Überlebens der Gattung 
herausgebildet hatte”. 
132 Pinkard, 2012, p. 30. 
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freedom”: “We have said that freedom is to be asserted as the basic essence 
of spirit, the freedom from and in the natural, which, however, must not be 
taken as arbitrary choice (Willkür) but rather as law-like freedom”.133 
Although Hegel clearly argues that freedom from the natural belongs to the 
essence of spirit, Pinkard presumes that the idea of the law-likeness of 
freedom, just as the idea of law in general, belongs to the domain of nature 
and somehow “refutes” nonnatural elements. Hegel criticizes this view in 
the chapter “Observing Reason”, where he argues that law (Gesetz) in 
general, hence also natural law, is a product of spirit’s own act of 
“positing” (Setzung) in the sense of thinking about the various forms of 
being and formulating the relations between them. Insofar as the spirit 
“posits” the laws, it finds, validates and formulates them. “Legislation” 
(Gesetzgebung) is thus an act executed and altered by the spirit, not by 
nature. When the spirit looks for laws of nature and articulates them, it 
actually deals with itself and articulates something very fundamental about 
itself. The laws Hegel has in mind include social laws (norms), state laws 
(legislation) and divine laws (commands). They all stem from a free subject 
or a community of subjects, and they are all brought forth by the faculty of 
“reason”. As such, they are grasped as a self-conscious process of 
collective self-determination. Therefore, contrary to the common sense 
view, Hegel does not hold that the concept of “law-like freedom” is a 
contradictio in adjecto. 
(3) Pinkard also attempts to prove Hegel’s naturalism by contraposition, 
arguing that Hegel is not a spiritualist, for he “does not hold that natural, 
material objects are (to use an admittedly slippery term) reducible in any 
                                           
133 Ibid., p. 43 note 62. This citation, translated by Pinkard, stems from Vorlesungen 
über die Philosophie des Geistes: Berlin 1827/1828 (Hamburg: Meiner, 1994), p. 19. 
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kind of way to mental or spiritual objects”.134 Even if one agrees with 
Pinkard that Hegel is certainly not a mad Jenseits-spiritualist who imagines 
that all is spirit, objections to Pinkard’s definition can be raised. Firstly, not 
everyone who is not a proper spiritualist is automatically a naturalist. To 
prove naturalism reliably, one should rather prove that all the mental or 
spiritual objects are effectively reducible to natural objects. One cannot 
only prove that the opposite does not occur. Secondly, and more 
significantly, in the chapter “Sensation” in “Anthropology”, Hegel shows 
that just as the soul enacts the natural objects by “sensing” (empfinden) 
them, i.e. by making them into an intelligible part of itself, to an “ideality” 
within the soul, the soul also externalizes itself into the outer nature in 
order to become visible and so to be “found” (gefunden). Hegel interprets 
certain corporal phenomena as supervening on spirit’s motions: the spirit 
embodies itself through mimic, gesture, blushing, laughing and crying, and 
in this way becomes perceptible for another sensing soul. In both cases, in 
the internalization and the externalization, the soul itself is the actualizing 
agent, not nature. 
(4) Finally, Pinkard claims that Hegel is a naturalist because he 
acknowledges the existence of soul in animals, in contrast to what Pinkard 
regards as the anti-naturalist religions which purportedly deny soul in 
animals: “Hegel divides animals from people not on the religious ground 
that animals do not have souls – on Hegel's account, they do have souls – 
but on the ground that they cannot think, that is, cannot entertain reasons as 
reasons”.135 It is not clear, however, what exactly the “religious ground that 
animals do not have soul” is. Which religion does Pinkard mean? Branches 
of Christianity may differ over whether the soul of animals is immortal: 
                                           
134 Pinkard, 2012, p. 38, note 28. 
135 Ibid., p. 44 note 72. 
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Baptists doubt it, as does the Church of Christ, and some Catholics negate 
it.136 But which religion in the world deprives animals of having a soul at 
all? Pinkard apparently relies on the “Preface to the Second Edition” of the 
Encyclopaedia, where Hegel deals with the issue. Hegel, however, claims: 
“It is thinking that first makes the soul – with which the lower animals are 
endowed too – into spirit; and philosophy is only a consciousness 
concerning [...] spirit [...] which distinguishes it from the lower animals, 
and makes it capable of religion”.137 Also in the second paragraph in the 
Encyclopaedia we read that one ought not to forget that, due to thinking, 
“only man is capable of religion, and that the lower animals have no 
religion”.138 In both cases, Hegel speaks of Tier, “beast”, not “lower 
animals” – a translation which rather confirms the vague prejudice that man 
is animal, only a higher one, and the other animals are by their nature 
“lower animals”. Pinkard’s interpretation thereby conveys the impression 
that the attribute “naturalism” is used against religion in general, while it is 
not evident that Hegel would adopt this line of thought. What Hegel 
originally claims is not generally hostile to religion. 
Out of the discourse of naturalism about the mental, there emerges a 
further reading that interprets the social-habitual consciousness as the 
naturalistic side of Hegel’s collective spirit: the view of “social 
naturalism”.  
 
2.4.2 Social naturalism (Tesla) 
Italo Testa stands in the recent tradition of naturalistic readings of Hegel as 
he convincingly refutes any “physicalist, reductionist or eliminativist” 
                                           
136 http://do-animals-have-souls.info/organised-religions.html 
137 Hegel, 1991, p. 12. 
138 Ibid., p. 25. 
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naturalism in Hegel’s system,139 while simultaneously establishing a 
naturalistic thesis about Hegel’s “epistemological realism”: “This thesis 
could be called Hegel's naturalism: the idea that there is one single reality – 
living reality – and different levels of description of it”.140 On the surface, 
this definition may sound plausible. However, Tesla argues that Hegel 
holds an “explicit” epistemological position, namely a “natural theory of 
mind”,141 that is expressed in the sentence: “Spirit, for us, has Nature as 
its presupposition”.142 Tesla’s goal is to look for the sense in which this 
“natural theory of mind” can be correctly related to the “social space”.143 
Based only on two appearances of the term “second nature” in paragraphs 4 
and 151 in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Tesla identifies in 
Hegel what he labels “social naturalism”, a form of McDowellian “second-
natural naturalism”.144 He declares that social life in the form of the “social 
and institutional bodies” is the “second nature” of humans, because “the 
institutions of social life are extensions and objectifications of human 
nature and of individual mind”.145 Tesla, who does not dwell on the term 
“second nature”, presupposes its meaning. Unlike Tesla, Aristotle, who 
introduces this term to philosophy in his Nikomachean Ethics and mentions 
it only once, does not understand by “second nature” the sociality per se, 
but rather hexis, a habit an individual has difficulty to alter. Even if one 
agrees that the social is indeed an objectification of the mind, it does not 
necessarily follow that it should be called “nature”.  
                                           
139 In “Hegel's naturalism or Soul and Body in the Encyclopaedia” (Tesla, 2013, p. 35). 
140 Ibid., pp. 23f. 
141 Ibid., p. 30. 
142 Ibid., p. 21. 
143 Ibid., p. 31. 
144 Ibid., p. 28. What follows is not a refutation of McDowell’s “second-natural 
naturalism”, but only the evidence given by Tesla for its existence in Hegel. 
145 Testa, 2013, p. 35. 
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Looking carefully at Hegel’s words in the paragraphs which Tesla left 
without a commentary, we actually find that in both paragraphs Hegel says 
“as a second nature” (als eine zweite Natur), not “is a second nature”.146 
This difference may appear to be hair-splitting, but the question arises as to 
what precisely Hegel compares with “second nature” and why. 
Consideration of the context in which this term appears is thus appropriate. 
In paragraph 4, it is evident that the object of Hegel’s analysis is the 
idea of “right” (Recht), not society. He clearly grounds this idea in the 
spiritual realm and in the free will, not in nature. His claim is that, by 
producing the realm of right, the spirit produces its own world which, while 
like a second nature in some respect, is actually not nature, but culture. 
Nature develops by itself, but culture requires effort and a process of 
learning. Hegel’s conception here is set in an analogy with nature as that 
which is “produced” (hervorgebracht), as natura naturata, not natura 
naturans. 
In paragraph 151, Hegel argues that the ethical habit, das Sittliche, only 
appears as a second nature if it is taken to be identical with what 
individuals simply do, how they are without the contrivance to change. 
Again, he does not define the ethical realm itself as natural in any sense. In 
fact, by this Hegel shows that he is aware of the Aristotelian origin of the 
concept of “second nature”. Whereas Tesla uses the term “second nature” 
in quite a trivial manner and even literally, Hegel, like Aristotle, does not 
mean nature or even the social realm, but a property an individual cannot 
easily change. Furthermore, in paragraph 146 Hegel argues that the 
individual subjects believe that valid ethical laws possess even more 
authority than natural constraints. Here we find the analogy with nature as a 
mighty power which is experienced by the individual subject as if it were 
                                           
146 My emphasis. 
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ultimately independent and self-determined. For Hegel, to say that nature is 
really independent is wrong, because nature is conceptually formed in 
contrast to the independent spirit. This would be as wrong as saying that 
social realities must be considered as unalterable givens. 
Tesla, who neither elaborates on McDowell’s second-natural 
naturalism, nor refers to the Aristotelian origin, ignores that Hegel also 
deals with the question of “habit” as “second nature” from the perspective 
of the “Philosophy of Spirit”, especially in the “Anthropology” in 
paragraphs 409–10. In these paragraphs, the mechanism of habit is viewed 
as one “moment” in the life of the “practicing” spirit, namely the self-
feeling subjective spirit. But undoubtedly this is only one layer in the 
concept of spirit, namely the initial still-unconscious part. In this moment, 
the idea of spirit is intentionally treated in the immediate form, in which it 
appears to individuals, not to the “absolute spirit”, and hence not as it is 
truly “in and for itself”. Tesla would seem to be aware of Hegel’s 
philosophy of spirit as a whole and hence of the problem of concentrating 
exclusively on parts of the subjective spirit, e.g. on the idea of second 
nature, when he says: “If the Hegelian philosophy of Spirit reflects such an 
approach – some form of methodological and ontological holism – then we 
cannot claim to have dealt with the mind-body question adequately if 
we have concentrated exclusively on subjective Spirit”.147 However, while 
fully reducing the Hegelian conception of the institutionalizing “objective 
spirit”, let alone the sphere of “absolute spirit”, to a programmatic 
naturalization of social habituation, Tesla does not draw the full 
consequences from his own correct restriction. 
In order to illuminate further the question of Hegel’s naturalism we 
should analyze his own words on nature. But before we do so, we shall turn 
                                           
147 Ibid., p. 16. 
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to one last critical voice concerning naturalism in Hegel which can shed 
light on his relation to naturalism – Husserl’s criticism. 
 
  2.4.3 A note on Husserl’s critique of Hegel 
Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, as the science of “the essence of 
consciousness”,148 approached in the first person, was an explicit effort to 
deal with the accelerating spread of naturalism in logic and epistemology, a 
tendency that culminated in the still-dominant Quinean naturalism about 
cognition. Husserl thus shares a similar struggle with Hegel. However, 
Husserl himself has never interpreted Hegel’s philosophy as a 
confrontation with naturalism. On the contrary, in his essay “Philosophy as 
Rigorous Science” (1910-11) he blames Hegel’s “relativist” concept of 
science for causing the intensifying of naturalism, not directly, but by being 
the cause of the post-Hegelian historicism and hence the naturalist counter-
reaction. In light of the fact that Husserl never deals with Hegel, it seems 
that Hegel’s own reaction against naturalism is downsized by Husserl’s 
reproach and becomes obscure. Let us reconsider the motives for Husserl’s 
critique. 
Principally, Husserl demands from philosophy what Hegel demands: to 
be scientific in the sense of being teachable and learnable. Husserl favors 
Kant’s rigorous “critique of cognition”, because it “makes the 
philosophical scientificity possible”, but at the same time he criticizes Kant 
for rejecting the idea of the teachabilty and learnabilty of philosophy and 
for affirming the “unscientific character of philosophy”. Husserl criticizes 
Hegel and the “romantic philosophy” for not having included in their 
systems the principles of “critique of cognition”. He argues that, as a result 
                                           
148 Husserl, Ideas I (1913) § 34 (1983, p. 67). 
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of this dropping, Hegel’s philosophy has led to two major intellectual 
crimes. Firstly, it led to the “falsification” of the impulse to constitute a 
“rigorous science”, because Hegelianism caused the exact science to react 
with the intensification of naturalism, hence with skepticism too. Secondly, 
Hegelianism led to the “weakening” of this impulse in the form of 
historicism and relativism about philosophical epochs, which, even though 
these impulses are anti-naturalistic in themselves, still end up being 
“worldview philosophy”. One cannot miss hearing Husserl’s accusing 
tones towards Hegel’s excessive anti-naturalism. 
Against this background, Husserl asserts that besides the “radical 
critique” of naturalism – which he thought to be especially important at his 
times, and which is still relevant today – one needs a positive non-hostile 
critique of the foundations of naturalism and an appreciation of its 
circumspect scientific methods. In my discussion on naturalism, the line of 
the argument has attempted to take up this point and to continue with the 
spirit of the Husserlian project of naturalism-critique. In light of the 
confrontation with naturalism, it is astonishing that Husserl identifies such 
a powerful anti-naturalism in Hegel that could historically cause even more 
naturalism. I, on the contrary, would assess that Hegel is involved in a 
negotiation with naturalism, advocating non-naturalism as a milder stance 
in a fruitful dialogue with various forms of naturalism. 
Husserl finds an advantage in naturalism, namely its desirable general 
target of implementing the idea of rigorous science everywhere. Yet, like 
Hegel, Husserl criticizes that the naturalist is nothing other than an unaware 
idealist who naturalizes the faculty of reason by means of empiricism and 
thereby also naturalizes the ethic, aesthetic, pedagogic and logic realms. 
Husserl claims, again like Hegel, that experimental psychology distorts the 
real foundations of all these “pure” disciplines. Therefore, modern 
empirical psychology poses two problems for Husserl which, as we have 
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seen, also mattered to Hegel: the “naturalization of consciousness” and the 
“naturalization of the ideas”. Husserl makes clear that natural science itself 
cannot be epistemology, and as we have shown, Hegel implicitly claims the 
same thing, only with the necessary modification to his time. 
The crux of the matter is that the very fact that Husserl wishes that 
epistemology would find a scientific-objective way to speak about 
experience and consciousness, which is the same aspiration Hegel had, is 
an expression of his skeptical belief that, until his time, epistemology in 
general, including Hegel’s epistemology, had still not become “rigorous 
science”. To a certain degree, this is still true for today. 
 
2.5 Hegel’s non-naturalistic concept of nature  
After considering the various naturalistic readings, doubts arise about the 
actual content of the concept of nature which Hegel has in mind. We thus 
turn to the presentation of Hegel’s concept of nature, especially at the 
outset of the “Philosophy of Nature” in paragraphs 245–52, in order to 
reconstruct the core issues and to show them as a possible response to the 
naturalistic attitude. The aim of this section is not to dwell on all the 
various ways Hegel uses the term “nature” in his writings, but on those 
which are relevant to the naturalism question and to the preliminary 
understanding of Hegel’s non-naturalistic approach towards knowledge. 
Before we begin with the particularities of Hegel’s concept of nature, it 
is important to note that Hegel also uses the term “nature”, unlike the 
typical naturalist, in the pre-Aristotelian meaning of ‘essence’ (Wesen) or 
‘quality’ (Beschaffenheit), for example, when he mentions the “the nature 
of size”,149 “the nature of concept”,150 “the nature of the copula in the 
                                           
149 “Natur der Größe” (9/54). 
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judgment”,151 “the nature of force”,152 “the nature of the spirit”153 or “the 
nature of the state”.154 Hegel even clearly notes that, by the expression “the 
nature of the thing”, he also means the “concept” of it.155 At the same time, 
he also shares the phenomenological meaning of nature as that which is 
sensually perceivable, as “pure externality”. However, Hegel goes beyond 
these received meanings and refers to nature as an immediate manifestation 
of “the Idea”, as that which seems to contain a riddle, but which is initial 
and common. These determinations will be analyzed in the following.  
 
2.5.1 Nature as the idea 
By defining nature as the idea in “the form of otherness”, Hegel means that 
nature is the idea in the form of the non-idea. This seemingly paradoxical 
situation happens when the idea is “negative” to itself and so “outside” 
itself, i.e. “external”. Since Hegel refers to nature as that which is sensually 
detectable, his description may not initially seem to be alien to the 
naturalistic conception. The difficulty is that Hegel speaks of nature as an 
abstract thought or a mere idea, and, at the same time, as a given 
“immediacy”, as an extra-cognitive being. By this, he is aware of the 
question of nature’s indeterminacy and integrates into his definition the 
common-sense understanding of nature as something outside of us which 
seems to behave independently of our cognition. The common view takes 
nature as the whole of matter, a plenitude of atoms or molecules or an 
                                           
150 “Natur des Begriffes” (9/212). 
151 “Natur der Kopula im Urteil” (8/371). 
152 “Natur der Kraft” (8/270). 
153 “Natur des Geistes” (7/504, 7/344). 
154 “Natur des Staates”(7/417). 
155 “Natur der Sache, d. i. den Begriff” (8/156, 10/31). 
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infinite amount of things yet to be discovered. Therefore, it was even 
argued that Hegel’s conception of nature is “thoroughly non-idealistic”.156 
Hegel’s use of the term Idee as a systematic metacategory is not easy to 
understand in the context of nature. His fundamental claim is not that 
nature is the non-idea per se, but rather that nature “hat sich als die Idee 
ergeben” and it is now an objective existence of nothing less than “die 
Idee”, hence a given that is in effect a posited given. The reason for this 
formation is that nature, like spirit, functions in Hegel’s organization of the 
sciences as one of the two basic categories of the real. In this way, Hegel 
systematically grounds the “ideational” (ideell) – not “ideal” (ideal) – 
structure of the sensually perceived and conceptually explained nature. In 
order to better understand Hegel’s concept of the Idee, as a form of being, 
one should be reminded not to envisage Idee as Vorstellung, the picturing 
power of imagination that creates a representation of a particular object 
running through my mind, nor as bloß Gedachtes, a thought devoid of 
content, without reference to the ‘real’ in the sense of wirklich, that which 
has an actual effect on reality. Instead, the idea is for Hegel, perhaps unlike 
in Plato, the most “concrete” working being: “the adequate concept, the 
objectively true, or the true as such”.157 Yet, the “idea” is not world-
transcending or ineffable. The questions arise as to which idea is the idea in 
the correct form of the idea, and as to why Hegel stresses that nature is the 
idea, albeit in the form of the non-idea. 
In Hegel’s explication of his concept of nature, he anticipates his 
concept of spirit by articulating a nondualistic, yet lapidary, distinction 
between the systematic status of finite nature and infinite spirit: the shape 
of the idea of nature is different from the shape of the idea of spirit insofar 
                                           
156  In “The Very Idea of the Idea of Nature, or Why Hegel Is Not an Idealist?” (Marker, 
1998, p. 10). 
157 Hegel, 2010, p. 670; 6/462. 
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as nature does not hold in itself its own Begriff, does not hold the concept 
of itself as a concretization of Idee, as a form of being. The natural does not 
know that it is an idea, for it is not conscious of any self, and hence is not 
conscious of itself. This implies that the natural cannot be said to be really 
conscious. It does not know, for if it had known, it would have known that 
it knew. Since for Hegel, contrary to the empiricist-ethologistic approach in 
the philosophy of knowledge, true consciousness is also conscious of itself 
as its own self, he negates knowledge (Wissen) in animals, but not 
cognition (Kennen). He hereby echoes Aristotle’s conception of physis 
which he interprets as an instinctive unconscious agency: “But because the 
urge [Trieb] is not a known end, the animal still does not know its ends as 
ends, and that that which unconsciously acts in accordance with ends 
Aristotle calls ϕύσις”.158 
The naturalist-vitalist view commonly opposes Hegel’s formulation of 
the primacy of spirit over nature, i.e. of self-consciousness over 
unconsciousness, claiming that nature produces the most precious good: 
life. Yet Hegel, who does not work on an anti-nature plea, would also agree 
that one of nature’s highest goods is life, however, he uses the term “life” 
in a broader sense, namely also as a logical category, not only as a mere 
natural phenomenon. He determines the spirit and its products, e.g. science 
or works of art, as even livelier than the natural life, containing “a higher 
kind of life [...] than the natural form”.159 It is clear to him that spirit is the 
“the truth and final goal of Nature and the genuine actuality of the Idea”.160  
                                           
158 Hegel, 1970, p. 389, § 360, Zusatz (my brackets); 9/473. 
159 Ibid., p. 18, § 248; 9/28f. Hegel writes: “eine höhere Lebendigkeit [...] als die 
natürliche Form”. By “Lebendigkeit” Hegel means the liveliness of the ‘self-moving’ 
categories of thought. Allen and Unwin translate somewhat misleadingly: “a higher 
animation [...] superior to natural form” (1970a, p. 209). 
160 Hegel, 1970, p. 24, § 251; 9/36. 
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Using die Idee as a medius terminus to bring together the categories of 
nature and spirit is admittedly perplexing, and the question of monism-
dualism arises unavoidably. Hegel’s response to the naturalistic worry 
about the dualistic dichotomy between nature and spirit is that they are both 
realizations of the same self-identical idea. The crucial point is that the 
transition of nature to spirit is “not a transition to an out-and-out Other, but 
is only a coming-to-itself of the mind that is outside itself in nature”.161 
Both spirit and nature have their place in the one system of thought. 
Hegel’s dialectic strategy is neither monistic nor dualistic, but rather shows 
that all phenomena of the real, both natural and spiritual, are stepwise and 
immanently connected with each other as well as with the “the idea”. The 
systematic categorical transition from nature to spirit is analogous to the 
transition from “life” to “recognition”, within the last part of the logic, “the 
idea”.  
The structure of the interrelation between nature and spirit aims at a 
conceptual “unity” (Einheit) in the sense of an inseparable entirety, the 
mode of being-one-with-each-other and at the same time being-one-with-
itself. While such “oneness” does mean being somehow aggregated 
together, it does not assume in advance the absolute state of being-one-and-
the-same like the naive monism of nature on the one hand, or the 
Geistmetaphysik on the other. The Hegelian categories “nature” and 
“spirit” are generic names for two manifestations within one unity. From its 
nature, naturalism also aspires to achieve such unity, but due to its totality-
claim it is constantly in danger of failing to name the nonnatural ingredient 
in the unity it seeks. The naturalistic approach neglects to acknowledge the 
manifestation of a being that is situated beyond or before nature and 
                                           
161 Hegel, 2007, p. 15, § 381, Zusatz; 10/25. 
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therefore capable of grasping nature as a whole, namely Geist, the self-
thinking nous.  
The interrelation between nature and spirit has a teleological meaning: 
“Spirit, just because it is the goal of Nature, is prior to it”.162 One has to 
think of this relation in logical terms, not chronological: since spirit is 
nature’s “end”, i.e. its “final purpose” (Endzweck), it can be set by the same 
token as the initial reason for nature’s being. Hegel’s radical position is that 
spirit has ontological priority over nature because spirit “posits” nature, i.e. 
spirit is that which “thinks” nature and relates to it conceptually. In Hegel’s 
system, both the organic nature and the idea of spirit exemplify paradigms 
of the infinite teleology, and hence of the Idee, in contrast to the finite 
teleology of mere objectivity. In contrast to the domesticating reading of 
Hegel, which admits only the convenient epistemological priority of spirit 
over nature,163 Hegel’s insight in the Science of Logic is rather that spirit is 
both ratio cognoscendi and ratio essendi of nature, for nature is not just an 
immediate given. The ontological priority of the spirit is not expressed in 
terms of “pure being” or “abstract essence”, but of the “concept”. Precisely 
for this reason, Hegel argues that the “substance” should be also construed 
as “subject”. The naturalistic approach conceals spirit’s dialectical 
relationship with nature, as it takes spirit to be dependent on nature and 
thus needy. Contrary to ontological naturalism, Hegel takes nature to be 
only finite realization of the idea, not the whole one. 
To come closer to Hegel’s critique of naturalism, we can observe the 
truth progress in the sentence ‘idealism is an idea’, compared with that of 
‘materialism is matter’. The latter is evidently wrong, insofar as 
materialism is an idea too, just unaware of itself as such. While attempting 
                                           
162 Hegel, 1970, p. 444, § 376 Addition; 9/538. 
163 Cf. Papazoglou, 2012, p. 33. 
 110 
 
to think that ‘all is matter’, the thinkers misunderstand themselves. 
Likewise, naturalism, under its own premises, does not indicate something 
natural, as it is neither a purely natural object, nor the object of natural 
scientific inquiry, but an idea unaware of itself as idea. This misological 
condition of not being self-aware is exactly what doxastic naturalism 
demands. Yet, only the spirit can be a real naturalist, while nature itself 
cannot be a naturalist at all. 
 
2.5.2 The natural as the initial and the common 
In his epistemology, Hegel uses the predicate “natural” in the meaning of 
initial, given, default, trivial, that which is first and foremost taken to be 
true. In this sense, he speaks of truth-skepticism as a “natural assumption” 
(natürliche Vorstellung),164 as a doxa, a belief made and held by a “natural 
consciousness” (natürliches Bewusstsein). The latter just begins its 
scientific education, its philosophical Bildung. This is why it was 
interpreted by Hyppolite as a “conscience commune”165 and by Taylor as an 
“ordinary consciousness of things”.166 In Hegel’s thought, naturalism itself 
would count as a natural thought, a common stance. 
The problem of this common consciousness is that as long as it 
conceives itself as natural and not as appertaining to the faculty of 
intelligence, it cannot go beyond itself and become knowledge, because: 
 
“Whatever is confined within the limits of natural life cannot by its own 
efforts go beyond its immediate existence; but it is driven beyond it by 
                                           
164 So translates Miller (Hegel, 1977, p. 48). Baillie translates: “It is natural to suppose 
that” (Hegel, 2003, p. 44). 
165 Hyppolite, 1946, p. 19. 
166 Taylor, 1975, p. 128. In the Zusätze in the Encyclopaedia we also encounter “das 
gewöhnliche Bewusstsein” (8/174, 9/18, 10/16). 
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something else, and this uprooting entails its death. Consciousness, 
however, is explicitly the Notion of itself. Hence it is something that 
goes beyond limits, and since these limits are its own, it is something 
that goes beyond itself.”167 
 
The natural embodiment itself is thus not necessarily a limitation of 
knowledge per se, but only of immortal existence. Hegel’s ontological 
concept of consciousness, namely of consciousness as Bewusst-sein, as a 
form of being, does not reduce consciousness to a natural body. Hegel does 
not limit the concept of consciousness to the immediate spatiotemporal Da 
of a certain Da-sein. Just as death is, in nature, logically continuous with 
life, in knowing, in a somewhat opposite manner, the self-conscious 
notionfull spirit is continuous with the unconscious notionless nature. The 
natural being is the initial moment of the spirit to be surpassed by the spirit 
itself. Because of its anticipated death, it is natural to the natural 
consciousness, the Naturgeist, not to want to go through the process of 
becoming “absolute spirit” or “pure knowledge”. Hegel’s “science of the 
experience of consciousness”, his Phenomenology of Spirit, is designed to 
assist with this task of sublating what he identifies and combats as the anti-
scientific skeptical sticking to the “natural beliefs”. In the act of thinking, 
the natural, so construed, is das Aufzuhebende par excellence, and 
therefore, in philosophy, the concept of nature is susceptible to a constant 
problematization. 
 
                                           
167 Hegel, 1977, p. 51; 3/74. 
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2.5.3 Nature as a riddle 
The problem of grasping the essence of nature continues to provoke our 
thinking again and again. Hegel expresses this problem in an original way 
insofar as he describes nature as “the unresolved contradiction” (der 
unaufglöste Widerspruch).168 The contradiction in nature is between the 
concept of nature, i.e. nature made into an object of knowledge or a ‘dead 
process’, and the being of nature, i.e. the workings of nature in the world. 
As we have shown, Hegel explicates the concept of nature as the idea being 
outside itself, as externality. This concept, which is our form of presenting 
nature as ‘dead’, ‘mechanical’ and merely ‘relational’, takes nature to be a 
mere object of knowledge constructed by the mind. This concept of nature 
stands in contrast to nature’s performative being. The performance of 
nature in space and time means its real organic existence and non-
mechanical life. Hegel points out that, by virtue of this contradictory 
logical structure of nature, spirit does not “find itself” in nature, is not at 
home in it, and only ahnt sich there, only has some “vague clue” of itself in 
it. In other words, spirit has only “the remotest idea” of how it is to be 
nature, and so nature becomes a “riddle” to spirit. This quandary, which 
ought not to be misinterpreted as mystifying nature, sees in nature a hard 
nut to crack and a worthwhile object of inquiry. 
The way Hegel addresses the riddle of nature brings to mind mutatis 
mutandis the Augustinian topos of the liber naturae, “the book of nature”. 
This topos was created in order to make the difficulty of understanding 
nature palpable. The figure of “the book of nature” embodies the idea of 
revealing nature’s laws in nature itself, in analogy to the reading of the 
divine laws in the liber scripturae, “the book of scripture”. However, for 
Augustine, nature is the second book god wrote for the uneducated poor 
                                           
168 Hegel, 1970, p. 17, § 248; 9/28 
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man, the idiota, in order to understand the divine doctrines more easily, 
namely with his eyes.169 In a kind of reply to Augustine, Galileo Galilei 
thought that the book of nature can become readable and comprehensible 
only for the mathematician, i.e. only if one understands its mathematical 
language with its geometrical “letters” of circles, triangles etc.170 From the 
other pole, Charles Baudelaire thought that the poet is the one who better 
understands the “vague words” of nature, as for him: “Nature is a temple in 
which living pillars sometimes give voice to confused words”.171 These two 
modern examples of passionate study of nature, the mathematical-
geometrical and the romantic-poetic, respectively represent a radical purist 
form of an exclusive absolute claim to understand nature. They both stand 
in contrast to Hegel’s picture of nature insofar as Hegel acknowledges that 
the attempt to comprehend the unconscious nature in its transition to 
consciousness, even if one carries out a strict conceptual analysis and even 
if one successfully contests and undermines naturalism, remains a lasting 
challenge in a true philosophical manner. The scientist and the poet, each in 
their own way, tell us their truth about nature while promising exclusivity. 
The thinker, in contrast, prefers to pose the questions and stress the 
possible difficulties and deficiencies in the common-sense forms of 
understanding. 
Due to the unintelligible nature of nature, nature remains ungraspable 
without the Geist. To better illustrate this riddle of nature, Hegel quotes 
Johann Georg Hamann, who compares nature with an unvocalized 
                                           
169 Cf. Augustine, 1956, p. 522: “May the sacred page be a book for you, so that you 
may hear; may the globe of the earth be a book for you, so that you may see; in these 
books only [Scripture], those who know letters read these things; in the whole world, 
even the fool can read”. 
170 Cf. Evernden, 1992, p. 52. 
171 Baudelaire, 1999, p. 55: “La Nature est un temple où de vivants piliers laissent 
parfois sortir de confuses paroles”. 
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“Hebrew word”,172 which cannot be correctly read without the help of the 
vocalizing Verstand. Hegel’s ambivalent ‘oceanic feeling’ towards the 
question of nature is also conveyed by the following words in a more 
precise manner: 
 
“What is Nature? [...] Nature confronts us as a riddle and a problem, 
whose solution both attracts us and repels us: attracts us, because Spirit 
is presaged in Nature; repels us, because Nature seems an alien 
existence, in which Spirit does not find itself. That is why Aristotle said 
that philosophy started from wonder. We start to perceive, we collect 
facts about the manifold formations and laws of Nature; this procedure, 
on its own account, runs on into endless detail in all directions, and just 
because no end can be perceived in it, this method does not satisfy us 
[...] What is Nature? It remains a problem”.173 
 
Recognizing the enduring philosophical problem of nature as open-ended, 
or even irresolvable, led Hegel to conceive the framework of his 
Naturphilosophie not simply as a positivistic attempt to ultimately answer 
the last great questions of nature, but as a logically structured tactic to 
follow the meaning of the ontological question of why there is nature at all. 
Hegel paints this question with cosmotheological colors: why did god 
produce nature, if god is the almighty unneedy? Why did the divinity create 
a non-divine being as nature or less divine than itself?174 Hegel’s response 
to this quandary is to negate the idea that god is “far from the world”. 
Instead, he suggests an epistemological model that would show that god 
“has two revelations, as nature and as spirit”. Since the logic of the human 
                                           
172 9/19. 
173 Hegel, 1970, p. 3; 9/11. 
174 Cf. 9/23. 
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spirit is to recognize itself through what it is not in the world, nature and 
spirit compose the world as a whole and hold it together. To the relief of 
naturalists, Hegel clearly rejects the deification of nature, although he 
mentions that nature contains something divine. Finally, he rejects, as 
mentioned before, that the natural has priority over other works of god, 
namely humans and their works.175  
 
2.6 In between conclusions 
This chapter has attempted to show that Hegel can be read as offering an 
ongoing dialogue with divergent streams of naturalism. Since this is a 
multifaceted dialogue, we had to focus only on the relevant aspects of it. 
We have seen that, although Hegel has shown interest in natural study, his 
thought is in and for itself not naturalistic, because his ideas about nature 
and spirit are not fully consistent with the above presented forms of 
naturalism. We concentrated only on the forms of naturalism relevant for 
our question concerning the character of Hegelian philosophy of science. 
The conclusion is that the tendency to ascribe naturalism to Hegel is 
more than just a local phenomenon of contemporary Anglophone 
scholarship insofar as it mirrors a questionable state of the art at the 
intersection between philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. The 
naturalistic reading interprets the natural world as a necessary 
presupposition for satisfying the needs of a self-conscious mind. At the 
same time, by using the etiquette “naturalistic”, it downsizes the reciprocal 
intersubjective dimension of recognition needed for the being of self-
consciousness. Restating a quasi-Kantian perspective, it emphasizes instead 
the natural embodiment of the individual mind as a form of limitation to the 
                                           
175 Cf. 9/27f. 
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knowing subject. Its hypothesis is that the finitude of the human cognitive 
capacity is allegedly caused by the very natural character of the embodied 
knowing subject. However, unlike the naturalistic claims, Hegel’s effort in 
the Phenomenology of Spirit is to show that the Kantian Erkenntniskritik, 
and any other naturalized epistemology, is in its turn criticizable and 
objectionable. Positively put, the naturalistic reading of Hegel succeeds in 
identifying and exposing a particularly crucial interconnection between 
Hegel’s conception of spirit and his general theory of knowledge. For at the 
heart of the “non-metaphysical” reading is, after all, the endeavor to purify 
Hegel’s name from being scientifically untenable. The various naturalistic 
interpretations embody a justified philosophical challenge, namely the 
lasting attempt to read spirit in its unity with nature. At this point, it is 
worth noting that the critique of the non-metaphysical reading must not 
necessarily lead to the confirmation of hermeticism and gnosticism in 
Hegel.176 
The question of naturalism has its value in that it leads to the question 
about being as a whole, and hence nature too. The question of nature itself 
is implied in the question of naturalism, and it leads us, in its turn, to the 
question of that which is not nature, of nature’s end: the intentional. This 
Geistige is that which demands to be known by itself. As long as spirit 
looks for itself in nature alone, and not in itself, it is not for itself de facto. 
The non-naturalistic concept of spirit underlies the normative-ontological 
space of ethical principles and plays an epistemic role in logically 
justifying it. In particular, it underlies and justifies the ethical principle of 
environmental responsibility towards nature. 
The only way to correct naturalism’s ‘own goal’ is to score another 
goal, beginning with gradually directing the intellectual sight from the 
                                           
176 As Glenn Magee’s argues in his Hegel and the Hermetic Tradition (2001) 
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natural to its other horizon. One of Hegel’s ways of doing this is to deliver 
a dialectical-phenomenological critique of pseudoscience in which he 
warns about the danger of taking naturalism about the mental literally. The 
next section addresses the way Hegel understands the problem of 
naturalism about the mental. 
 
2.7 What is not science? Transition to Hegel’s non-naturalistic concept 
of science through his critique of physiognomy and phrenology 
In the search for spirit as the general knowing subject, or as the subject of 
possible knowledge, one can fall into a serious materialistic trap about 
which Hegel warns in his critique of physiognomy and phrenology. The 
unmasking of this trap can be helpful in approaching Hegel’s theory of 
science. Although there is no doubt that physiognomy and phrenology are 
considered nowadays as obsolete pseudoscience to the extent that it seems 
useless to repeat Hegel’s objections, his critique aims at a certain 
systematic thought that can help us with a pre-understanding of his concept 
of science. I will now reconstruct his pertinent claims. 
Hegel argues that the main problem of physiognomy and phrenology as 
sciences is that they aim at understanding certain features of the spirit, 
namely human deeds and the moral character of persons, whereas in fact 
these pseudosciences look for traces of the spirit in the most opposite form 
of the spirit, namely the immediate natural form: the static bones and the 
arbitrary physical properties. They do not even try to look for the spirit in 
emotional embodiments like crying and laughing, the Verleiblichungen, 
which would perhaps be more expected. Therefore, physiognomy and 
phrenology only seem to be a rational result of “observing reason”, whereas 
in effect all they do, says Hegel ironically, is grasp reason unreasonably: 
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“Die Vernunft [...] ist [...] unvernünftig aufgefasst”.177 In contrast to other 
branches of philosophy of spirit, like psychology and anthropology, 
physiognomy and phrenology misconceive the true essence of the mental 
because of their self-subordination to the natural sciences – and this is due 
to a category mistake. Hegel points out that, in the end, their method does 
not lead to anything scientific because they do not recognize the nonnatural 
overindividual nature of the mental, or as Michael Quante put it, the 
“social-externalist character of the mental”.178 To look for the knowing 
subject does not mean to look for a certain biological organ. 
This thought is also relevant for the critique of naturalism in the brain 
science. Hegel himself argues that even when we see the “brain fibres” we 
do not grasp the “being of the spirit”, because if we see them they are 
separated from the whole of the body, dead on the operating table, and so 
not the true being of the spirit anymore.179 Hegel’s warning may look 
superfluous in our day because today we have imaging techniques such as 
x-ray computed tomography (CT) and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) 
that can make the brain visible by simulating the different functions of the 
brain areas without cutting it. Therefore, Hegel appears to be wrong in 
claiming that observing brain fibres already means looking at them when 
they are cut out from the living body. To be sure, in Hegel’s time, to look at 
the brain areas was literarily to look at “dead objects” (tote Gegenstände), 
but his critical point, however, is still applicable because the MRI brain 
simulations are themselves still not the living knower as a whole that can 
see and speak. The brain maps are themselves still dead objects that need 
interpretation. The language of neuroscience, if it is to be self-aware, ought 
                                           
177 3/262. 
178 Quante, 2010, p. 54. However, since Quante refers to this problem as “scientism”, he 
unintentionally gives the empirical natural sciences the priority among the sciences. 
179 3/261. 
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not to mistake the biological brain organ, be it dead or alive, for self-
consciousness itself. The same logical pitfall that appears in the language 
of naturalist epistemologists also appears in the language of naturalist 
neuroscientists when they confuse the biological organ of brain with 
consciousness as a whole. Maxwell Bennett and Peter Hacker have already 
pointed this out, naming it the “mereological fallacy”.180 The most 
important thing to remember in this context is the insight that 
consciousness may have a natural aspect, but the being of consciousness 
itself, per definition, is not physical, for consciousness is not a “natural 
kind”. 
 
                                           
180 Cf. Bennett and Hacker, 2003, pp. 68–74. 
 3. Approaching Hegel’s concept of science 
After dwelling on the deficiencies of the naturalistic readings, we now 
approach Hegel’s concept on science by examining his words on the issue. 
We will begin our investigation with what is not science for Hegel by 
eliminating three exemplary answers rejected by him as well as presenting 
his critique of the Kantian notion of science. We will then inquire into the 
concepts Geist and Wissenschaft, their translations, and how the different 
renderings affect the comprehension of Hegel’s concept of science. Since 
the whole project of the Phenomenology of Spirit, which is the declared 
“deduction of the concept of science”, aims at breaking through to the 
general level of the concept of science as the proper “standpoint of 
science”, investigations of the “Preface” and “Introduction” to the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, but also the Encyclopaedia, will help to bring us 
closer to an understanding of the main features of his conception, including 
the problem of beginning in science and his view on realism. Finally, we 
will suggest that Hegel’s concept is a possible response to Thomas Kuhn. 
 
3.1 What science is not 
3.1.1 Science is not knowledge by acquaintance: the case of anatomy 
To illustrate what science is, right at the beginning of the “Preface” to the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel gives a negative example of science, a 
science that “has no right to bear the name of Science”1 – anatomy. This 
initial move may be surprising, since it goes without saying that anatomy is 
                                           
1 Hegel, 1977, p. 1; 3/11. Miller translates Wissenschaft as “Science” with upper case. 
In 3.3.1 we will discuss this issue in more detail. 
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of course considered a science or a scientific study, namely a branch of 
biology, nowadays2 just as it was in Hegel’s day.3 Interestingly, in the 1858 
standard work, Gray’s Anatomy, anatomy is not taken to be a science; 
instead, in accord with Hegel, it is taken to be a descriptive “consideration 
of the various structures which make up the human organism”.4 Why does 
Hegel wish to take the title of ‘science’ away from anatomy? Why ‘de-
scientify’ anatomy? Hegel defines anatomy as the “Kenntnis” of the “parts 
of the body regarded as inanimate”,5 as a mere “Aggregat von 
Kenntnissen”. In this, he actually identifies three problems in the definition 
of anatomy that prevent it from being considered a proper science. 
The first problem is that anatomy is a Kenntnis. The problem of 
correctly translating the idea of Kenntnis, which is derived from kennen, 
into English is well-known: both kennen and wissen are commonly 
translated as “to know”. As John Dewey put it, kennen, just like γνωναι, 
noscere and connaître, indicates the “direct, prompt, immediate” mode of 
understanding, in contrast to wissen, which, just like εἰδέναι, scire and 
savoir, indicates the indirect, “roundabout and delayed” mode of 
understanding, the “circuitous apprehension” of meaning.6 Dewey took 
these distinctions from William James’ The Principles of Psychology7, who 
in turn took them from John Grote’s Exploratio Philosophica: Rough Notes 
on Modern Intellectual Science.8 Dewey’s explanation was that the 
                                           
2 Cf. Leslie Aeillo’s and Christopher Dean’s An Introduction to Human Evolutionary 
Anatomy, 2002, p. 1: “Anatomy is the science of the structure of animals”. 
3 Cf. Christian Gottlieb Selle’s Einleitung in das Studium der Natur- und 
Arzneiwissenschaft, 1777, p. 57: “Die Anatomie ist die Wissenschaft von dem Bau des 
menschlichen Körpers”. 
4 Gray, 1918, p. 1. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Dewey, 1997, p. 119. In How We Think, first published: 1910. 
7 James, 2007, vol. 1, p. 221. First published: 1890. 
8 Grote, 1865, p. 60. 
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equivalents of kennen and wissen could respectively be “to be acquainted 
with and to know of or about”.9 It is plausible to translate kennen as “to be 
acquainted with”, but to be exact, wissen simply means “to know”, as in “to 
know that”, and not only “to know of or about”. In fact, it is kennen that 
means “to know of or about” in the sense of having-heard-the-name-of. 
Like the French connaissance, it indicates a relatively lower degree of 
familiarity with an object, or, as Grote put it, “knowledge of 
acquaintance”,10 which Russell later reformulated as “knowledge by 
acquaintance”.11 For that reason, Dewey’s own pragmatic suggestion to 
translate kennen as “to know” and wissen as “to know that”12 is not 
satisfying and leaves the question of the semantic difference unanswered.  
Employing the German language further, one can say that such 
Kennenlernen (getting to know) that ends up only in Bekanntschaft 
(acquaintance or familiarity) is certainly not enough for the knowledge of 
Wissenschaft (science). To render Kenntnis in the case of Hegel’s critique 
of anatomy simply as “knowledge”, as Baillie and Miller do, is therefore 
highly problematic. In Miller, anatomy is the “knowledge of the parts of 
the body regarded as inanimate”13 and in Baillie “the knowledge of the 
parts of the body regarded as lifeless”.14 In this way, the meaning of 
Kenntnis is not sufficiently differentiated from the category of Wissen, so 
                                           
9 Dewey, 1997, p. 119. 
10 Grote, 1865, pp. 62, 121, 123, 148. Grote also calls this “phenomenal knowledge” 
(Ibid., pp. 2, 3, 14, 87, 142). 
11 The idea of knowledge as “acquaintance” that regards the phenomenal reality appears 
in Russell’s essay “On Denoting”, in Mind, 1905. The idea of “knowledge by 
acquaintance” is explicitly discussed in his “Knowledge by Acquaintance and 
Knowledge by Description”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1910–1911, 
reprinted in his: Mysticism and Logic (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1917, 
reprinted: Totowa, New Jersey: Barnes and Noble Books, 1951) pp. 152–167. 
12 Dewey, 1997, p. 119. 
13 Hegel, 1977, p. 1 (Miller). 
14 Hegel, 2003, p. 1 (Baillie). 
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that one risks misunderstanding Hegel’s epistemological distinction right at 
the beginning of his work. 
Hegel argues that anatomy, defined only as a set of Kenntnisse, is not 
Wissenschaft because it is not based on a real discursive process of 
knowledge by theory-laden concepts. Kenntnis contains only descriptive 
knowledge of empirically given facts, as in taxonomy or mere Fachwissen, 
without dispositions, process or prediction. It possesses thus only the 
declarative form of a propositional that-clause, i.e. knowledge-that or 
Seinswissen, to know that something “is”, or that “there is” something. To 
have Kenntniss of something does not necessarily mean to have a deep 
understanding of the essence of something as a whole or to have 
knowledge of the reasons or grounding of something. Miller comes closer 
to this understanding, insofar as he translates the words Aggregat von 
Kenntnissen as “aggregate of information”.15 The negation of the epistemic 
content of kennen becomes solid in the well-known passage: “Das 
Bekannte überhaupt ist darum, weil es bekannt ist, nicht erkannt”.16 From 
the above said, it is clear that there are problems with understanding the 
translation of this sentence as well. Miller translates: “Quite generally, the 
familiar, just because it is familiar, is not cognitively understood”,17 
without the original italics and without the concept of knowledge. Baillie 
rightly distinguishes between “properly known” and merely “familiarly 
known”, as he translates: “What is ‘familiarly known’ is not properly 
known, just for the reason that it is ‘familiar’”.18 In Hegelian terms, we can 
say that this passage itself is not necessarily well understood just because it 
became very famous. If ‘well-known’ means famous, that which is famous 
                                           
15 Hegel, 1977, p. 1. Baillie chooses “a collection of items of knowledge” (2003, p. 1). 
16 3/35. 
17 Hegel, 1977, p. 18 (Miller). 
18 Hegel, 2003, p. 17 (Baillie). 
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is not at once also very well known. In English one need say, the well-
known is not necessarily well enough known. 
Hegel, however, does not seem to stick to his identification of kennen as 
lower than erkennen, when he describes how the soul becomes spirit. He 
says there that through its full self-experience the soul comes to “Kenntnis” 
of what it is truly in itself, where one would expect Erkenntnis, as in the 
imperative erkenne dich selbst. But also in this context, Hegel uses 
Kenntnis as the direct phenomenal knowledge attained through experience, 
only that this time it is the experience that consciousness gains by dealing 
with concepts. 
To be sure, it is a bit difficult to understand the epistemological 
problem of anatomy through the weakness of the term Kenntnis alone, as 
only knowing-of, since Hegel’s problem with anatomy is epitomized, not 
only in the term Kenntnins, but also, and perhaps even more, in the term 
Aggregat.19 Thus, we have to reconsider the second and more 
comprehensible problem of the mere “aggregation” of knowledge. 
Being an Aggregat means being a collection or an assembly, and not 
necessarily a logically organized system or theory. Hegel uses the term 
“aggregate” in the negative meaning of a mere conjunction, an arbitrary 
combination which lacks the necessary coherent structure that scientific 
knowledge requires, namely a conceptual framework. This Hegelian use of 
the term has precedents. Kant claims that the Vernunft organizes the 
Verstandeserkenntnisse into one unity with the help of principles and 
according to one idea, so that they compose a law-like system, and not “an 
arbitrary aggregate”.20 Kant adopted this pejorative tone from Leibniz, who 
introduced the term “aggregate” to philosophy by describing the monad as 
                                           
19 3/72. 
20 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 673. 
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the true substantia simplex, in contrast to Democritus’ atom which he 
regarded as a mere substantia composita reached by aggregatum.21 Hegel, 
who stands in this tradition, refers to “aggregate” in the Encyclopaedia as 
an unsatisfying “arbitrary and empirical way” of gathering knowledge, 
which leads to the superficial form of common encyclopedias of sciences, 
in contrast to truly philosophical systematic encyclopedias.22 A precedence 
with a similar attitude towards encyclopedias, which Hegel may have 
known of, is Sebasitán Izquierdo who claims that true encyclopedic 
science, designated by him, still before Fichte, as “scientia de scientia”, is 
“non in aggregato omnium scientiarum”, in his Pharus Scientiarum 
(1659).23 
The third and perhaps less lucid problem which Hegel detects in 
anatomy, and which prevents it from being an epitome of science, is the 
fact that in anatomy we are informed about a dead body. But how does the 
lack of aliveness remove the status of science from anatomy? As noted at 
the end of the last chapter, it causes one to wonder what Hegel would think 
of modern imaging technologies, such as X-ray, ultrasound and MRI, with 
which the internal organs and other structures of a living body can 
nowadays be mapped and partially viewed. 
Doubtlessly, modern anatomy employs new technologies to study the 
body. Nevertheless, the question that matters is whether contemporary 
anatomy has undergone such a radical change in its essence that Hegel 
would call it a science today. The method of anatomy, which is naming 
sensually perceived items and learning them by heart, has not much 
                                           
21 Cf. Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, vol. 1, p. 102. 
22 Hegel, 1991, pp. 39f, § 16 (8/61). 
23 Cf. Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, vol. 12, p. 950, “Aggregat”; Cf. 
Miletto, Glauben und Wissen im Zeitalter der Reformation, 2004, pp. 163ff. The issue 
of systematicity will be dealt in 3.5.2. 
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changed. Learning to designate things is not a proper science on its own, 
for it is still a mere taxonomical endeavor which does not consist of holistic 
interpretations and knowledge of processes, i.e. knowledge of the forms of 
process in the world and of how they emerge and decay. As said before, the 
brain simulations are themselves not a living entity, but dead objects that 
call for interpretation. Modern anatomy would remain to Hegel as only a 
‘heap’ or a ‘pile’ of just some more ‘designations’ of body parts, a mere 
classification. Such proto-knowledge would not be enough for the 
knowledge of the spirit in its liveliness and wholeness. 
The purpose of Hegel’s critical discussion of anatomy is of course not 
serve as an introduction to anatomy, but to be a preliminary demarcation of 
science: true science is an altering body of knowledge which is not just 
descriptive, taxonomical or historical. In this, Hegel prepares the ground 
for defending the nature of philosophy as a proper scientific endeavor. This 
preparatory character of Hegel’s thought should be briefly explicated here. 
Hegel is troubled by the ordinary “general view” of science which 
states that anatomy is a proper science and, by the same token, that 
philosophy is not a science. This view holds that philosophical proof does 
not require all the details of how the investigation is executed, the 
“Ausführung”, since the thing itself, “die Sache selbst”, the “content of this 
science”, seems to be already included in the “aims” and “final results” 
declared by the author from the beginning. This ordinary view wrongly 
thinks that it already “possesses” the science of philosophy, in contrast to 
the science of anatomy in which the thing itself seems to be out of our 
reach. This problem is still highly relevant today: it seems that everyone 
can be a philosopher by nature, but no one can be anatomist by nature. 
Hegel challenges this view by arguing that it is as a result of speaking 
about everything, even “aims” and “universals”, in a “historical” and 
“uncomprehending way” (begrifflos), in which one also speaks about 
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nerves and muscles. Such a way of speaking, which is devoid of conceptual 
system, is pseudo-philosophical and prevents the thinker from reaching the 
truth in a real scientific manner. Since Hegel believes that we can deploy 
scientific concepts within philosophy, his goal is to show that philosophy is 
a genuine science which is actually far more scientific than anatomy. The 
case of anatomy ought to show that science cannot simply mean kennen in 
the sense of knowledge by acquaintance. 
 
3.1.2 Science is not purely empirical: against Baconian and Humean 
empiricism 
For the common view of science, there is nothing more obscure than the 
claim that science is not purely empirical. Already in his early years, Hegel 
did not consider science only as a descriptive empirical endeavor, as 
“Empirie”. In an early book review, he claims that an empirical proof 
procedure by observation is not science because it merely compares 
appearances with concepts, arguing that “in what the author [Gerstäcker] 
calls empirical natural science, we certainly proceed like that, but it is thus 
only empirical cognition [Empirie] and not science”.24 As shown in 1.3.1, 
the young Hegel also does not use the term science to refer to empirical 
cognition, but rather to theoretical knowledge, albeit one that is obtained by 
“mere reason” and “mere historical or deduced knowledge”. It is one of 
Hegel’s oldest fundamental ideas that neither the essence of scientific 
knowledge nor the project of its justification consists in purely empirical 
procedures. 
                                           
24 In “Gerstäcker’s Deduction of the Concept of Right” (1802): “In dem, was der 
Verfasser empirische Naturwissenschaft nennt, wird freilich so verfahren, aber dafür ist 
es Empirie und nicht Wissenschaft”, 2/276f), in Erlanger Literatur-Zeitung, 
Kritikenblatt, nr. 35, 1802. 
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In our repudiation of methodological naturalism in Hegel, we have 
already mentioned that he does not conceive of his “Philosophy of Nature” 
as an empirical investigation and even refrains from claiming that physics 
is a purely empirical science, because “the principal charge to be brought 
against physics is that it contains much more thought than it admits”.25 By 
presenting his “Philosophy of Nature” as an alternative model for 
philosophy of physics, Hegel exemplifies his critique of Hume’s 
empiricism, which he demonstrates at the beginning of the Encyclopaedia 
in paragraphs 37–39. Hegel identifies Hume’s empiricist view as the 
prototype of modern skepticism about the possibility of true universals. 
Hegel’s logic-based model of speculative philosophy of nature consists in 
the analysis of the meanings and contradictions of basic categories. He 
does not negate empirical cognition totally, but rather acknowledges that 
empirical inquiry provides science with the “ground” (Boden) and the 
“material” (Stoff). However, unlike the empiricist way of thinking, Hegel 
insists that, since the empirical element is only the sensually perceptible 
part, it does not amount to the “system of science” itself. He associates the 
most “fundamental illusion of scientific empiricism” with the habit of 
“unconscious” and “uncritical” presupposing metaphysical categories. 
Confining itself to the finitude of the sensually perceivable, the Humean 
empirical consciousness takes, without any further questions, the subjective 
realm of particular experience and individual perceptions to be the 
guarantee for the absoluteness of knowledge and then raises artificial 
doubts about the verifiability of the universal forms. In this way, no 
sufficient objectivity can be really attained. 
In the chapter “Observing Reason” in Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel 
deals with the problems of modern empirical science, not in order to 
                                           
25 Hegel, 1970, p. 3; 9/11. 
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naively praise the achievements of empirical science, but to prepare the 
reader for the constitution of another concept of science – a generic-
speculative one, namely his own. There is, however, a pro-Baconian 
reading which interprets Hegel’s relation to empirical science as positive 
and as emerging “clearly” from Hegel’s alleged enthusiastic approval of 
Bacon’s philosophy in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy.26 Pinkard 
attempts to find a proof for Hegel’s support of Bacon’s empiricism in 
Hegel’s own words: “And without the education (Ausbildung) of the 
experiential sciences for themselves philosophy could have come no further 
than the ancients”.27 In fact, without context, these words say only 
supposedly what Hegel really thinks. Pinkard downplays Hegel’s actual 
critique of Bacon. If we look at the original, we find: “ohne die Ausbildung 
der Erfahrungswissenschaften für sich hätte die Philosophie nicht weiter 
kommen können als bei den Alten”.28 These words are not Hegel’s report on 
his own view, but what Hegel says that Bacon thought to himself. 
Pinkard’s new pro-Baconian reading is questionable because Hegel’s use of 
the verb “hätte können” indicates here, as in the rest of this paragraph, the 
Konjunktiv I for expressing doubts in indirect speech, which means that this 
is what Bacon said to himself, as Hegel believes. In this way, Hegel clearly 
dissociates himself from Bacon’s view and, as proof of this, even explicitly 
states at the end of this paragraph that: “This is the spirit of Baconian 
philosophy”.29 Hegel’s talk of the “spirit” of Baconian philosophy is 
ironical, because, as he explains just before, Bacon denies the role of 
anything like “spirit” in science and knowledge. Right after this paragraph, 
Hegel criticizes the fact that Bacon takes the animal sensual experience as 
                                           
26 Pinkard, 1994, pp. 80f, 372f. 
27 Ibid., p. 373, footnote 7 (Pinkard’s translation). 
28 20/79 (my emphasis). 
29 Ibid.: “Dies ist der Geist der Baconischen Philosophie”. 
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the only source of knowledge, instead of considering unique human 
“thinking” as well. There is one place that seems to be Hegel’s ‘laudation’ 
of Bacon’s ‘worldliness’, but in fact, typical for Hegel, right after this 
sentence Hegel derides Bacon for believing, in a one-sided “uncritical” 
manner, that empirical science deals in truth only with sensual 
“experience”. Bacon forgets that while we generate knowledge we actually 
turn multiple perceptions of multiple “sensual particulars” into a 
“universal” form of thought, a mental representation. Hegel concludes that 
the biggest deficiency of Bacon’s way of thinking is the lack of 
acknowledgement of the differences between universalizing and 
particularizing. In his final analysis, the fatal consequence of Bacon’s 
outdated system is that the faculty of reason does not really come to 
acknowledge itself as what it is, as reason.  
In spite of the above, one can speak, in a certain sense, of Hegel’s 
‘speculative’ version of empiricism, if one keeps in mind that Hegel 
delivers in the Phenomenology of Spirit an alternative understanding of the 
empirical element of experience as the conceptual self-experience of 
consciousness. Our experience rests upon the conceptualization of 
perceptions and inferences drawn on the basis of theoretical dispositions. 
This Hegelian ‘conceptual empiricism’ has nothing to do with common 
positivism, for it does not take human experience to only consist of sense-
data or sensual perceptions, but rather to be enduring objectifying actions 
of consciousness which develop new conceptual schemes. Such ‘empirical 
knowledge’ of consciousness is not equivalent to animal vigilance and 
awareness, but to the recognition of conceptual structures in its objects and 
so with the knowledge of consciousness regarding itself. 
However, as we shall see in the next section, although Hegel holds that 
the empirical method, traditionally understood, is not sufficient to what he 
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calls science, his non-empiricist concept of science ought not to be simply 
replaced with the one-sided ‘rationalizing’ known as ‘armchair reasoning’.  
 
3.1.3 Science is not rationalizing: alteration in Hegel’s concept of science 
As mentioned before, in the period of 1793-1801, the very young Hegel 
defined scientific activity as a pure rationalizing by means of the 
mathematical method and formal logical inferences, as he was still 
influenced by the romantic critique of the Enlightenment. In his first essay, 
known as the “Tübingen essay”, he claimed that science is nothing more 
than the direct corollary of simple syllogisms performed by “mere reason”, 
by räsonieren. The latter became one of Hegel’s favorite terms for a non-
dialectical reasoning and a leading-to-nowhere calculus, which he 
considers as an intellectual assault, as something rotten. He continued to 
regard such “deduced knowledge” as artificial knowledge without value, 
for it is not wisdom and cannot help us in understanding how our moral 
decisions and systems of law came to be authoritative for us or how 
different religions or conceptions of art emerge out of each other. 
However, very soon after his first essay, Hegel began to see that this 
formalistic description of science did not correspond to the true idea of 
science, but rather to the abstract way of scholastic thought, which he 
called the “old metaphysics” or Verstandeswissenschaft. He firmly believed 
that the problematic “old metaphysics” ought to be completely overcome in 
the new post-Kantian era. This purely analytical Verstand-based science 
comes thereby under attack in all of his main works. In the “Preface” to the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, where one can clearly witness the positive 
alteration in Hegel’s relation to the content of proper science, he officially 
excludes the mathematical method from the realm of philosophical 
methodology. In a somewhat counter-Fregean prophetical speech, 70 years 
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before Frege’s influential work Begriffschrift, Hegel recognizes that the 
“formalism” that already dominates science will keep accompanying 
science until “the cognition of the absolute reality” successfully grasps its 
own nature and overcomes the naive undialectical mind-world gap. There 
is thus a change in Hegel’s relation to the ideal content of the concept of 
science after the early period, a turn-about, almost an about-face. After his 
declaration of love for science in Phenomenology of Spirit, we observe a 
permanent devotion to his new non-formalistic conception. In Science of 
Logic, mathematics is discarded again as “subordinate science”.30 The point 
is that true philosophical science cannot contain only purely analytic 
sentences, as mathematics does, because a philosophical science has to 
establish a genuine relation to the world, and it does this through world-
encompassing propositions. It is not enough to present a rational, consistent 
system of true sentences, for they also have to contain knowledge of real 
beings in the form of disclosure of the world, and not only of numbers, 
proportions or quantities. 
The alteration of Hegel’s early concept of science has methodological 
significance for the line of reasoning in our inquiry, because when Hegel 
goes against the mathematical-formalistic concept of science, he does not 
only attack external conceptions or historical views of other philosophers, 
he also systematically reviews his own concept of science from his early 
years. Since the formalistic way of understanding science is familiar to 
Hegel from his own world of thought and is thus natural to him, he aims at 
its Aufhebung. It belongs thus to the constitutive act of Hegelian scientific 
philosophy to begin with the dialectic critique of one’s own natural views. 
The aporetic situation is the following: Hegel’s concept of science 
seems to be neither empiricist nor rationalist. This statement is however 
                                           
30 Hegel, 2010, p. 9; 5/16. 
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not simply a self-contradiction. Hegelian science has neither only 
empirical-phenomenal nor rational-mathematical justification. But the 
question remains as to what exactly Hegel discovered that justified his U-
turn over these conceptions. Before we turn to this question, there is 
another prevailing conception of science that Hegel partly negates and that 
is worth discussing: the Kantian.  
 
3.2 Overcoming the Kantian concept of science 
Hegel principally agrees with Kant’s fundamental insight about the 
systematical structure of proper science. Yet, he attacks Kant’s concept of 
science and explicitly repudiates some basic Kantian thoughts. Since we 
cannot deal here with all aspects of Kant’s philosophy of science, we shall 
focus on (1) Kant’s epistemological construction of the “thing in itself”, (2) 
his priority of natural science as the safe way to science, (3) his statement 
that his work is not the system of science itself, but (4) only a search for 
secure method, and (5) his view about the accumulation of science. 
Hegel’s main criticism turns on Kant’s thesis of the unknowable “thing 
in itself”, which results in what Hegel derides as “finite” epistemology, a 
theory of cognition that overemphasizes the limits of human cognition. He 
argues that Kant’s epistemology presupposes the strict separation of human 
cognition from “the absolute”, which is in effect the goal of cognition. 
Hegel dismisses the very idea of Kant’s transcendental “thing in itself”, the 
intelligible “noumenon”, which is the opposition of “phenomenon”, i.e. of 
mere appearance of objects, as contradictory and as nothing less than a 
“ghost” (Gespenst).31 He argues that, instead of considering the Geistige, 
that which is inherent to the mind, Kant is satisfied with the construction of 
                                           
31 5/41. 
 134 
 
the “thing in itself”, which is, after all, still defined as a “thing”, and hence 
as a finite object of sensuality. Like Fichte before him, Hegel recognizes 
that Kant’s central philosophical concept is in fact skeptical about 
conceptual mediation. Hegel’s solution to the problem of the objectivity of 
such “thing in itself” consists in regarding this concept as a subjective 
thought, as our thought, and thereby not as something that can be truly 
divided from our consciousness. The “in itself” (Ansich), which is 
supposed to be intrinsic to the “thing”, is at the same time a relatum “for 
us” and so “for the consciousness”. Hegel calls this imagined relatum, 
which in Kant’s own terminology is “abstract”, an “empty” thought. For 
Hegel, Kant’s subjectivist notion of science lacks thus the most essential 
thing, namely “the absolute”, as the infinite divine cognition, and with it, 
the claim for the very possibility of absolute truth. 
Hegel’s uneasiness with the lack of a plausible notion of absoluteness in 
Kant’s epistemology is expressed in Faith and Knowledge where he refers 
to Kant’s epistemology as “subjective idealism”, saying that “the whole 
task and content of this philosophy is, not the cognition of the Absolute, but 
the cognition of this subjectivity. In other words, it is a critique of the 
cognitive faculties”.32 This means that he detects in Kant a wrongly 
conceived contrast between the absolute and subjectivity. The Kantian 
project of the “Kritik der Erkenntnisvermögen” leads to what Hegel calls 
the “realism of the finitude”,33 a problematic form of realism which does 
not let reason, and hence science, properly perceive and grasp anything 
beyond the limits of the sensual-natural. Kant’s conception lacks the 
foundation of the “highest idea” which manifests in titles such as “the 
eternal” and “the infinite”. Hegel finds fault with such understanding of 
                                           
32 Hegel, 1977b, p. 68; 2/303. 
33 Ibid., p. 63; 2/296. 
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Vernunft that reduces the ontological level of its objects to that of non-
conceptual sense data, a level of data which every animal can generate as 
well. He reproaches Kant for taking the accidental and arbitrary aspect of 
sensuality and naturality, which is characteristic of the empirical human 
being, namely the absolute “egoity” (Egoität), the viewpoint of the “I-ness” 
(Ichheit), to be nothing less than the criterion of truth. In other words, the 
maximal absolute is misleadingly set in Kant in the minimal I. One of the 
problematic results of this Kantian magisterial doctrine is the exorbitant 
critique of tradition per se. Kant denies the historicity of human knowledge. 
Hegel refers to Kant’s relativistic subjectivism as “formal idealism”.34 
He explains that Kant asserts the impossibility of cognition because he 
presupposes a strong “antithesis”, a diametric contrast, between finite and 
infinite, sensual and over-sensual etc.35 In contrast, Hegel argues that every 
being can be grasped both objectively, as finite “thing” (Ding), within the 
finite realm of “being” (Sein), and subjectively, as a “mental 
representation” (Vorstellung) within the infinite realm of “thinking” 
(Denken).36 Kant, for his part, feels he has to leave room for “faith”. Hegel 
misses therein a conceptual foundation for the ideal of divine knowledge 
and perfect cognition reached by overindividual transsubjective Vernunft.37 
He articulates that the problem with Kant is not simply that Kant criticizes 
the Vernunft, but rather that his own argument paradoxically criticizes the 
ability of criticizing itself. 
A fundamental problem arises concerning the limits of experience. 
Kant, like Locke before him, limits from the beginning the possible results 
of his epistemological investigation to the sensually experienced world, 
                                           
34 Ibid., p. 78; 2/314. 
35 Ibid., p. 63; 2/294f. 
36 Ibid., p. 76; 2/312. 
37 Cf. ibid., pp. 55ff; 2/288ff. 
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which means to finite knowledge and finite mind, more concretely: to the 
“human” mind in the sense of our “naturally” limited capacities as 
individuals. According to Hegel, Kant identifies a collision between the 
human knowing subject and the atomistically conceived things in the 
experienced world around him, only because he takes them both to be the 
absolute. This Kantian conception of finite knowledge, which on the one 
hand takes both the object and the subject to be the absolute, but on the 
other still completely divides them, is designated by Hegel as “formal 
knowledge”. Such knowledge connects the subject to the predicate through 
the mere copula.38 This non-speculative form of non-essential identity is, 
for Hegel, too simple, insofar as it does not contain the acknowledgement 
of diversity in unity. He thus criticizes Kant’s philosophy as being 
“empirical in a totally raw manner” and possessing “barbaric terminology”. 
Hegel even denies the scientific status (Wissenschaftlichkeit) of Kant’s 
philosophy: 
 
“[...] for it is worked out from points of view which are inherently rude 
and empirical, and a scientific form is the last thing that can be claimed 
for it. In the presentation of it there is a lack of philosophical 
abstraction, and it is expressed in the most commonplace way; to say 
nothing more of the barbarous terminology, Kant remains restricted and 
confined by his psychological point of view and empirical methods”.39 
 
In view of this critique, one can say that Hegel’s transcendental search “is 
driven on by a restlessness which leaves it no repose until the search for 
                                           
38 Cf. 2/310. 
39 In the summary of his review of Kant in the Lecture on History of Philosophy (Hegel, 
1995b, pp. 430f; 20/337). 
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conditions has led to the unconditioned”,40 but one cannot claim that this 
search is simply “Kantian”.41 
Hegel’s criticism concerning Kant’s epistemology can also be directed 
at the Quinean psychologistic concept of science, which reduces the idea of 
knowledge per se to the capacities of the individual human subject.42 
Almost prophetically, Hegel warns in Faith and Knowledge that Kant’s 
popularized view of “limited” (beschränkt) reason will lead philosophy one 
day to become empirical psychology,43 which is exactly what happened 
with Quine’s epistemology. The latter takes the human sensual experience 
to be the only true source of knowledge. Epistemology is then treated as an 
empirical natural science. Hegel also criticizes the outcome of such a view: 
the priority of natural science as the only safe way to true knowledge. 
From our previous discussions on Hegel’s critique of the priority of 
natural science, it follows that Hegel’s paradigm of science vastly differs 
from that of Kant, who regards proper science as natural science based on 
geometry, primarily Newton’s physics, because it is an exact mathematical 
representation with empirical grounding, a “rigorous science” (strenge 
Wissenschaft). Hegel, for his part, criticizes Newton for his “formalism”, 
suggesting that mathematics is not the only proper method for philosophy, 
just as natural science is not the only possible model for proper science. 
The reason Kant upholds mathematical natural science is that he believes it 
to have the safest method, even though he also criticizes Newton, like 
Hegel, for not acknowledging the metaphysical foundations in his scientific 
enterprise. Kant declares in the opening sentence of the preface to the 
second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason that his life-project is to find 
                                           
40 Westphal, 1992, p. 75. 
41 As Westphal claims (ibid.). 
42 As shown in 2.3.3.1. 
43 2/296. 
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for metaphysics “the secure method of science” (den sicheren Gang einer 
Wissenschaft) and the “safe way of science” (den sicheren Weg einer 
Wissenschaft). The intensive preoccupation with science as a life-project is 
also to be found in Hegel, but not the demand in advance for security or 
safety. As a matter of fact, Hegel refers to such “Versicherungen” as empty 
declarations, directing it mainly at Kant, but also at Descartes. Eventually, 
in clear contrast to Hegel’s epistemological ambitions, Kant says that his 
work deals only with the “method” of science and that it is not a “system of 
science”. 
Another issue about which Hegel disagrees with Kant is the 
accumulation of science. In the first sentence of the dedication of the 
Critique of Pure Reason to the noble Prussian minister of education, Karl 
Abraham Freiherr von Zedlitz, Kant describes his project as supporting 
“the growth of the sciences”.44 Kant believes in the possibility of the 
“growth” (Wachstum) of knowledge as well as its “increase” 
(Vermehrung). The common-sense view takes the progress of science to be 
a quantitative progress, a steady “accumulation” of knowledge. In favor of 
Kant, one can say that he does not hold science to be generated by a mere 
accumulation of sense perceptions, but rather by a conceptual unification 
under the categories of understanding, the Verstandeskategorien. Kant’s 
emphasis on “growth” can be read in a rhetorical context: Kant proficiently 
convinces the aristocratic minister that this royal project of science is in the 
“Excellency’s own interest”. The category of “growth” ought to suit the 
Excellency’s class of wealth and richness well.  
Hegel also acknowledges a kind of steady movement in knowledge, and 
even a progression. Yet, this is a qualitative progression, not quantitative, 
and it occurs through gaining more and more precise determinations, not 
                                           
44 Kant, 1998, p. 95. 
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simply more and more objects. In effect, the scientific progress has for him 
rather the meaning of an organic development of the same knowledge over 
time. Wrapped with different “shapes of consciousness”, it is the same 
Wissen, the same action of a thinking agency, or the same “being” in the 
Logic, that only becomes more and more “determined”, i.e. rich with 
logical determinations and conceptual distinctions. Famously, in the 
twentieth century it was Kuhn who brought into doubt such Kantian 
enlightened ideas of progress such as “development-by-accumulation”, 
“cumulative process” and “accretion”.45 It would be thus useful to compare 
Hegel and Kuhn, who share several common points, as we will do in 3.6. 
However, as we shall see, Kuhn’s conclusions about science completely 
differ from Hegel’s. 
Hegel makes a scathing attack, even more than Kuhn, on the “impulse 
to enlarge science”46 in the Difference essay in the context of Reinhold’s 
system. He criticizes Reinhold for conceiving science and philosophy only 
“as a kind of handicraft, something that can be improved by newly invented 
turns of skill” and hence as “a lifeless product of alien ingenuity”.47 He 
concludes that, in science, unlike in technological development, one ought 
to drop the common-sense idea of “constant improvements”.48 This 
recommendation goes against the vulgar view of Hegel’s supposed belief in 
progress. Hegel warns that the enthusiasm to enlarge science ends up by 
considering the preceding philosophical systems as “nothing but 
preparatory exercises [Vorübungen]”.49 Such Kantian-Reinholdian 
enthusiasm, so he criticizes, wrongly identifies any inclusion of history of 
                                           
45 Kuhn, 1962, p. 2. 
46 Hegel, 1977a, p. 86; 2/16. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid., p. 87; 2/17. 
49 Ibid. The original translation of “Vorübungen” as “practice studies” is misleading. 
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philosophy with “plagiarism”.50 While anticipating his own later thought 
phase, Hegel insists on a non-quantitative conception of science, whose 
core idea is the acknowledgement of mind’s self-relationality. 
Now that we have presented the main conceptions of science that Hegel 
rejected, we can come back to the question of what shaped his concept of 
science. As we will see, at some point Hegel recognized that the 
development of the collective self-thinking Geist can be interpreted as a 
phenomenological account of the scientific point of view. Over time, Hegel 
improved the formulation of his meta-thought and made it central to the 
reflection on the real forms of science. The next section contains a 
discussion on what Geist means to Hegel in the context of meta-science. 
 
3.3 Science as Geist 
3.3.1 Science as the “crown of a world of Spirit” 
Hegel conceives of science as the “crown of a world of Spirit”,51 
doubtlessly intending to praise it highly. Such admiration may initially 
seem to befit a kind of scientism, a residue of the so-called Enlightenment 
era. Hegel, however, does more than just convey historical enlightened 
thoughts, as he stresses that science is the most precious good in the world 
of spirit. Hegel’s dictum emphasizes, above all, the necessary involvement 
of the idea of spirit in the understanding of the essence of science. Geist, 
like the Greek nous, indicates the cognitive faculty of reflexive thought, the 
intellect. This dictum conveys two interrelating meanings: firstly, science is 
the highest point of the world of self-aware thinking, its most significant 
point, the ‘cherry on top of the cake’ which makes it all so worthwhile. 
                                           
50 Hegel, 1995, p. 166; 18/190. 
51 Hegel, 1977, p. 7; 3/19. 
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Secondly, and more difficultly, science governs or controls other inner-
worldly areas of the externalized spirit, such as law, history or state, and to 
some extent even religion and art. This scientific understanding amounts to 
Hegel’s secularization of the concept of spirit in the sense of making it 
more worldly, its Verweltlichung52 or mundanization. Hegel, who declares 
that it is science, and not religion or art, which is at the top of the world of 
spirit, seems to have found a special good in nothing else than modern 
science. Hegel’s first words on science thereby raise the question of the 
respectable status he attributes to science: ought science to be so honored? 
To better understand the meaning of the crown analogy, and not fall 
back to the old hazy idea of spirit’s transcendence, we shall observe 
another eulogistic formulation of Hegel that is worth rethinking. In the oak 
metaphor, Hegel compares the state of the well-developed science with the 
strong oak tree (Eiche), which is the highest point of the organic 
development of an acorn (Eichel). He diagnoses “the onset of the new 
spirit”53 in his time, a new beginning that is still far from being an 
accomplished form of knowledge, a “completed” (vollendet) science. Can 
science ever be “completed” at all? The topic of the analogical comparison 
is the completeness of the organic development of science out of the “new 
spirit”. At the highlight of the development of spirit, science positively 
appears as an ideal, as a standard of perfection. 
Furthermore, Hegel attributes to science, and hence to spirit as a whole, 
the perfect form of a “circle” (Kreis), and specifically: a kind of ourboros, 
the tail-devouring snake. Interestingly, Kant also uses the same symbol of 
circle in Dreams of a Spirit-Seer to affirm exactly what Hegel rejects: the 
                                           
52 Cf. Stekeler, 2014, p. 257. 
53 Hegel, 1977, p. 7; 3/19. Perhaps due to a typing error, “spirit” exceptionally appears 
here in Miller’s translation in lower case. 
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self-skepticism of science, its own “modest mistrust”54 regarding its ability 
to know. For Hegel, however, the image of a circle is organological, not 
geometrical, as he does not mean that science has come to its historical end 
or that it cannot be further developed. Rather, such circularity and 
completeness stand for the basic conditions of the enduring possibility of a 
non-dogmatic living science. It is not that the circle is closed, but rather that 
it makes life possible, like blood circle. 
With the exception of his early years, Hegel deals extensively with 
science in his main works and can reasonably be considered as a lover of 
science, and even as a proponent of an original kind of non-naturalistic 
scientism. By introducing the idea of spirit in the determination of science, 
Hegel attempts to surmount the historical phenomenon of modern 
naturalistic scientism that only assures doing well with “natural spirit”, and 
without the grounding idea of spirit as the whole of self-thought. 
However, Hegelian philosophy of science can be misinterpreted as 
taking science to be just one domain of the spirit among others.55 Pinkard 
argues in this direction when he says that “Hegelian philosophy of science 
aims to see scientific practice as part of the overall development of 
reflective social practice, of ‘spirit’”56 and that Hegel’s accounts “constitute 
all the ways in which ‘spirit’ can appear: as art, as politics, as ‘high 
culture’, as social critique, as religion, as science, and so on”.57 The merit 
of this passage is that Pinkard is one of the few readers who acknowledge, 
at least once, the existence of such a thing as “Hegelian philosophy of 
science”. Science is justly considered by Pinkard as one of the “formations 
                                           
54 Kant, 1900, p. 115. 
55 See more on this issue in section 3.5.1. 
56 Pinkard, 1994, p. 13 (my italics). 
57 Ibid., p. 83 (my italics).  
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of consciousness” (Gestaltungen des Bewusstseins),58 but he regards 
science only as one of the formations of consciousness, one among others, 
and not as the most developed one or even their “absolute” form. Pinkard 
identifies the “formations of consciousness” – and therefore science – with 
“forms of life”,59 “norms”60 or “historical phenomena”.61 But one ought to 
be careful not to presuppose that the term “science” refers only to modern 
empirical natural science. The core idea of Hegel’s scientific holism is 
expressed in his description of science as nothing less than the crown of the 
spirit’s world, and not just as some part of it. Modern empirical natural 
science is indeed regarded by Hegel as only one product of the spirit, 
namely of the sensual spirit. The intention of his project of dealing with 
science as a whole is, however, to mark out the path to “pure science”, a 
path that is already a “science” on its own. The interpretation of Hegel’s 
words should not aim at relativizing the status of science in his system by 
choosing without saying the empiricist use of the word science. Such 
interpretation can add to the puzzlement around the relation between 
science and spirit. The close link between science and spirit is not only 
evident in the phrase “the crown of a world of Spirit”, but also in Hegel’s 
concise assertion that spirit is science: “The Spirit that, so developed, 
knows itself as Spirit, is Science”.62 We thus need now to rethink the 
various meanings of science as spirit. 
 
                                           
58 Ibid., p. 9. 
59 Ibid., 
60 Ibid., p. 6. 
61 Ibid., p. 9. 
62 Hegel, 1977, p. 14; 3/29. 
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3.3.2 The twofold meaning of the science of Geist 
As aforesaid, the highly and organically-like developed spirit is for Hegel 
“science” itself, in the broad sense of the word. This state of the spirit is 
characterized in a double sense, namely as reaching the moment where 
spirit is “the knowledge of the spiritual” (das Wissen von dem Geistigen) as 
well as “the knowledge of itself as Spirit” (das Wissen von sich als dem 
Geiste).63 This twofold formulation of what Hegel understands by science 
is not just an emphasis on the same idea or a repetition of it, but rather a 
discernment that is crucial for a deeper reflection on the essence of science. 
These words do not just come to describe the reflective situation in which 
subject and object become somehow the same, establishing a kind of total 
equality. In that case, we would have simply said that spirit, as subject, is 
also its own object. But there is more to it than that. By this way of 
determining the concept of science, Hegel depicts a specific situation where 
spirit, as subject, knows that it is a spirit and a subject for itself, insofar as it 
experiences itself as knowledge about the various beings, and as such, it 
also knows itself – beyond all the other objects and beings. Spirit becomes, 
in this situation, a well-determined object which is not even an object 
anymore, but a thinking self. The self-reflective spirit reaches that point 
“for itself” (für sich selbst), i.e. not only from the perspective of someone 
else but also from its own perspective, for “it must be an object to itself, but 
just as immediately a sublated object, reflected into itself”.64 This idea 
belongs to phenomenology approached in the first person. 
It is unavoidable to be reminded by this double determination of science 
of how Aristotle defines in Metaphysics, mutatis mutandis, the stage of the 
best developed knowledge, using, however, the concept of god, not spirit. 
                                           
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid., p. 14; 3/28. 
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Aristotle, who declares that the science sought by him, later to be known as 
ta meta ta physica, contains the knowledge of the first principle, concludes 
that this is the “most venerable science” (τιμιοτάτη ἐπιστήμη) and the 
“most godly” (θειοτάτη), for two reasons: firstly because god (θεός) has it, 
and secondly because it has god as its immediate object. The object of this 
metascience, which is the life of god, as the best reality, is conceived as the 
thought of thought, νόησις νοήσεως.65 This recursive concept of self-
reflective thought, the thought that thinks of thought and hence of itself, i.e. 
the self-thinking thinking, is Aristotle’s core idea of divine knowledge as 
infinite reflective knowledge. This enduring self-referential noesis noeseos 
represents the dynamic life of the ‘supreme being’ as the “unmoved mover” 
and hence as the pure actuality, energeia, – an idea that comes back in 
Hegel’s view of the living substance that is a subject too, “pure, simple 
negativity”.66 
We now turn our attention back to Hegel, whose spirit was born out of 
Aristotle’s nous, but went beyond it. Hegel works out a different 
ontological thought: he does not declare that god alone is the owner of this 
higher self-conscious science, but also the human spirit. He adds to the 
determination of spirit the meaning of our common ethical and cultural 
praxis forms, indicating that it is the spirit, and hence the humanity, as an 
externalization of the spirit, that makes and develops science of science as 
well as science. By this, he takes an intellectual step that brings him beyond 
the Aristotelian theology and closer to the spirit of the modern humanities. 
Science is thus said to be the domain where we experience the spirit at 
work, its “actuality” (Wirklichkeit): “Science is its actuality and the realm 
                                           
65 Aristotle, Metaphysics, book 12, 1074 b34. 
66 Hegel, 1977, p. 10; 3/23. 
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which it builds for itself in its own element”.67 Taylor calls this thesis the 
“principle of necessary embodiment”,68 meaning the embodiment of the 
spirit in living subjects, language, and institutions. It is however important 
to remember that, although Hegel articulates that it is spirit that creates and 
“builds” (erbaut)69 science, the role of spirit in Hegel’s philosophy of 
science is not to create a pseudo-religious “edification” (Erbauung),70 i.e. 
an abstract vague feeling of being uplifted or elevated by emotions. At such 
edification aims the romantic view of science that misunderstands the 
essence of science. Hegel rather wants to remind us that spirit, as the 
ethical-normative intersubjective sphere, is that which makes us reasonable 
beings in the first place. 
The inclusion of the idea of the self-reflective spirit in Hegel’s 
determination of science is not arbitrary, but crucial for the understanding 
of the basic meaning of science as the realm of thought where we reflect on 
ourselves and the good justifications of our actions. Hegel defines science 
in respect of the spirit also in the Encyclopaedia, where he states that “the 
aim of all genuine science” is that spirit “shall recognize itself (sich selbst 
erkenne) in everything in heaven and on earth”. Science, as the self-
recognitive activity of spirit, is defined as spirit’s “apprehension (Erfassen) 
of itself”.71 The reference to “spirit”, along with “the absolute”, can be one 
of the main obstacles for the contemporary exegesis of Hegelian 
philosophy of science. The naturalistic reading must notice and admit that 
Hegel did not explicate that science is “the crown of a world of Nature”. 
The difficulty of understanding the relation between science and spirit is 
                                           
67 Hegel, 1977, p. 14; 3/29. 
68 Taylor, 1975, p. 83. 
69 Hegel, 1977, p. 14; 3/29. 
70 Ibid., p. 5; 3/16. 
71 Hegel, 2007, p. 3, § 377, Zusatz (my brackets); 10/10. 
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affected also by the problem of translating Geist as spirit. This problem 
shall be presented in the following. 
 
3.3.3 On the translation of Geist 
The existing translations of Geist as spirit and mind can cause difficulties 
in understanding the term.72 The polysem word Geist evidently suffers 
from overdetermination to the extent that the Langenscheidt Encyclopaedic 
German-English Dictionary (1990) lists 16 distinct entries for Geist. This 
word comprises such different meanings as demon, ghost, soul, brain, 
mind, spirit, inner meaning of a law, etc. In his Hegel Dictionary, Michael 
Inwood differentiates between nine Hegelian technical uses of the term 
Geist, from general “human mind” and psychological “subjective spirit” to 
social-institutional “objective spirit”, “world spirit” and “absolute spirit”, to 
list a few.73 Inwood correctly argues that “Hegel views these not as distinct 
senses of Geist, but as systematically related phases in the development of 
a single Geist”,74 because “Hegel begins by using a term in one or more of 
its already familiar senses and then develops his own sense or senses from 
it”.75 However, one can notice that what recurs in all these meanings is the 
Hegelian idea of Geist as the secularized self-knowing we-subject. 
It is therefore unsatisfactory to translate Geist only as spirit or mind, 
without any comment. The problem arises because, on the one hand, the 
term spirit may bring to mind the religious-theological context of Holy 
Spirit as a metaphysical supernatural being, an unreal invisible entity. Geist 
would then seem to stand for mere immateriality, emptiness or something 
                                           
72 David Charlston wrote his dissertation on the ambiguity of the translations: Hegel’s 
Phenomenology in Translation: A comparative analysis of translatorial hexis (2012). 
73 Inwood, 1992, pp. 274–277. 
74 Ibid., p. 276. 
75 Ibid., p. 14. 
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like a ghost.76 On the other hand, the term mind has much too widely used 
meanings, varying from a mere opinion, as in ‘changing one’s mind’, to a 
personal decision, as in ‘making up one’s mind’, memory, as in ‘keeping in 
one’s mind’, sanity, as in ‘losing one’s mind’, thought, volition, feeling etc. 
Above all, the problem of mind in the Hegelian context is that mind is 
usually treated as an individual I-subject, as something each one of us has 
‘in our brain’, which Hegel designates as “der subjektive Geist”, the finite 
embodied intelligence, in contrast to the collectively or socially understood 
general subject. This simplifying use is especially noticeable in the 
contemporary common use of the term ‘the mental’ in philosophy of mind 
and cognitive science. Here, the idea of Geist is not understood as Hegel 
takes it to be, namely as a collective intellect in the sense of a community 
organized around a true concept, a “Begriffsgemeinschaft”.77 
The discomforting translation of Geist leads the interpreter to look for a 
deeper meaning of the term in various possibilities such as society, 
humanity, arts, institutions, culture etc.78 The problem with such concrete 
suggestions is that they designate the various possible externalizations of 
Geist, the examples given by Hegel himself. The sought translation of Geist 
as a metacategory is supposed to designate the intrinsic being that wallows 
and prevails in all these externalizations, all these realized Geist-products. 
The Geist, like the nous, is the optimal knowing subject, because it is 
related to itself in its knowing. 
However, the difficulty in the translation of Geist is not the root of the 
main problem, but only a symptom that reveals the existence of a 
hypodermal problem in the understating of the original text. The main 
problem of rendering Geist or nous into a useable English term is rather the 
                                           
76 Cf. Hardimon, 1994, p. 43. 
77 Cf. Stekeler, 2014, p. 349. 
78 Cf. Hardimon, 1994. p. 42. 
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absence of a useable term and hence the lack of conceptual clarity 
regarding its meaning. This specific absence exists due to a general absence 
of a living theory of Geist within contemporary philosophy of science. In 
order to understand the nature of Geist better, there is a need to work 
against this absence. Hegel, for his part, shows that this is possible due to 
the method of philosophical phenomenology that reveals the activity of 
Geist in the history of thought. The Hegelian program of the dialectical 
language of thought is not simply concerned with reaffirming the old post-
Aristotelian medieval metaphysics, because the revealing of the active life 
of Geist in the Geist-world implies the revealing of concepts in their 
reality, represented by certain figures of thought and schools of thought. 
This kind of investigation belongs to the process of real self-knowing. 
According to Hegelian thought, such disclosure of the operative use of 
concepts, which is done by the Geist itself, is relevant for the introduction 
to any philosophy of science to come. 
In order to approximate more effectively Hegel’s concept of science, a 
rethinking of the problem of the translation of Wissenschaft is also 
required, as this also causes uneasiness. We shall turn to this now. 
 
3.4 On the translation of Wissenschaft 
3.4.1 A preliminary note on the problem of translating Wissenschaft as 
science 
The guide question of our inquiry turns on the meaning Hegel attributes to 
the word Wissenschaft. There is a general problem ˗ not only in Hegel ˗ in 
translating the German word Wissenschaft simply as science, without any 
comment on the inherent distinction between the two terms. At least 
morphologically, it is obvious that Wissenschaft is a derivative of Wissen, 
of knowledge, designating the development of knowledge. A German folk 
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etymology says that Wissenschaft is that which Wissen schafft, that which 
creates or produces knowledge. Wissenschaft means thus the process of the 
production of knowledge. The term Wissenschaft is also used in German as 
the translation for the Latin scientia in the sense of the philosophical quest 
for knowledge. Wissenschaft can be described as systematic knowledge or 
theoretical knowledge. It is therefore plausible when Pinkard argues that 
whenever Hegel speaks of Wissenschaft he means “‘science’ in the German 
sense of Wissenschaft – that is, a kind of structured theoretical 
knowledge”.79 It is not unproblematic, though, to add that this knowledge is 
of “some circumscribed domain”.80 Wissenschaft has rather a generic use in 
German that refers to the universal idea of scientific knowledge, the 
epitome of knowledge. The particular sciences are called the 
Einzelwissenschaften or simply die Wissenschaften in the plural form. 
Hegel scholars are certainly right when they decide to say something about 
the special sense of the word Wissenschaft. Whereas in German one 
understands the generic use of the word without much difficulty, such use 
does not seem to exist in English anymore. 
It becomes a bit perplexing when Pinkard explains that for Hegel 
Wissenschaft does not only mean “theoretical knowledge”, but also a 
“structured theoretical account of knowledge”.81 At this crucial locus of 
definition, Pinkard does not sufficiently reveal to us the problem of 
translating Wissenschaft as science, although he does touch on the issue. 
Does Wissenschaft mean “account of knowledge” as well as “knowledge”? 
Is it always like this or only in Hegel? Pinkard actually claims that Hegel’s 
“theory of knowledge” is “theory of the ground of all knowledge” which 
“would be”, again, “theoretical knowledge”. The term Wissenschaft seems 
                                           
79 Pinkard, 1994, p. 4.  
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid., p. 5. 
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to simultaneously mean “knowledge”, “account of knowledge” and “theory 
of the ground for knowledge”, whereas the words “account”, “theory” and 
“ground” are left underdetermined and only appear to be more mysterious. 
In defense of Pinkard’s reading, one can say that the unsolved fundamental 
gap between his own concept of science as modern empirical natural 
science and the content of Hegel’s concept of science was not completely 
ignored, as he is at least aware of the problem of translating Wissenschaft 
simply as science. 
I shall continue the analysis by reconsidering the existing translation of 
Hegel’s Wissenschaft as “Science” in upper case. 
 
3.4.2 The translation of Wissenschaft as Science in upper case 
Whereas the plural form “die Wissenschaften” in Hegel is translated as 
“sciences”, the term “die Wissenschaft” is translated by Miller as “Science” 
in upper case S. This translation causes one to wonder what is so special 
about the term die Wissenschaft. Why not use science in lower case? This 
choice of translation poses the question of the meaning of Wissenschaft in a 
fruitful comparative way that is not possible in the German discussion of 
the original text. 
The upper case S in Miller’s translation is, at least initially, a confusing 
neographism. In fact, Miller is not the first to capitalize Hegel’s terms. 
There are already several occasions of translating Wissenschaft as 
“Science” in Stirling’s The Secret of Hegel (1865), along with the normal 
use of the term “science” in lower case. It seems that translators ask 
themselves why Hegel says something like “the science”. In contrast to 
English, in German, it is common for Wissenschaft to appear as die 
Wissenschaft. But the questions remain as to why the term die Wissenschaft 
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regularly includes the definite article, and as to how to transfer the 
uniqueness of this word grammatically into English.  
When Hegel speaks of “die Wissenschaft” he refers to science in 
general. He does not mean a particular science. Although the German die, 
just like the English ‘the’, usually stands for the definite article referring to 
a noun that is already known to a specific listener, it can also indicate, like 
in our case, the generic use of the definite article, like the ‘the’ in ‘the 
human being’, der Mensch. It can also indicate the uniqueness of one thing, 
as in ‘the sun’, die Sonne. The die in die Wissenschaft does not thus refer to 
any specifically determined science, as the ordinary definite article usually 
does, but rather to the idea of science itself which is taken to be generally 
known to the listener. Die Wissenschaft is the project of all the sciences 
together. In English, in contrast, it is simply not common, at least not 
anymore, to speak generally of ‘the science’ in the broad sense, when 
referring to the idea of scientific knowledge or to the project of the various 
particular sciences. 
Not having a specific and proper way to signify this distinction in 
ordinary language, Miller prefers the translation “Science” with a capital S, 
just as in other Hegelian terms such as Spirit, Idea, Reason etc. This use 
has already been compared with “over-inflated rhetoric or extravagant 
metaphysical claims”.82 In fact, the translator aspires to render the special 
tone in which Hegel adds predicates to subjects, as he is aware of Hegel’s 
speculative mode of using concepts, in which he aims at both analyzing and 
synthesizing a certain concept in one and the same sentence. But Hegel’s 
own voice is actually enough to hear his philosophical treatment of the 
hidden layers in the concepts. Miller’s thought-provoking style aims at 
resembling the way the German language signifies all its nouns, its 
                                           
82 Charlston, 2012, p. 167. 
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Substantive. The rhetorical uppercasing is an attempt, more or less 
successful, to solve the problem of transferring the generalness of the 
meaning of die in die Wissenschaft. This meaning is in accord with the 
basic idea of the universality of science on the one hand, and the unity of 
science in the sense of its wholeness on the other. These two conceptual 
determinations are explicitly discussed by Hegel, and they are highly 
significant for understanding his concept of science.83 
Nonetheless, I would suggest that the term science without articles or 
upper case S can be said to have – positively formulated – the zero article, 
which is used in English with other nouns, like school, class, university, 
hospital and government. The use of zero articles can indicate the 
institutional sense of such general nouns. In this respect, it is appropriate to 
translate die Wissenschaft as science in lower case and it is perhaps, as 
David Charlston says, “deliberately more modest” and “more 
reasonable”.84 The same goes for the term philosophy, which is rendered in 
German as die Philosophie, and spirit, der Geist. 
We cannot now avoid being confronted with the seemingly 
insurmountable hermeneutic gap between the content of the concept of 
science in Hegel’s time and our own time. The next section will explain 
why this gap is a kind of synecdoche. 
 
3.4.3 The synecdoche of science: from ‘knowledge’ to ‘natural knowledge’ 
Science, as is well known, lives in different languages. The English word 
science comes from the Old French science, which was derived from the 
Latin noun scientia, ‘knowledge’, and the verb scire, ‘to know’. 
                                           
83 Cf. Tom Rockmore’s essay “Hegel and the Unity of Science Programm” (1989a). 
84 Charlston, 2012, p. 167. Charlston does not explain the philosophical consequences 
of the semantic differences between ‘definite article’ and ‘zero article’. 
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Interestingly, whereas the analytic verb scire has the proto-Indo-European 
root skey which means to split, dissect, separate or discern, like in scindere, 
in the Greek schizein or the German scheiden, the verb ‘to know’ has the 
same root gno as the Latin gnoscrere or the Greek gignoskein. In contrast 
to both, Wissen has the root ueid, ‘seen’, like in videre, and in the Greek 
eidenai, ‘to know’. The concept of knowledge thus accommodates and 
unites two ancient paradigms: knowledge as discerning and knowledge as 
seeing. Be this as it may, when we use the term science nowadays, we 
usually do not think of knowledge in a general or abstract manner. Rather, 
we think of a certain kind of knowledge we also call scientific knowledge. 
But science, of course, cannot be simply defined as scientific knowledge, 
where the explicandum comes back in the explicans. This etymological 
state of the term gives rise thus to the following question: how did science 
come to differ so vastly from knowledge? 
Roughly until the Enlightenment, science meant scientia, knowledge in 
general. At the same time, it also meant any systematic knowledge and any 
academic discipline. In most of the Roman languages the word 
corresponding to science still carries this meaning. As natural philosophy 
gradually gave way to the term natural science, the primary meaning of the 
word science became limited to empirical research. The latter, however, is 
not scientia anymore, but rather a form of data assembly. This shift in the 
meaning of the word science from knowledge in general to natural science 
can also be partly identified in the German word Wissenschaft, to leave out 
Hegel and some others, already at the “end of metaphysics” during the 
eighteenth century.85 The common explanation for this process is the 
alleged success of the natural sciences. But in fact, this is a rather historical 
misconstruction that has led to what Husserl called “Krisis der 
                                           
85 Cf. Jaeschke, 2010, p. 176. 
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Wissenschaften”. Wissenschaft is no longer understood as reasonable 
philosophical knowledge, but rather as a particular, mostly empirical, 
science which proceeds in a historical-like manner and relates only to 
particular details.86 Wissenschaft, which became ‘science’ in the common 
sense, is thus wrongly conceived as historia or Naturwissenschaft. 
Wissenschaft, albeit in a weaker form, because the humanities are still 
called Geisteswissenschaft. 
The change of the meaning of science is not simply a historical or 
natural shift from scientia to modern science. This change corresponds to a 
constriction of the meaning and ought not to be merely categorized as an 
etymological change unworthy of philosophical deliberation. The 
substitution of the term ‘modern empirical natural science’ simply with the 
term ‘science’ presents us with a narrowing or downsizing figure of speech. 
Such use of the term is not a metaphor, but a metonymy that can be 
classified as synecdoche, namely totum pro parte. In a synecdoche a term 
for the whole of something refers to a part of something or vice versa. In 
the synecdoche of science, the general term science is taken to be adequate 
for the presentation of only one component of science, natural science, so 
that the term science is literally narrowed. 
This is, however, surely not only question of semantics. This 
synecdoche in the term science manifests the received view of science, the 
doxa of science. It is a rhetorical strategy to promote naturalistic ideology, 
according to which only natural science is valid as proper science. This 
narrowing ideology takes itself to be a necessary ontological position in the 
theory of science; whereas, following Hegel’s line of thought, it is unaware 
of the necessity to overcome its own fundamental position – if it is willing 
to investigate the truth of itself. 
                                           
86 Cf., ibid., p. 175 
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3.5 What is science? 
Now that we have contemplated the different views of science that Hegel 
negates, we are more prepared for the question of what science is. Like 
every question of the form ‘what is x?’ the question ‘what is science?’ 
presupposes the very being of that which is called ‘science’. This question 
is thus somehow wrongly formulated and should read more rigorously as 
follows: what is that which eventually becomes science? How does 
anything become science? What makes anything into science? What does 
science do? As we shall see, the reason for employing the category of 
‘becoming’ rather than ‘is’ is that the ‘being’ of science, in Hegelian terms, 
consists in a constant alteration and development of a living whole, “ein 
werdendes Ganze”, performed by a self-conscious being. 
The next sections deal with Hegel’s basic ideas in a reconstructive 
manner and can be read as preliminaries for a broader discussion on his 
philosophy of science. 
 
3.5.1 Self-knowledge 
The idea of Wissenschaft as the development of self-knowledge in general, 
and not only of natural science, also continues to remain at the center of 
Hegel’s terminology after Phenomenology of Spirit. A good example of 
this conception can be found in an early systematic sketch for the 
Encyclopaedia from 1808. Hegel wrote it for his pupils at the time that he 
was teaching logic in a high school in Nurnberg.87 In the last part of this 
work, at the clearly highest point of the system, Hegel poses a section on 
                                           
87 Karl Rosenkranz published it in 1840 under the title Philosophische Enzyklopädie für 
die Oberklasse, among other Hegelian Texte zur Philosophischen Propädeutik. 
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science called “III. Die Wissenschaft” (§ 208), located after art and 
religion, in the last and third part “Wissenschaft des Geistes”. In this 
paragraph Hegel attempts to define science: 
 
“Science is the conceptualizing cognition (begreifende Erkenntnis) of 
the absolute spirit. When the absolute spirit is being grasped in a 
conceptual form, the whole alienation within knowledge is sublated 
(aufgehoben), and knowledge has reached perfect equality with itself. 
This knowledge is the concept (Begriff), whose content is [the concept] 
itself, and which conceptualizes itself (sich begreift)”.88 
 
This definition of science as the conceptualizing cognition of the absolute 
spirit performed by the self-conceptualizing concept proves not to be that 
simple at all, as it raises question upon question: who is the absolute spirit 
that science confronts? How can it be the subject of human cognition? Why 
is there alienation in knowledge in the first place? How can it be sublated? 
What does it mean that knowledge is equal with itself? How can the 
concept conceptualize itself in a non-mystical way? One thing is clear: 
science is a perfect knowledge, a kind of noesis noeseos. But is it possible 
at all to have such knowledge? 
In this definition, Hegel repeats three elements from the definition in 
Phenomenology of Spirit, with which we have already dealt: (1) the 
concept (Begriff), as the result of the act of conceptualizing (Begreifen), i.e. 
                                           
88 4/69: “Die Wissenschaft ist die begreifende Erkenntnis des absoluten Geistes. Indem 
er in Begriffsform aufgefaßt wird, ist alles Fremdsein im Wissen aufgehoben, und dies 
hat die vollkommene Gleichheit mit sich selbst erlangt. Es ist der Begriff, der sich selbst 
zum Inhalt hat und sich begreift”. Wolfgang Bonsiepen dedicated an essay to this 
seldom-discussed passage: “Zur Datierung und Interpretation des Fragments ‘C. Die 
Wissenschaft’”, in Hegel-Studien, 12, 1977, pp. 179–189. 
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of understanding through reason, (2) the spirit in its absolute form and (3) 
self-knowledge. In the phrase “cognition of the absolute spirit”, we 
encounter again the double meaning which echoes the Aristotelian way of 
thinking. In the genitivus objectivus this phrase refers to a cognition whose 
object is the absolute spirit, whereas in the genitivus subjectivus it refers to 
a cognition generated by the absolute spirit. This sort of utter cognition 
involves being identical with itself after quitting being “alienated” 
knowledge. The latter always takes its object to be necessarily other than 
itself, namely other than knowledge. The novelty of this Hegelian 
observation is its location at the end of the system, at the last ‘stop on the 
line’, which is not simply a line, but rather a circuit. This final destination 
represents a kind of sublime point within the Hegelian non-descriptive 
theory of Wissenschaft as a concrete form of self-knowledge. 
This section was modified in the Encyclopaedia (1817), so that the 
corresponding chapter “Science” was renamed “Philosophy”. The 
inevitable impression is that for Hegel philosophy and science became at 
this point equated concerning their systematic status. This impression can 
be read as an approval of Hegel’s aspiration to present philosophy as 
science, an issue that will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. From 
this point on, Hegel uses the terms philosophy and science interchangeably 
and speaks of “philosophical science”. Also in his last words on the history 
of philosophy, in the last chapter of the lectures, “E. Final Result”, we find 
similar thoughts about science, namely that the last period of time, the 
present time, corresponds to the self-realization of the absolute spirit in 
science. Spirit attains actuality 
 
“[...] only as the result of its knowing itself to be absolute spirit, and 
this it knows in real scientific knowledge. Spirit produces itself as 
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Nature, as the State [...]. In scientific knowledge alone it knows itself as 
absolute spirit”.89 
 
Wissenschaft is here translated as “real scientific knowledge”, and we can 
sense again the uneasiness of translating Wissenschaft simply as “science” 
and the anticipated problems in the comprehension of this term. For Hegel, 
science is an indication of the presence of “absolute knowledge” in time, 
not of Hegel’s allegedly own “absolute knowledge” of everything. 
As if to make it even more complicated, Hegel approvingly adds a 
Schellingian determination of Wissenschaft which makes it sounds 
somewhat enigmatic: “To know opposition in unity, and unity in opposition 
– this is absolute knowledge; and science is the knowledge of this unity in 
its whole development by means of itself”.90 At first glance, the schematic 
opposition between the subjective and the objective does not explain clearly 
enough the meaning of “by means of itself”. How exactly can science know 
the “whole development” of the subject-object unity? Here Hegel raises a 
developmental claim in the face of science: science, as the development of 
knowledge, must be aware of its own immanent historical dimension. The 
phenomenon of our self-knowledge reflects, above all, a particular form of 
being, of our being. 
With the Science of Logic which presents “pure science”, and with the 
Encyclopaedia which presents other “philosophical sciences”, we discover 
that science also remains at the top of the developed system after 
                                           
89 Hegel, 1995b, p. 552; 20/460. “Denn er [der Geist] ist dies [wirklich] nur, indem er 
sich selbst als absoluten Geist weiß; und dies weiß er in der Wissenschaft. Der Geist 
produziert sich als Natur, als Staat; [...] aber nur in der Wissenschaft weiß er von sich 
als absolutem Geist”. 
90 Ibid., p. 551; 20/460: “In der Einheit den Gegensatz, und in dem Gegensatz die 
Einheit zu wissen, dies ist das absolute Wissen; und die Wissenschaft ist dies, diese 
Einheit in ihrer ganzen Entwicklung durch sich selbst zu wissen”. 
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Phenomenology of Spirit. But science is conceived by Hegel, not only as 
self-knowledge of the absolute spirit, but also as the system per se. At this 
point, a deliberation on the original meaning of this term can shed light on 
what Hegel intended by this term. 
 
3.5.2 System 
In the “Preface” to Phenomenology of Science Hegel describes science as a 
“system”,91 while following a tradition that can be traced back to the Stoic 
Philosophy. Plato, Aristotle, and their precedents do not mention the term 
σύστημα, i.e. sýstēma, in the context of science. Plato only uses this term in 
the music theory of intervals, while Aristotle uses it only in literature 
theory, in his description of the polis, and in his philosophy of nature in the 
context of organism and life genesis.92 Referring to science explicitly as 
σύστημα is thus a rather post-Platonic and post-Aristotelian phenomenon. 
It was the Stoics who first understood science as σύσ-τημα, verbatim ‘com-
position’. Their system consists of premises and conclusions which 
together form an inference, i.e. logos. Hegel also thinks of composition, 
and it is significant to note that composition here does not mean 
construction. What Hegel has in mind when he thinks of science as a 
system is a dialectically designed set of conceptual determinations and 
premises, which together form a whole that is set in motion with the help of 
contradictions and conclusions. The logical proof of such a system is, 
however, in contrast to the Stoic view, not just generated syllogistically. In 
his use of the term System, Hegel rather pays tribute to the Lambertian – 
later Kantian – grounding distinction between systematic and historical 
                                           
91 3/14, 22, 27, 66. 
92 Cf. Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, vol. 10, p. 824. 
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thought.93 More than anybody else, however, it was Kant who, himself 
inspired by Lambert, influenced Hegel’s conception of science as a whole 
that entertains the character of systematicity. Kant’s claim is that all true 
knowledge must be capable of being systematized under one idea. Let us 
briefly observe the influence of Kant on Hegel in this issue. 
Kant provides a concise definition of science in his work Metaphysical 
Foundations of Natural Science (1786): “Every doctrine, if it is to be a 
system, i.e., a whole of cognition ordered according to principles, is called 
science”.94 He argues that the human Vernunft is discursive and thereby has 
a permanent interest in systematizing its knowledge by means of inferring 
from first principles. Science is thus a rational and logical product of 
human reason, which possesses in its nature the property of being 
systematic. Kant develops his concept of system as opposed to that of a 
loosened “rhapsody”95 or a “mere aggregate”.96 Hegel does much the same 
when he negates the idea of aggregate of knowledge in science.97 Kant 
understands by system “the unity of various kinds of knowledge under one 
idea”.98 Hegel adopts this idea of being “under one idea” and actively 
integrates the “various kinds of knowledge” into one “system of science”. 
In Faith and Knowledge Hegel even takes this Kantian idea of a guiding 
meta-idea or super-idea to be the most positive merit of Kantian 
fundamental idealism.99 Kant passed on this view, first to Fichte, and then 
to Schelling and Hegel, who all had high respect for the Kantian project of 
                                           
93 In Lambert’s Fragment einer Systematologie from 1767 (cf. Historisches Wörterbuch 
der Philosophie, vol. 10, p. 830). 
94 Kant, 2004, p. 3.  
95 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 106, 860–862. 
96 Ibid., B 860 /A 832. 
97 Hegel, 1977, p. 1 (Miller); see also section 3.1.1. 
98 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 860 /A 832. 
99 Cf. Hegel, 1977b, p. 68; 2/303. 
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developing a systematic science, although they had different conceptions 
regarding system and science.100 The modernist task for Kant and the post-
Kantians was to make a systematic science out of philosophy, and so it was 
the Kantian philosophy which contributed to Hegel the idea of 
systematicity within a non-aggregative conception of science, along with 
the condition of the subsumption of the system under one idea. 
 
3.5.3 Becoming 
Besides arguing that science is a form of systematic self-knowledge, Hegel 
refers to the development of science as a constant activity of self-
consciousness, namely a cognitive process of spirit’s self-discovery. The 
conception of science as a changing process challenges that of science as 
apodictic knowledge and is one of Hegel’s most influential ideas. This 
dynamic conception begins a new era of overcoming received dogmatic 
conceptions of the static ‘eternal forms’. It led Richard Rorty to speak with 
enthusiasm of Hegel’s “protopragmatism” as that which helped “to switch 
over from fantasies of contacting eternality”.101 Yet, the anti-epistemologist 
Rorty argues that such protopragmatism “helped us to start substituting 
hope for knowledge”,102 whereas Hegel himself never seems to have given 
up the “hope for knowledge”. On the contrary, Hegel believes that 
philosophy can “lay aside the title of ‘love of knowing’ and be actual 
knowledge.”103 Let us thus review Hegel’s idea of science as a process in 
light of the question of pragmatism. 
                                           
100 As was shown in 3.2. and will be shown in 4.3. 
101 Rorty, 1998, pp. 232f. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Hegel, 1977, p. 3; 3/14. 
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The process of science, as we learn from Science of Logic, is 
demonstrable and amounts to the “deduction” of the concept of science, i.e. 
the justification of the capability of the scientific categories to operate 
thinking. Here, Hegel is thinking of Deduktion in the Kantian sense of 
transcendental proof concerning the conditions of the possibility, not in the 
common sense of applying some general rules on particulars in a syllogistic 
fashion. The processuality of science implies the “genesis” of science, 
which Hegel calls “Werden”. The whole project of the Phenomenology of 
Spirit sets out to expose this genesis: “It is this coming-to-be of Science as 
such or of knowledge, that is described in this Phenomenology of Spirit”.104 
The translation of Werden as “coming-to-be” is not without difficulty, since 
for Hegel, the logical category of Werden refers to that which changes 
constantly and so combines in itself some “being” (Sein) as well as some 
“nothing" (Nichts). Choosing the term Werden is by no means arbitrary or 
idiomatic, for it has the meaning of an ontological category that determines 
the dynamic act of emerging and decaying in the ontic space. In the process 
of becoming science, both being and nothing take part. The scientific 
process is thus a movement of self-knowledge that essentially exhibits the 
dimension of historicity.  
Such a genealogical position towards knowledge may resemble, prima 
facie, Kuhn’s pro-historicist science theory which acknowledges the 
importance of studying the history of science for the sake of understanding 
science. Hegel, however, would not be satisfied with merely pointing out 
the positive value of learning old scientific theories. Hegel speaks of the 
Werden of science because he wants to formulate the fürsich of science, its 
‘self’, as an institutional system with an inner ‘motor’ that goes beyond the 
                                           
104 Ibid., p. 15 (Miller); 3/31: “Dies Werden der Wissenschaft überhaupt oder des 
Wissens ist es, was diese Phänomenologie des Geistes darstellt”. 
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mere aggregate of individual intuitions. In the terminology of Hegel’s 
ontology, his logic of generic entities, the basic categories of “being” and 
“nothing” together form a unity that comes to exist fully on its own as a 
Dasein that is for itself and is a proper subject. At the end of the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, the becoming of science gives birth to a concrete-
universal form of Dasein: the scientific viewpoint. 
Exactly because science undergoes a process of Werden, like any other 
object, system, or form in the world, the contents of science are describable 
and presentable. Since science is human practice, it can be a proper object 
of phenomenological investigation and something like “phenomenology” 
of science can be constantly further developed. Hegel understood that the 
idea of science as “absolute knowledge” is so mystified and its truth so 
veiled, that it requires a special phenomenological treatment that will show 
that “absolute knowledge” is the performing of self-conscious human 
knowledge, and not some divine unreachable knowledge. Hegel calls such 
presentation through logical demonstration: “Darstellung”. This is one of 
the key concepts in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit: what it presents is 
not presentable in a trivial manner. The theme of the Werden of the 
Wissenschaft überhaupt, or even simply of Wissen, is the emergence of not 
less than critical scientific thought itself, the act of science when it 
reflectively thinks of itself. The problem is that in science one usually pays 
too much attention to the details of nature, as the object, and not to “the 
absolute”, as the general performance of science activities. 
The beginning of the “becoming” of science is the initial state of 
knowledge, which, strictly speaking, amounts in the Phenomenology to the 
“sensuous consciousness” of the “immediate spirit”, i.e. to animal 
perception, which is de facto das Geistlose, “spiritless”. The starting point 
in Science of Logic is also analogous to this idea of initial knowledge. 
There, it is the indeterminate simple “pure being”, das reine Sein, that 
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refers to all that of which we can just say that ‘it is’, or, in other words, all 
that for which we can use the predicate “S is p” without even really 
knowing what S is or what p is. In order to become “eigentliches Wissen”, 
consciousness has to accomplish a long way of true and false 
determinations, including the Logic itself, the pure knowledge of the 
categories of thought, not gathered from a fallible position of a 
consciousness. In contrast to the prevailing view, the unveiling of the 
“becoming” of science, which is Hegel’s own task in the Phenomenology 
of Spirit, was not meant to be propaedeutic, i.e. the usual “initiation of the 
unscientific consciousness into Science” (Anleitung des 
unwissenschaftlichen Bewußtseins zur Wissenschaft)105 in the form of mere 
guidance or giving instruction. Neither is this process the “foundation of 
science” (Begründung der Wissenschaft), i.e. the justification of scientific 
knowledge by means of setting or collecting epistemological principles. It 
is certainly not what Hegel considers as the Schellingian “rapturous 
enthusiasm which, like a shot from a pistol, begins straight away with 
absolute knowledge, and makes short work of other standpoints by 
declaring that it takes no notice of them”.106 Instead, Hegel describes his 
science of phenomenology as a “pathway” (Weg): “The Science of this 
pathway is the Science of the experience which consciousness goes 
through”.107 Experience is here a proper object of scientific inquiry, rather 
than a warrant for the validity of already existing scientific statements. 
Thus, the alteration of science can be investigated in the light of the 
alteration of experience itself. This issue affects, as we shall see now, the 
question of validity and truth of science. 
 
                                           
105 Hegel, 1977, p. 16; 3/31. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid., p. 21; 3/38. 
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3.5.4 Truth 
Hegel’s conception of science as the processual “becoming” of systematic 
self-knowledge raises the question of the truthfulness of science: how can 
the altering “experience of consciousness” be a warrant for reaching true 
“absolute knowledge”? 
Any form of radical skepticism about truth, in contrast to Hegel’s 
conception, simply denies the possibility of truth in science. The more 
circumspect and modest version of this skepticism takes science to be only 
a search for truth or approximation to the truth, but still, not the truth itself. 
A classical truth-skeptic might believe that science is based on inductive 
logic and therefore cannot reach truth or falsity, but only “decide upon 
probability”,108 as Reichenbach put it. With more or less success, Popper 
develops further this tradition of pragmatic fallibilism. His improved 
concept of probability is in fact his attempt to overcome such skepticism. 
But for the most part, Popper’s principle of fallibility is also supposed to 
demonstrate that scientific theories, insofar as they contain universal 
statements, can never reach absolute truth.109 In this respect, even though 
Popper argues against Reichenbach and other post-Fregean positivists, he 
basically shares with them this kind of truth skepticism. 
Hegel’s “absolute idealism”, in contrast, establishes an identity relation 
between truth and fully developed science, for “the true is the whole” of a 
scientific system. This principle can be interpreted as Hegel’s version of 
scientific realism based on truth holism. Hegel argues that, unlike the 
whole of science, the various shapes of knowledge are only “moments of 
truth” which do not share permanent existence in the truth. The dynamic 
structure of the “moments of truth” is constantly modified with respect to 
                                           
108 Reichenbach, Erkenntnis 1, 1930, p. 186, cited in: Popper, 2002, p. 6, footnote 4. 
109 Popper, 2002, pp. 10, 16. 
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the thing laid in front of them, the dealt “ob-ject”, der Gegen-stand. The 
endpoint of the Phenomenology of Spirit, the “standpoint of science”, 
represents true knowledge as “absolute knowledge”, which is at the same 
time the beginning of the “pure knowledge” of logic. “Absolute idealism” 
means that the performative claims of knowledge, as speech acts, are not 
relative to any particular human culture, and thus any particular meaning, 
interpretation or explanation. 
At the end of the “Introduction” to his Logik für die Mittelklasse 
(1810/11), Hegel formulates the identity between science and truth in a 
very concise form: “Science does not search for the truth, but is in the truth 
and is the truth itself”.110 These gnomic words express Hegel’s fundamental 
idea that science is a conceptual analysis of that which can guide our 
distinctions between true and erroneous. Science articulates what there is, 
in contrast to what we merely believe there is. In civic society, it is 
precisely science that is in charge of canonizing the true.111 In some 
measure, Sellars associates himself with this idea when he proclaims that 
“in the dimension of describing and explaining the world, science is the 
measure of all things, of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is 
not”.112 Yet, Hegel and Sellars do not intend to express a naive trust in 
science. A philosophy that praises the knowability of the being ought not to 
be mixed up with naive faith and blind trust. It only claims that the false 
                                           
110 4/166: “Die Wissenschaft sucht nicht die Wahrheit, sondern ist in der Wahrheit und 
die Wahrheit selbst”. 
111 Stekeler stresses thus the relation between science and truth in Hegel in the 
following way: “Das heißt, wenn wir den Begriff der Wahrheit nicht mystifizieren, 
müssen wir ihn über den Begriff des Wissens und dieses im Rahmen des Gesamtes von 
sprachlich artikuliertem Wissen und einem entsprechenden empraktischen, etwa 
technischen, Können begreifen. Die Institution der Kontrolle und Kanonisierung des 
Wahren, gerade auch generischer Geltung und damit materialbegrifflicher Normen für 
inferentielle Gehalte, ist die Wissenschaft” (2014, p. 153). 
112 Sellars, 1997, p. 83. 
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historical scientific statements are not a proof of the failure of the whole 
project of science. Not only does the pragmatist theory of science entertain 
grave doubts about the possibility of truth, but also the historicist one, 
which tends to mystify the concept of truth.  
In order to bridge the gap he opened between his dictum ‘science is the 
truth’ and healthy skepticism, Hegel clearly distinguishes untrue 
phenomena of science from true science: “But Science, just because it 
comes on the scene, is itself an appearance: in coming on the scene it is not 
yet Science in its developed and unfolded truth”.113 The problem of 
differentiating between phenomena of science and true science, the 
“problem of demarcation”, is at least as ancient as Parmenides’ didactic 
poem, but it came to be known in Anglophone philosophy through the 
translation of Popper’s “Problem der Abgrenzung”. Hegel’s basic claim is 
that the fact that there is knowledge that “appears” (erscheint) and “comes 
on the scene” (auftritt) for the first time, calls itself “science”, and is 
published in science magazines, only means that it would take time for us 
to experience the full recognition of the truth of this knowledge, which is 
de facto still not wholly true. Appearance alone in the world of science is 
not a warrant for the truth. As said before, Hegel’s concept of truth does 
not settle for Popper’s criterion of probability, but also not for the 
Heideggerian view of truth as “unhiddenness” (Unverborgenheit), a view 
which takes the Old-Greek word aletheia (ἀλήθεια) literally. Hegel’s 
concept of science as the development of critical self-knowledge over time 
is not derived from the scholastic correspondence theories of truth either. 
The novelty of his phenomenological approach is that the tension between 
true and untrue consists in the distinction between the “moment” of 
becoming visible to the consciousness, the for-me-ness, and the moment of 
                                           
113 Hegel, 1977, p. 48; 3/71. 
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truth that arrives at the consciousness hereafter, the in-itself-ness. Hegel 
reprovingly refers to the truth-skeptical approaches as “excuses”114 or 
“pretexts which create the incapacity of Science”.115 He does so because he 
attempts to show that, in the end, since philosophy is a science whose 
object is the truth itself and its canonization, it has to deal with conceptual 
forms. 
 
3.5.5 Form of concept 
Since Hegel argues that “the truth has only the concept (Begriff) as the 
element of its existence”,116 and that science is the truth, we can infer that 
for him science also has the concept as the element of its existence. Since 
“the quality of being scientific” (Wissenschaftlichkeit) implies that one 
knows how to determine and apply a concept appropriately, to be scientific 
means to be able to “provide”117 the concept. Therefore, Hegel argues that 
Wissenschaftlichkeit, as the praxis of applying concepts, is the only “true 
shape of truth”118, and that “science is renounced” (auf die Wissenschaft 
Verzicht tun)119 when the concept is not required for knowing the truth, i.e., 
when people only care about their private opinions concerning the meaning 
of words, and not the generally accepted one. Hegel’s thoughts echo the 
indispensable role of the logos in proving the truth of the episteme, an issue 
to which we shall come back. 
                                           
114 Ibid., p. 48 (Miller); 3/70. 
115 Hegel, 2003, p. 133 (Baillie); 3/70: “Ausreden, welche das Unvermögen der 
Wissenschaft [...] schöpft”. 
116 3/15 (my brackets). Miller chooses to translate Begriff as “Notion” (1977, p. 4) and 
Baillie as “notions and concepts” (2003, p. 4). In the next paragraph I shall explain why 
I chose to translate it as “concept”. 
117 Hegel, 1977, p. 48; 3/71. 
118 Ibid., p. 4; 3/14. 
119 3/17. The verb Verzicht tut is somewhat mistakenly translated by Miller as “abjures” 
(1997, p. 6) and by Baillie as “holds in contempt” (2003, p. 5). 
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Yet, Hegel’s statement about the truth of scientific concepts is not 
trivial. Other truth theories put the accent on other issues rather than 
concepts; for example, on the sensual appearance of the being or on the 
divine revelation on the one hand, and on inference rules, axioms, or 
conventions on the other. The question arises as to what Hegel means by 
Begriff in the context of science. Miller renders it as “Notion”120 and Baillie 
as “notions and concepts”,121 so that we can experience again the ambiguity 
in translation. Another possible, yet uncommon, translation would be 
“term”. Terminus technicus means in German Fachbegriff and terminology 
means Begrifflichkeit or Begriffsapparat. Begriff is derived from begreifen, 
which means to grasp physically, but also the cognitive act of 
comprehending and recognizing, conceiving. Therefore, the translation of 
Begriff as ‘concept’ fits slightly better than ‘notion’ which tends to be more 
subjective, personal or arbitrary. Hegel knows the features of the classical 
term logic and uses the term Begriff in a consequent manner in the sense of 
eidos. The conceptual form means the eidetic form of being, that which 
science employs in its investigation and at the same time investigates. 
Many places in Hegel’s writing bear witness to the fact that the 
development of his concept of concept plays a central role in his 
philosophy of science, especially the fact that he dedicates one third of his 
Logic to “The Doctrine of Concept”. The latter was named by Hegel 
“Subjective Logic” in a somewhat misleading way, because he does not 
mean uncertain or unobjective logic, but rather logic of the basic cognitive 
actions of the thinking subject. This non-formalistic logic is an analysis of 
linguistic forms that express the essence of concept, judgment, and 
inference from a purely logical point of view, not psychological or 
                                           
120 Hegel, 1977, p. 4; 3/15. 
121 Hegel, 2003, p. 4; 3/15. 
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phenomenological. Hegel insists that concepts are not subjective in the 
sense that they are relative to each subject, and hence contingent and 
arbitrary. He believes that the concept contains objectivity, because it is the 
unity of the objective “being” and “essence”, their follow-up stage. He 
further insists that the concept is not an abstract entity of thought or an a 
posteriori reflection, but a “concrete” and “free” being. Let us try to 
explicate how this statement can become plausible. 
In the Encyclopaedia Logic, the concept is defined as “schlechthin das 
Wirkende” and even as “das Wirkende seiner selbst”.122 It is said to have 
more actuality than the actual things and so more real than reality itself. 
But of course Hegel, who does not blindly promote a simple form of 
conceptual realism, does not argue that concepts exist in reality just like 
things. The concept, as wirkend, brings the being to ‘work’ and so to 
become something in reality in the sense of Wirklichkeit. It is in itself ‘at 
work’, i.e. wirklich. The Hegelian concept of concept possesses a much 
stronger sense than that of being the mere external cause of something else; 
it is rather the intrinsic cause of its being and hence of itself, a causa sui. 
This thought about the power of the concept might lead to confusion if one 
misconstrues the idea of the concept’s self-actualization as some magical 
‘superpower’ or ‘vital’ power. Concepts can be grasped as a form of causa 
sui in respect of the organic structure of the development of scientific 
thought. On Hegel’s interpretation, science exists due to the “self-motion” 
(Selbstbewegung)123 of the concept, and thereby it is not unyielding or 
inflexible. Rather, the results of scientific investigations eventually alter the 
concepts. 
                                           
122 8/311 (§ 163). 
123 3/65. 
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However, in this context, the term “self-motion” may sound a bit 
peculiar to the untrained ear. Hegel employs here a classical Aristotelian 
category to innovatively describe what he regards as the organic-like 
independent life of modern science, not only insofar as it has a complex 
“body”, but also insofar as it has a “soul”. Hegel wants to give an 
alternative explanation to the a priori status of scientific concepts: science 
is not based on any particular decision of one person or arbitrary 
conventions. He argues that scientific activity demands attention to the 
concept as concept and so to “simple determinations” (einfache 
Bestimmungen), like “being-in-itself” (Ansichsein), “being-for-itself” 
(Fürsichsein), “being-equal-to-itself” (Sichselbstgleichheit) etc. One can 
serve the project of the sciences if one works on the concepts themselves. 
As part of his discovery of the role of Geist in modern philosophy of 
science, Hegel tries to tell us – in what can be interpreted by anti-
intellectualists as a radical or even bizarre avant-garde gesture – that such 
categories are “pure self-motions which could be called souls”.124 The 
interpretation of this sentence should not be mystified, as if Hegel speaks of 
a mysterious spiritual substance working ‘within’ the things. Concepts are 
like moving souls, insofar as they are the effective powers of the Geist. The 
motion of the concepts is “free” because it does not have an external 
agency. But it does not mean that this motion is simply voluntary and has a 
contingent destination. Rather, this motion of thought is intelligible, 
because it is inherent in the system of science as a whole and thus exhibits 
a logical necessity. As such, it must be demonstrable that the movement 
between the chapters of the ‘book of logic’ carries the necessity of itself, 
with itself, wherever it goes. One has to admit that Hegel uses here the 
power of abstract thought, at least to some degree, in order to show that in 
                                           
124 3/56: “reine Selbstbewegungen, die man Seelen nennen könnte”. 
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science we always have to appeal to already achieved generalized forms of 
knowledge. The innovative description of the self-movement of the 
categories of thinking is perhaps Hegel’s Galilean “And yet it moves”. 
To call concepts “souls” is definitely not trivial, especially as Hegel 
insists on the non-psychological aspect of the Phenomenology of Spirit. 
Yet, it can shed light on the question of whether Hegel really paints some 
kind of naturalistic picture of science. Hegel’s Aristotelian-like analogy 
corresponds to the following: just as one can think of the “absolute spirit” 
as a living idea whose end is in itself, science is a living thought bearing in 
itself its end. We want to know ourselves for the sake of knowing. The 
body of science is the entelechy of self-knowledge. Such “pure” categories, 
which are conceptual forms of being, eide, are also designated by Hegel as 
“determinations of thought”, Denkbestimmungen. The essence of concept is 
not the unavoidable limitation of some natural finitude, but rather the 
quality of being Bestimmtheit, i.e. being de-termined. When the concepts 
begin to move on their own in the fields of thinking, they take a certain 
direction on certain roads, on which they become more and more precise, 
immer bestimmter. Thus, the original idea of setting motion in the realm of 
logic can be considered as the further development of an old Aristotelian 
idea with Aristotelian means. 
The character of “scientifcity” (Wissenschaftlichkeit) is highly 
significant to Hegelian philosophy because the cognition of the absolute, 
the ultimate goal of philosophy as metascience, can be reached only 
through intensive conceptual work. Therefore, as we shall see, Hegel 
deliberately chooses for himself the project of making philosophy more 
“scientific” (wissenschaftlich). 
For now, we ask ourselves one more question about Hegel’s concept of 
science: does Hegel believe that the scientific cognition of the absolute 
have anything to do with god?  
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3.5.6 Science of god? 
It seems that, immediately after Hegel’s time, any use of the term god in 
philosophy of science became obsolete. God, who no longer counts as a 
hypothesis in the great works of natural philosophy, at least since the High 
Renaissance, had disappeared from philosophy of science long before 
Nietzsche announced the same in the general philosophy. As a corollary, 
theology does not count in the modern era as a proper science anymore. It 
is a fact that Hegel also does not explicitly put god on the top of his system, 
but rather the “truth” and “science” in the form of the “absolute spirit”, 
“absolute idea”, or simply “the absolute”. Therefore, the question arises as 
to how Hegel understands the relation between god and science. 
To be sure, since Hegel does not refrain from mentioning “god” in 
different contexts, there are several places in his texts where one can 
assume that by “god” Hegel means “the absolute”. Thoughts of god serve 
as concrete elements in some of his philosophical inquiries. In Science of 
Logic he emphasizes that its content can be described as “the exposition of 
God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and a finite 
spirit”.125 In the Encyclopaedia he claims that science has a divine purpose: 
“To have cognition of God through reason is certainly the highest task of 
science”.126 Methodologically, god serves here as a title for “the truth”. But 
the link between science and the cognition of god is not simply the 
theologifying of the project of science. Let us consider what Hegel thought 
of the science of theology. 
To clarify his words on god, Hegel explains that he completely rejects 
the “abstract” categories of Verstand-theology, those which are mirrored in 
                                           
125 Hegel, 2010, p. 29; 5/44. 
126 Hegel, 1991, p. 74; 8/104. This we learn from the addition of the students of Hegel. 
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the “dead”, fixed dogmas concerning god. Such categories are used in the 
popular views of a given “religion”. Hegel prefers what he considers as the 
scientific Vernunft-theology which is based on theoretical reasoning and 
conceptual analysis. Insofar as “god” is only used as one of the many 
familiar names for “the absolute”, along with “the holy”, “the good”, “the 
sublime” etc., Hegel’s interpretation of the mission of science ought not to 
be falsely read as a romantic theologification, a view that is also alien to the 
mainstream of post-Hegelian philosophy of science. Instead, Hegel 
attempts to reestablish contact with the tradition that goes from Aristotle 
through Spinoza and holds that the sense of science is to be able to come, at 
the end of reasonable deliberation, to a demystified proper concept of god. 
The core notion of this tradition is methodological and points out that we, 
who set the question of knowledge, still do not know and are still in search, 
unlike divine knowledge, which already and always knows itself, and 
hence knows what knowing is. 
Hegel does not think in this issue like Kant, who believes that the spirit 
that knows everything spontaneously, without mediation and per intuition, 
is the divine supermind which is superior to the human spirit that knows 
per mediation. Kant calls the human spirit “discursive” and regards it as 
lower. For Hegel, the fact that in order to know anything at all one needs 
certain conceptual structures as mediation is not a deficiency. He does not 
think that the discursive mind is insufficient for the sake of full cognition. 
To come to know god out of reason is possible. Such cognition only 
presents us with a principal problem if god is presupposed as the 
inconceivable subject or even as the epitome of the inconceivable per se. In 
the process of knowledge, one moves from the conceivable to the still-
inconceivable, from the known to the less known. For the same reason, 
Anselm of Canterbury entitles his extraordinary “Discourse” known as 
Proslogion with the words “faith seeking understanding” (fides quaerens 
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intellectum). The mere belief, even if it already exists, must intrinsically 
look for the reasons for its existence. The basic principle of the traditional 
philosophical god is to embody the possibility of an intellectus, a form of 
knowledge, which can be the object of its own knowledge, ens intelligibile, 
and at the same time the ens intelligens, the knower. In this manner, the 
Geist is the cognitive reason of its own cognition, a form of causa sui. 
For reasons that are easy to understand, the lofty concepts of “the 
absolute” and “world spirit”, which play a crucial role in Hegel’s 
philosophy of science, cause uneasiness, so that it is possible that Hegel 
would not have used them today,127 or that he would have reconstructed his 
thoughts in contemporary language. Such concepts, which are not in 
common use in everyday discourse, are in a certain sense “metaphors”,128 
insofar as the reflective language is sometimes figurative. For Hegel, the 
concepts of subject, object and absolute are kinds of titles, which are 
located on the same level, since subject and object constitute a relation, and 
the absolute is precisely the overcoming of this relation. The absolute is the 
completed melting of world and spirit in each other, their mixing until they 
become one: world and spirit in macro, object and consciousness in micro. 
Together they form one concept: worldspirit with object-consciousness. 
Now that some of the main features of Hegel’s conception of science 
have been presented, more light can be shed on the issue by observing the 
way Hegel deals with one of the fundamental problems in philosophy of 
science: the problem of beginning in science. 
 
                                           
127 As Welsch argues (2003, p. 48). 
128 Ibid. 
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3.6 How to begin in science? 
While performing a self-reflection, Hegel addresses right at the beginning 
of his system of science, and later of the logic, the problem of how to 
correctly begin in science. This problem results from the paradox of 
beginning in knowledge: if the truthfulness of the beginning remains 
unproven, then such knowledge is not fully justified, and hence it is 
unreliable, and if further efforts are made to prove the truthfulness of the 
beginning, then one actually begins somewhere ‘before’ the real beginning, 
and so we arrive again at the question of where exactly to begin. The last 
case leads to a vicious circle or an infinite regress. The problem of the good 
and persuasive beginning in systematical science involves thus the question 
about the best first principle from which all derivations should logically 
follow. What is at stake here is the choice of the adequate self-justifying 
logical prius. Hegel’s treatment of the problem of beginning aims at 
challenging two basic skeptical positions: firstly, the ancient school of 
Pyrrhonism, which promotes the suspension of judgment about any belief 
due to the problem of finding an appropriate criterion of truth,129 and 
secondly, Kantian negative epistemology, which dismisses the possibility 
of knowledge only in the noumenal areas that are not verifiable by sensual 
experience. 
The strategy of Hegel’s solution is to begin with the maximum 
“immediate” entity (das Unmittelbare), which is the least conceptualized 
element, and to justify this choice upon the progress of the work. In 
concrete terms, this means to begin in phenomenology with the basic 
“sense-certainty” of “natural consciousness” and in logic with the 
                                           
129 This school of skepticism was founded by Phyrro of Elis in the fourth century BCE 
and is best known to us from Sextus Empiricus’ book Outlines of Pyrrhonism from the 
late second century CE. Hegel deals with this school of thought in details in his 
Lectures on the History of Philosophy. 
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undetermined “pure being” that is also “nothing”. In any case, Hegel 
explicitly rejects the beginning with “the absolute”, like in Fichte’s and 
Schelling’s systems. Instead, he begins each time with the maximal non-
true, which is the most distant point from the absolute, and finishes with the 
most true, the absolute, while the end of the system is the same point of the 
beginning, only more explicit and unfolded. This solution forms an 
immanent spiral-circular connection between the beginning and the end of 
the system. 
The concrete suggestions that Hegel makes are not to begin in science 
(1) with fear of failure, (2) with presuppositions about the truth and (3) 
with arrogance, but rather by using the scientific guide of others. 
Deliberations on these suggestions shall be presented in the following. 
 
3.6.1 No fear 
The “Introduction” to Hegel’s metascientific project in his Phenomenology 
of Spirit begins with a thought on how not to begin in science: not to begin 
with “fear” (Furcht) of “error” or “mistake” (Irrtum), because it breeds the 
fear of the impossibility to know, which involves, in turn, the fear of truth. 
Prima facie, this warning can be read as a kind of psychological 
recommendation based on Hegel’s diagnosis that the pre-scientific 
personality is characterized by a type of mistake phobia or a failure phobia, 
so to speak, atychiphobia, in this case: a non-pathological form of 
atychiphobia in the face of scientific activity. On this reading, Hegel’s 
phenomenological disclosure of problematic mental structures can be 
interpreted as some advanced ‘cognitive therapy’. However, in the 
framework of philosophy of science, this recommendation causes 
astonishment, especially because Hegel insists on the non-psychologistic 
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character of his work. Since Hegel’s use of the term fear in this context 
may appear to be vague, I shall try to clarify it a bit more. 
Before Hegel mentions “science” for the first time in the 
“Introduction”, namely in the second paragraph, he begins with a critical 
presentation of the epistemological argument claimed by the skeptical 
“natural view” (natürliche Vorstellung). The latter acknowledges the 
impossibility of “recognizing” (Erkennen) the truth in philosophy, i.e. “the 
absolute essence” (das absolute Wesen) or “that which is in itself” 
(dasjenige, was an sich ist). In this paragraph, Hegel still does not use the 
term “science” (Wissenschaft), but only “recognizing” (Erkennen) and 
“cognition” (Erkenntnis). This terminology is significant, because it refers 
to the terms of the Kantian Erkenntnisphilosophie, but it repudiates it, 
insofar as it argues that the very existence of the transindividual institution 
of science is exactly the proof of the possibility of recognizing concrete 
universals in science. Science, and not the merely subjectively justified 
knowledge of particulars, is capable of recognizing that which is 
considered by us each time as the truth. Following this thought, Hegel sets 
himself the following question: what are the problems of the so-called 
“natural consciousness” that cause her fear of dwelling with science? 
Hegel argues that fundamental truth-skepticism fears the beginning in 
science because it believes in the need to come to agreement on the natural 
limits of cognition before the act of recognizing itself. It seems that we 
would otherwise have to admit that all our knowledge-claims about the 
world are based only on our own conventions and our pragmatic decisions 
of how to make plausible assertions that we ought to understand. The 
beginner’s fear, understandably not wanting to jump right in at the deep 
end, is paralyzing, because if we cannot know anything for sure, it would 
seem better not to start at all. The epistemological argument of this 
skeptical beginner goes like this: there are two modes of cognition, an 
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active one, cognition as a “work tool” (Werkzeug), and a passive one, as a 
“medium” (Medium), but both are imperfect because both cause alterations 
in the object they aim to reach, so that they do not reach the absolute as it 
is. Hegel does not name specific philosophers, but one is reminded of 
Aristotle who also dwells non-skeptically in his book On the Soul on the 
active and passive aspects of cognition reached by the thinking soul.130 Yet, 
the explicit reference to the problem of the Erkennen of the in-itself 
(Ansich) is clearly directed to the Kantian tradition of Erkenntnistheorie, 
because it is an epistemology that is at the same time essentially 
Erkenntniskritik.131 Starting his own scientific project, Hegel underlines the 
absurdity of both modes of cognition, arguing that the very declaration of 
the need for Erkenntniskritik causes serious and enduring damage to 
science in the form of “mistrust” (Mißtrauen). This pre-understanding, that 
before one begins with science one should have a basic trust in the ability 
of science to know anything at all, can be seen as one of Hegel’s improved 
‘enlightened’ thoughts: a kind of ‘scientism’, but a non-naturalistic form of 
‘continental scientism’. 
Hegelian ‘scientism’ is a passionate attack on the eidos-skeptical and 
logos-skeptical foundation of the empiricist Enlightenment. Hegel gives an 
alternative phenomenological interpretation to an old problem: empiricist 
mistrust in science is caused by “worrying” (Besorgnis) about making a 
“mistake” (Irrtum), a worry that turns to “fear” (Furcht) and which appears 
exactly because one thinks one has to choose only between the two 
mentioned imperfect cognition modes. Hegel hints at a logical fallacy in 
the above-mentioned skeptical argument, namely the ‘false dilemma’: the 
contrasting of two limited and exclusive alternatives gives the impression 
                                           
130 Aristoteles, De anima, III 4, 429 b29 – 430 a2. 
131 Hegel aims at a similar criticism also in Faith and Knowledge, as shown in 3.2. 
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of a necessary conceptual bifurcation. In the third paragraph, Hegel brings 
to the fore the figure of science, exactly as that which is a factual 
opposition to the vain negative critique of cognition. Such opposition dares 
to declare that we can indeed “recognize the absolute”. The assumption of 
the division between cognition and the absolute is the very “inability of 
science” (Unvermögen der Wissenschaft) to set itself free from the mere 
“presuppositions of such relations” (Voraussetzung solcher Verhältnisse) 
and from the required “effort of science” (Mühe der Wissenschaft). The 
fear of a science that can know “the absolute” is caused by a crippling 
skepticism which tends to be, so we almost read in Hegel, anti-science. 
Being ironic and employing the logic of self-application, he contends that 
this fear must be faced with fear in order to be overcome. The solution of 
fear of fear obviously mirrors the logical form of the negation of negation. 
The fact that Hegel turns to a psychological-intentional phenomenon 
such as fear to explain an epistemological dilemma is still not without 
question. To be sure, there is an old debate about the relation between 
knowledge and fear: whereas the Enlightenment claims that the less you 
know, the more you fear, for ignorance breeds fear, just as fear breeds hate, 
there is the old belief that the more you know, the more you fear. In this 
issue, Hegel seems to follow the basic ‘enlightened’ ideals regarding the 
necessary public distribution of scientific knowledge. In support of Hegel’s 
quasi psychological argument, one can claim that the phenomenon of fear 
does not only belong to psychological discourse. Hegel’s use of the term 
fear should not raise disciplinary difficulties, as it does not perform a 
principal category mistake. Hegel argues here against security fanaticism 
that intentionally breeds fear in order to feel some kind of imagined safety. 
Phenomenologically, fear is an intentional phenomenon that may involve 
real threatening objects where the fright is justified, or only potential 
objects in which case the angst is irrational. Nevertheless, Merold Westphal 
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rightly apprehends that: “A kind of psychoanalysis seems to be called for, 
but Hegel offers nothing of the kind in his Introduction”.132 Unfortunately, 
neither does Westphal himself provide us with any kind of psychoanalysis, 
while taking the issue of “fear” in Hegel to be the unresolved question of 
the whole introduction: “What we do not learn from the introduction is how 
seriously we are to take [...] Hegel’s use of these terms as fear, anxiety, 
despair, violence and death”.133 On this reading, Hegel’s choice sounds 
mysterious, only because he does not dwell further on psychoanalysis. 
However, positively formulated, Hegel raises the problem of worrying 
because he wants to prepare his claim that science, in its ideal form, is 
exactly that which is capable of overcoming such skeptical worries and 
becoming immune to them. Hegel believes that true knowledge can 
seriously remove some fears and dualisms. He recognizes that the question 
of fear is relevant to the epistemological question, insofar as he argues that 
the main consequence of the fear of failure is the fear of knowing, 
gnosiophobia, which in turn develops into the fear of truth, alethophobia. 
The real existence of good science, i.e. the factuality of true knowledge, 
ought to be contrasted with archaic antiscientific fear. 
The gnosiophobia and alethophobia, as the phenomena of fear in the 
view of scientific activities, are not to be treated as just some particular 
emotions of individuals or as psychological phenomena, because their 
significance in the epistemological context is that they attain the form of a 
“doubt” (Zweifel). Hegel interprets this doubt as a form of “two-foldness” 
(Zwei-fel), a dualism that results from the unreasoned conception of 
cognition as diametrically contrasted to the absolute. The identity between 
cognition and the absolute is one of Hegel’s challenges, because not to 
                                           
132 Westphal, M., 1979, p. 7. 
133 Ibid., p. 14. 
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allow for such identity, which is actually the goal of scientific 
demonstration, is for him the most significant petitio principii in Kantian 
epistemology: its skeptical circular reasoning only begs the question 
concerning the cognoscibility of the absolute. In virtue of the above said, 
Hegel’s anti-Kantian argument reveals the alliance and interconnection 
between the petitio principii of the naturalistic view of science and the 
artificial finite-making of cognitive capacities, like in the Quinean 
animalization of the thinking subject. 
In phenomenological terms, Hegel interprets the situation of having fear 
due to not-knowing as a situation in which we confront the unknown as a 
mere appearance of something whose essence we do not fully recognize. 
The fear in view of an unexplained phenomenon that was not experienced 
before leads to making presuppositions and prejudices, sticking to them 
and, above all, believing in them. Hegel rejects that the beginning must be 
foundationalist, i.e. must be based on presuppositions. The next section 
scrutinizes Hegel’s relation to epistemological foundationalism. 
 
3.6.1 Antifoundationalism 
The role Hegel ascribes to “presuppositions” (Voraussetzungen) in the 
beginning of science is a subject for debate: what is at stake is the existence 
of foundationalism or antifoundationalism in his philosophy of science.134 
On the basis of Hegel’s words, it seems easy to assess that he advocates 
foundationalism in Science of Logic, for he himself states that 
                                           
134 Among others see: Joseph Flay, “Pragmatic Presuppositions and the Dialectics of 
Hegel’s ‘Phenomenology’” (1982); Rockmore, “Foundationalism and Hegelian Logic” 
(1989); Rosen, M., Problems of the Hegelian Dialectic: Dialectic reconstructed as a 
Logic of Human Reality (1992); Maker, “Hegel’s ‘Phenomenology’ as Introduction to 
Science” (1993) and Philosophy without Foundations: Rethinking Hegel (1994); 
Houlgate, “Hegel’s Critique of Foundationalism in the ‘Doctrine of Essence’” (1999). 
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Phenomenology of Spirit is set to be the “presupposition” for understanding 
“pure science” in Science of Logic, whereas he is a non-foundationalist or 
even anti-foundationalist in Phenomenology of Spirit, going against 
presupposing the meaning of used concepts. In this work, Hegel analyzes 
preexisting presuppositions regarding knowledge-claims and does not seem 
to recommend any specific presuppositions for the beginning. 
In spite of this evidential interpretative situation, a challenging reader 
could contend that Hegel is de facto a foundationalist in Phenomenology of 
Spirit because he seems to presuppose something like “natural 
consciousness” or common sense, along with all its natural opinions. 
However, that with which Hegel begins his work is the topic of 
“consciousness”, the main theme of this work, and not merely a 
presupposition or an assumption. In accord with this, the same challenging 
reader would probably notice that in Science of Logic Hegel can be read as 
a non-foundationalist, who begins with the most undetermined category of 
mere “pure being” precisely because he does not intend to start with any 
significant presuppositions or “determinations”, except perhaps his own old 
work. In any case, as mentioned before, Hegel does not begin with the 
absolute, but with the non-true, while finishing with the true. 
Against this background, a coherent non-foundationalist reading would 
combine the two positions and interpret Hegel as taking efforts to begin 
each time with “presuppositionlessness” (Voraussetzungslosigkeit). One 
has to be careful, though, not to obscure or mystify this type of ideal. In 
reality, what Hegel suggests is legitimate: to begin his argument each time 
without the paradoxical need to prove the beginning right at the beginning. 
What he offers as an understandable beginning is “the immediate” per se, 
over whose existence one generally agrees without further proof, whether it 
be the common consciousness or the unspecified being. 
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Hegelian methodology contains thus an argument against 
epistemological foundationalism in science. Such foundationalism holds 
that in order to tell science from non-science, the theory of science needs a 
“presupposition” (Voraussetzung) or an “axiom” (Grundsatz)135 that could 
serve as an external grounding in the form of a truth criterion. Such criteria 
ought to assure that the theory does not generate any logical contradiction, 
and among them are the principles of falsifiability, testability, 
reproducibility, evidence, defeasibility or consistency, all which presuppose 
however, that principally, the truth itself cannot be otherwise logically 
proven or somehow revealed. Such a criterion obviously makes sure that 
the theory is parsimonious and economical in the number of hypothetical 
entities and assumptions, and as elegant as Ockham’s razor. “Plurality is 
never to be posited without necessity” (numquam ponenda est pluralitas 
sine necessitate). However, Hegel’s phenomenological investigation of 
knowledge of knowledge shows that such criteria should actually be 
regarded as internal to consciousness and as given to it by none other than 
itself. All the various given theories of truth are themselves questionable 
forms of consciousness. The Hegelian theory of theory, so understood, 
underlies thus the most parsimonious and economical criterion, namely 
consciousness itself, yet its wholeness. In this respect Hegel’s criterion is 
rigid: it demands that the beginning of the investigation must take place 
with themes and ideas that already contain conceptual distinctions, and not 
only with theses or claims. 
Since Hegel’s strategy is that the beginning in a scientific investigation 
does not have to be the whole truth, for it cannot be, his solution to the 
paradox of beginning was designated as “philosophy without 
                                           
135 Like in Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre (1972, p. 34). 
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presuppositions”,136 in which we must consciously and undogmatically 
start “with the non-true”.137 Phenomenology begins with the analysis of 
sensuality, as the least true shape of spirit, because its truth applies only to 
the “pure being”, so that it knows only that something is. The sense-
certainty of the sensual knowledge, as only knowing-of, has the poorest 
truth and is thus the paradigm for the most inadequate description of 
absolute knowledge. Hegel is careful to make this beginning coincide with 
that in the Logic, where he speaks of the most abstract notion of being, the 
“pure being”, which is far from being concrete in any way. The beginning, 
which is still not secured or safe, has to exhibit the differences between 
what there is and what there is not and to manifest how this distinction is 
implemented in reality. The truth has to authenticate itself gradually during 
the work, so that at the end we reach the complete justification of the 
beginning. In Encyclopaedia Logic Hegel is even explicit about the need to 
begin with the error. He claims that one has to begin with the unverified, 
because “the truth must, precisely as such, validate itself”.138 Another 
reason for such beginning is the following: “when what is in question is 
cognition in the mode of thinking, we cannot begin with the truth, because 
truth, when it forms the beginning, rests on bald assurance, whereas the 
truth that is thought has to prove itself to be truth at the bar of thinking”.139 
Hegel’s response to the problem of beginning is therefore to choose for his 
works a multistate type of logic based on evolving circular reasoning. 
The end of the system, however, must meet the beginning again. Hegel 
articulates this in Phenomenology of Spirit when he argues that the truth “is 
the process of its own becoming, the circle that presupposes its end as its 
                                           
136 Rosen, 1992, p. 34. 
137 Cf. ibid., p. 37. 
138 Hegel, 1991, p. 134; 8/180. 
139 Ibid., pp. 234f; 8/306. 
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goal, having its end also as its beginning; and only by being worked out to 
its end, is it actual”.140 The genuine form of this movement “is the circle 
that returns into itself, the circle that presupposes its beginning and reaches 
it only at the end”.141 At the end of the Phenomenology of Spirit, when 
spirit knows itself for the first time “immediately”, the spirit itself becomes 
“the certainty of immediacy, or sense-consciousness — the beginning from 
which we started”.142 Eventually, everything natural, just as intellectual, 
can be thought as self-realization of the absolute idea. Everything is thus a 
presupposition for the absolute and the absolute is the presupposition for 
everything. Hegel’s inquiry into “the absolute” aims at a speculative 
metalogic of material conditions, insofar as it aims at recognizing the 
absolute in its unconditionedness. To be sure, Hegel is generally against 
unexplained preconditions. Still, it is important not to forget that, when 
Hegel advocates truth without presuppositions, he does not mean that 
thinking itself is not engaged in any kind of presuppositions, but rather that 
he intends to explicate during the work the most important recurring 
presuppositions which are relevant for the formation of concepts. 
To begin without presuppositions means in concreto to deal with 
conceptual explications in order to perform analysis of meaning. For this 
reason, Hegel demands that the meaning of key concepts like “objective”, 
“subjective”, or “absolute” be explicated at some point, and not taken for 
granted or presumed as already known. Yet, this does not mean that these 
words should be defined and fixed for good at the beginning like technical 
terms, but rather that the whole task of a philosophical work is to expose 
relations between the logical forms and the semantic development of basic 
concepts, i.e. “to give the concept”. When one uses Ism-words in 
                                           
140 Hegel, 1977, p. 10; 3/23. 
141 Ibid.. p. 488; 3/585. 
142 Ibid.. p. 491; 3/589f. 
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philosophical treatises and lets them appear as a necessary scientific fact 
without any explanation, one reduces the language to a set of technical 
terms. Instead of transcending the word into the earnestness of a concept, 
the Ism actually strangles the living content and leaves behind an abstract 
dead object. The logical content of merely imagined thoughts (Vorstellung) 
and unauthentic bloomy figures of speech (Redensarten) is vacuous, as 
they contain no logos. Unexplained linguistic expressions are attacked by 
Hegel as only “an empty appearance of knowledge” (eine leere 
Erscheinung des Wissens) that disappears in the face of the “arising 
science” (auftretende Wissenschaft), which in turn disappears in the face of 
the true science as a whole. 
Hegel’s analysis of presuppositions, his “logic of presuppositions”,143 
can actually be read as a critique of naive realism. Such critique exposes 
the “unintelligibility”144 of each given real object, its intrinsic 
misunderstanding and self-contradiction. The paradox of naive realism is 
that it presupposes the existence of the external world on the basis of 
seeing and at the same time sees the same external world exactly as the 
perfect opposite of the world of the mind and the faculty of cognition. 
Instead of really proving the realist claim, realism eliminates a priori the 
existence of anything which is not real, of the unreal, while not questioning 
the received metaphysical terminology that is at work in this thinking. Such 
conceptual schemes serve in the positive sciences as obscuring hypothetical 
assumptions about undemonstrated entities. The next section will deal with 
Hegel’s relation to realism. 
Finally, it is also possible to read Hegel first as a foundationalist and 
then as a non-foundationalist, because the principle of the Phenomenology 
                                           
143 Flay, 1982, p. 23. Flay’s interpretation is influenced by Robert Stalnaker’s essay 
“Pragmatic Presuppositions” (1975). 
144 Ibid. 
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of Spirit, as William Maker argues, is a dialectical hybrid of these two 
positions: to be a “presupposition for science without presuppositions”.145 
As an introduction to Science of Logic, Phenomenology of Spirit is a 
methodological preparation in the form of a “self-sublating mediation”.146 
Maker rightly interprets the result of Phenomenology of Spirit, “the 
absolute knowledge”, as radical-negative insofar as Hegel sublates all 
presuppositions in the form of predeterminations and preconditions. The 
Phenomenology of Spirit shows in effect how autonomic science should not 
begin. Maker’s dialectical move is the following: 
 
“Thus the Phenomenology of Spirit is not a presupposition for the 
science because it establishes no principle, method or ground for the 
science, and yet it is presupposition for the science because it shows 
why such a science cannot have any such external grounding”.147 
 
Maker’s diagnosis is that a major part of contemporary philosophy holds a 
relativistic approach against any presuppositions,148 namely a kind of 
“antifoundationalism” that upholds the “context of contextuality” out of 
which no one can allegedly break away.149 Hegel’s philosophy is said to 
advocate antifoundationalism too,150 but in a more radical way, for it “does 
not embrace an uncritical relativism”151 or entail loss of objectivity. The 
crucial point is that, in contrast to the common versions of contemporary 
                                           
145 Maker, 1993, p. 91. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Ibid., p. 87. 
148 Cf. Maker, 1994, p. 2. 
149 Maker himself rather advocates “postfoundationalism” that works against relativism 
by “relativizing the relativism” (1994, p. 1), even though he admits that the activity of 
knowledge requires the unconditioned and ungrounded (ibid., p. 5). 
150 Ibid., p. 16. 
151 Ibid., p.  108. 
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anti-foundationalism, the Phenomenology of Spirit criticizes 
foundationalism in a systematic and immanent manner. 
Besides dealing with the problems of fear and presuppositions, Hegel 
takes pains to clarify the question of how to reach the scientific point of 
view from outside science, while using the metaphor of the ladder, which 
shall be examined in the next section. 
 
3.6.3 The ladder 
What is the first step into science? As Hegel locates science in a “higher” 
place, the question is rather how to climb up to science. Hegel 
acknowledges that the demand of the individual for a “ladder” (Leiter)152 is 
legitimate. The metaphor of the ladder became famous through 
Wittgenstein whose reader must “throw away the ladder, after he has 
climbed up on it”;153 that is, after he has understood the “elucidatory” 
sentences of Wittgenstein. What Hegel suggests as a ladder to “pure 
science”, to his Science of Logic, is his Phenomenology of Spirit. But who 
exactly needs the ladder? 
Hegel devotes the ladder to the beginner in science, whom he describes 
as the inexperienced natural consciousness who approaches science without 
knowing the reason. Such beginners find themselves attempting “to walk 
on their head” oddly and with unnecessary “violence”. This helpless 
consciousness takes everything in science and philosophy to be an 
“inversion of truth” (das Verkehrte der Wahrheit)154 or even “perversion of 
                                           
152 Hegel, 1977, p. 14; 3/29. 
153 Cf. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicusc (6.54): “My propositions are elucidatory in this 
way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed 
out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, 
after he has climbed up on it.)” (Wittgenstein, 2010, p. 90). 
154 Hegel, 1977, p. 15 (Miller); 3/30. 
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truth”.155 But what kind of “ladder” can science practically offer? Hegel 
took this question so seriously that his reply became one of the most 
complicated works in philosophy. 
Hegel uses the word “ladder” (die Leiter) in a way that hints at the 
meaning of the similar word “guide” or “leader” (der Leiter). This “ladder” 
is the guide that shows the way to a higher destination: the scientific system 
of thought. The normal expectation from a guide book is to contain a set of 
instructions, including suggestions, tips, demonstrations, simulations, and 
perhaps illustrations. But none of this is to be found in Hegel, at least at 
first glance. Performatively, Hegel wonders about the scientificity of such a 
guide. In fact, what Hegel does is to sharpen the problem of designing a 
guide by revealing the paradox of demanding that the way to science, the 
ladder itself, be scientific too. This rigorous demanding seems to be 
logically impossible: if the contents of science permanently change in 
history, a stable and reliable guide would seem to be out of reach and even 
principally unreachable. Yet, at the time of the Phenomenology of Spirit, 
Hegel had certainly come to believe that it is possible to bestow upon the 
beginners a thoroughly scientific guide to science, viz. a generic-
speculative science of science. In a certain respect, and in the broad sense 
of the term phenomenology, each generation of self-conscious thinkers 
writes each time a kind of new phenomenology of spirit. 
Hegel’s response to the problem of the first scientific step is a 
methodological one and consists in his phenomenological “path” to the 
science of logic through a conceptual inquiry into the existing formations 
of consciousness, the various rungs of the ladder. This philosophical act of 
offering a guide to inexperienced beginners is designated by him as the 
“science of the experience of consciousness”. This metascience brings the 
                                           
155 Hegel, 2003, p. 14 (Baillie); 3/30. 
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beginners in science to the “science of the spirit” through “education” 
(Bildung) in the wide sense of the word, i.e. the development of their 
intellectual abilities. To a certain extent, Hegel offers an external guide that 
is at the same time an internal guide, as his Post-Kantian argument rather 
advocates the ideal of the balance between autonomy and heteronomy: we 
should not expect to base all our scientific knowledge only on ourselves 
and to produce it all alone, while ignoring the relevant work of others. Such 
totalitarian autonomy in epistemology can lead to narcissistic vanity and 
solipsism. Hegel’s way to science is not a project based on pure reason 
alone or on armchair rationality, because if one wants to be in science ‘at 
home’, one has to accept that one is not and cannot be there home alone. 
Hegel here tries to make an intersubjective case, while overcoming the 
false argument from authority which limits beginners in science in the 
name of argumentum ad verecundiam, for experts always seem to know 
everything better. At the same time, for the honest beginner in science, it 
seems that, due to the restricting argumentum ab auctoritate, we can never 
principally appeal to the authority of others and hence we need to do all the 
thinking work alone in order to get it properly done. But Hegel 
acknowledges that this kind of pseudo-autonomy can become a misleading 
dangerous thought, an autistic and infantile one. 
In the final analysis, Hegel’s positive conception of promoting a foreign 
scientific guide among beginners is in line with his civic trust, not faith, in 
the teachability and learnability of scientific and philosophical knowledge. 
Such a guide needs to contain critical analysis of traditions of 
metaknowledge. As mentioned before, Hegel’s conception of scientific 
guide also goes hand in hand with his critique of naive realism and his own 
version of conceptual realism. The next section deals thus with Hegel’s 
reaction to the challenge of realism. 
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3.7 On Hegel’s realism 
Although Hegel holds that “[e]very philosophy is essentially idealism or at 
least has idealism for its principle”,156 his theory of knowledge can also be 
described as “epistemological realism”,157 for it intentionally goes beyond 
the one-sided views of pure idealism or pure realism. “Epistemological 
realism” means that we can know something about things that exist 
regardless of our consciousness, “regardless of what we think, say, or 
believe about them”.158 Hegel gives utterance to this when he argues that 
“[p]ure science thus presupposes the liberation from the opposition of 
consciousness” and that “[t]his objective thinking is thus the content of 
pure science”.159 Yet, one has to be careful not to use the term “realism” in 
a merely technical manner, for the question is: realism about what? 
Mere direct realism about the res as a finite “thing” or about finitude in 
general is tautological and would not convince Hegel, who rather upholds 
indirect realism about concepts and ideas. He does this on the condition 
that such realism simultaneously entails a complementary version of 
idealism about the res that acknowledges the “ideality” of things. Echoing 
Fichte’s early Wissenschaftslehre (1794/5), Hegel already works out – in 
Jenaer Systementwürfe I (1803/4) – a complex mediation between idealism 
and realism with the goal of overcoming the “unreasonable controversy”160 
between total idealism and total realism. Indeed, Hegel’s critical version 
can be designated with Fichte’s own terms as ideal-realism, or conversely 
as real-idealism. Fichte coined the terms Real-Idealismus and Ideal-
                                           
156 Hegel, 2010, p. 124; 5/172. 
157 Westphal, 2003, p. 2; Tesla, 2013, p. 23. 
158 Westphal, 2003, p. 2. 
159 Hegel, 2010, p. 29; 5/43. 
160 Hegel, Gesammelte Werke 6, ed. Düsing K. and Kimmerle H (Hamburg: Felix 
Meiner, 1975) p. 229. 
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Realismus for his approach in Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre 
(1794).161 Brandom calls this Hegelian approach “conceptual realism”.162 
Hegel repudiates externalist forms of direct realism with the same 
argument he criticizes the Berkeleyan and Kantian “subjective idealism”: 
the perceptual experience is not absolutely mind-independent. Such 
imagined mind-independence is a false conception of the absolute. The 
absolute is not a realm of mindlessness resulting from an imagined plenary 
division between a presumed mind-poor world and a world-grasping agent. 
As a solution to the problem of realism, Hegel offers to conceive of the 
perceptual experience itself as a shape of consciousness and hence as 
internally accessible to the consciousness, as intrinsically intelligible. The 
finite existence of a “thing” exists only as a single moment in the context of 
the divisive work of the intellectual “understanding” (Verstand), and not 
independent of it. Hegel claims that the mature “developed” (gebildet) 
consciousness, which can also be understood as educated, ought not to 
relate to its objectifications permanently as “real” or as “pure things”, but 
rather as what they are: logically interconnected phenomena of self-
consciousness in the form of a set of mental representations. The departure 
point of Phenomenology of Spirit is thus the analysis of the inherent 
relations between the phenomena of consciousness and the various states of 
objecthood. The natural “immature” (ungebildet) consciousness 
unknowingly divides a part from itself but treats it as a foreign “object” 
(Gegenstand) essentially different from itself. If consciousness seeks to 
reach true statements about the world and meet “the absolute”, it ought to 
                                           
161 Fichte, 1997, p. 198. Hegel sympathetically reviewed in 1831 in Jahrbüche für 
wissenschaftliche Kritik the work of Albert Leopold Julius Ohlert titled Der 
Idealrealismus. Erster Teil. Der Idealrealismus als Metaphysik in die Stelle des 
Idealismus und Realismus gesetzt (Neustadt, 1830). 
162 In a lecture at LMU Munich “Conceptual Realism and the Semantic Possibility of 
Knowledge” (2011), published in Brandom‘s website (http://www.pitt.edu/~rbrandom/). 
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learn to treat the object it experiences as a mind-accessible subject in the 
form of a set of mental representations, i.e. as if the object were a graspable 
conceptual scheme or an internally accessible self-conscious being. To 
become fully self-conscious, as Hegel put it, means to also grasp 
substances as subjects. This fundamental observation is constitutive of the 
Hegelian immanent critique of pure realism. 
Hegel’s non-psychological conception of self-consciousness is crucial 
for the understanding of his realism about knowledge of knowledge, which 
is not supposed to establish the counter-discourse of pure “idealism” or to 
confuse the ideal with the real, as the “uneducated thought” (ungebildetes 
Denken)163 does. The “real” is only that which a “thing” is. Therefore, as a 
logical category of thinking and hence of being, it is rather an abstract and 
determination-poor category. To say about something that it is “thing” is 
not to say a lot about its essence. The ideal, like the eidos, is a more 
concrete and precise determination of being as self-thinking thought. 
Hegel’s version of real-idealism assumes that, in the pith of the 
consciousness-objects, there is a kind of conceptual structure that makes it 
possible for human beings to refer to them intelligibly. In this view, there 
are no real inner-worldly objects that are free from such intrinsic 
conceptual structures. The sheer independence of the manifold things in the 
human world, i.e. their virtual self-reliance and their seemingly autonomic 
subsistence, is part of the illusion of the “given” that every single person 
experiences while confronting the shared world. In reality, every object of 
any kind is somehow determined so that we can at least speak of it, say 
something about it. Mental objects disclose their own general forms of 
“determinateness” (Bestimmtheit), which is in turn an indication for 
Begrifflichkeit and for conceptual representability. 
                                           
163 Hegel, 2010, p. 119; 5/165. 
 196 
 
However, Hegel does not simply hold a wild type of “linguistic 
idealism” à la Ian Hacking who claims that “only what is talked about 
exists; nothing has reality until it is spoken of, or written about”.164 Hegel’s 
real “linguistic position”, as Welsch put it,165 claims that if the “being-in-
itself of the things” (Ansichsein der Dinge) exists and is not supposed to be 
an empty thought, then such a being is not external to language, but rather 
determined through it and depends on it. The reference to the “thing in 
itself” cannot be above or outside language, for no reference is wholly 
independent of language. The identity of such things-in-themselves is 
determined precisely by their negative relation to others; they exclude the 
possibility that there are forms that are at work in the things. Since 
language is, after all, the framework for every proposition, object, negation, 
relation and representation, referring to objects outside language also 
happens inside language. Thus, such eerie “in-itself” (Ansich) that is 
beyond any language is impossible ex definitione. 
In spite of this, Hegel would not confirm that objective truth is relative 
to language, as Davidson does, nor does he believe that it is relative to the 
individual human being, as Putnam does.166 In contrast, Hegel contends 
that thinking of objects does not consist in the subjectivist reduction 
according to which such mental objects are quasi only “our thoughts”, 
when he argues in the Encyclopaedia Logic that “the true objectivity of 
thinking consists in this: that thoughts are not merely our thoughts, but at 
the same time the In-itself of things and of whatever else is objective”.167 
The structures of thinking itself thus have qualities of objecthood as well. 
                                           
164 Hacking, 1975, p. 24. 
165 Welsch, 2003, p. 53. 
166 Cf. ibid., p. 60.  
167 Hegel, 1991, p. 83; 8/116. 
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Thinking is objective, insofar as it also intrinsically happens in the object 
and towards its inwardness. 
Therefore, Brandom plausibly argues that Hegel is a “conceptual 
realist”, one who sees the “objective world as already in conceptual shape, 
and hence graspable as such”.168 Conceptual realists also hold that truth is 
not a certain target, state or property, because the coherence of truth, just 
like the coherence of meaning, is not a final rigid state, like matter or a 
dead body. Truth is not about something one simply achieves one day, but 
rather a free self-movement. On this understanding, Hegel does not hold 
any classical theory of truth, neither correspondence-theory nor coherence-
theory. Brandom reminds us that what is radical and interesting in Hegel’s 
non-analytic concept of truth is that what matters is not the result of the 
process of truth, but the process itself.169 The Hegelian “motor” of change 
means that in each concept there is a difference between truth and untruth 
that moves us to the next concept. Brandom rightly stresses that it is of 
course not the case that all is spirit, for there would then be no differences 
at all, just as it is also not the case that the Hegelian truth process is merely 
infinite. He interprets, however, Hegel’s treatment of the principle of 
contradiction in a somewhat problematic way, for he calls it the endorsing 
of “materially incompatible commitments”, whereas Hegel himself does 
not really endorses the incompatible commitments, but only presents them 
as the motor of conceptual change in science. 
The last discussions have brought us a little bit closer to Hegel’s 
concept of science. We began our approach towards Hegel’s concept of 
science with what science is not, and continued with commenting on 
Hegel’s words on science. We arrive now at the last section of this chapter 
                                           
168 In “Hegel and Analytic Philosophy” (2015, p. 5), published on Brandom‘s website 
(http://www.pitt.edu/~rbrandom/). 
169 Cf. ibid., p. 12. 
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in which effort will be made to understand Hegel from the postmodern 
perspective of Kuhn’s influential theory of science. 
 
3.8 Hegel’s possible response to Kuhn’s concept of science 
There is an ambiguity in the relation between Kuhn and Hegel. On the one 
hand, Kuhn’s postmodernism can be seen as a decisive rejection of Hegel’s 
modernism, his adherence to systematism and ‘totalism’. But on the other 
hand, Kuhn seems to echo Hegelian themes insofar as he recognized the 
crucial role of the study of the history of science for the development of 
science and so epitomizes the historical turn within the Anglophone 
philosophy of science. Kuhn’s approach became one of the acknowledged 
positions within contemporary philosophy of science, embodied in the 
university departments of Science Studies and History of Science. His 
theory of science in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) was co-
responsible for the post-analytic turn in the analytic philosophy of science, 
because, roughly until Kuhn, the self-declared analytic tradition grasped the 
historicity of science as principally indifferent to science itself, so that this 
tradition believed it could cut itself off from the commitments to its 
continental history. Let us thus begin with a short presentation of what 
might count as the similarities between Hegel and Kuhn.  
Firstly, Hegel would agree with Kuhn that science is a process that 
takes place in time, evolves and has a history that matters to its becoming 
and being. Hegel claims, for example, that the post-Aristotelian science of 
logic urgently needs further development. Kuhn’s basic claim is that 
learning from previous scientific revolutions has an existential meaning 
insofar as the scientific discoveries alter our “conception of entities”.170 
                                           
170 Kuhn, 1962, p. 7 
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This can be read as Kuhn’s ontological thought. The reason why learning 
from the history of science is permanently relevant is this: “Out-of-date 
theories are not in principle unscientific because they have been 
discarded”.171 Outdated theories do have “historical integrity”172 that 
consists in the fact that they were right at their time and so they are, to 
some extent, historically correct. At first glance, this thought seems to be 
quite Hegelian. However, whereas Kuhn criticizes the “unhistorical 
stereotype drawn from science texts”173 in contemporary textbooks which 
dogmatically show results and methods devoid of their historical contexts, 
Hegel condemns the “historical” way of speaking in philosophy and 
science, and prefers the logical-conceptual structure. He explicitly refrains 
from designating his method of inquiry as “historical”. 
Furthermore, Hegel might agree with Kuhn about the rejection of the 
linear conceptions of progress, i.e. of “development-by-accumulation”, 
“cumulative process” or “accretion”.174 Yet, as we have shown, Hegel does 
have in mind a kind of quantitative cumulative process. When he describes 
the progress of thinking in Science of Logic, he means the permanent 
further-determination of every form of being, the process of its conceptual 
evolution from an undetermined “pure being” to the fully determined 
“absolute idea”. 
Kuhn, who did not agree much with Hegel and regarded him as 
“obscure”,175 wanted to see himself as “a Kantian with moveable 
categories”, even though Kant, unlike Kuhn, was pretty much anti-
                                           
171 Ibid., pp. 2f. 
172 Ibid., p. 5. 
173 Ibid., p. 1. 
174 Ibid., p. 2. 
175 Nickles, T., “Scientific Revolutions”, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
ed. E.N. Zalta (www.plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/scientific-revolutions, 
2014). 
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historicist about science. In fact, Kuhn has developed a Darwinist-
naturalistic theory of science that differs much from that of Hegel or even 
Kant. In the following, four main differences between Hegel and Kuhn 
concerning their conception of science shall be presented. 
The first difference between Kuhn and Hegel concerns the definition of 
science. For Kuhn, science is the process of discovering nature. Hegel 
would agree that science is a process, yet science is for him not only the 
discovering of nature, but also the discovering of the products of human 
spirit, like art, religion and state, as products of the spirit. Even when the 
spirit discovers nature, it discovers the otherness of spirit, and hence still 
something that stands in some relation to spirit. Above all, science is not 
only about discovering the nature of nature, but also about discovering the 
nature of spirit, namely spirit’s self-knowledge. Hegel thus emphasizes the 
mode of recognition more than that of discovery. From this essential 
difference between Kuhn’s and Hegel’s definition we come to one of its 
crucial consequences: the status of concepts in science. 
The second central difference between Hegel and Kuhn turns on the 
determination of the logical relations between scientific concepts. Kuhn’s 
emphasis on the significance of the altering basic categories of the 
“paradigms” during scientific discoveries may bring to mind Hegel’s 
thought about the dynamic character of scientific concepts. Like Hegel, 
Kuhn thinks that the goal of learning history of science is to understand the 
emergence and operationality of central “paradigms”, the fundamental 
conceptual categories in “normal science”. Such understanding enables a 
revolutionary awareness for potential modifications of contemporary 
paradigms. Revolutions happen in science when scientific results show 
inadequacies and are wrong or incorrect. Therefore, Kuhn, again, like 
Hegel, defines “scientific discovery” in relation to “conceptual categories” 
and so in a way that resembles the Hegelian sympathy with the logic of 
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concepts. Kuhn argues: “That awareness of anomaly opens a period in 
which conceptual categories are adjusted until the initially anomalous 
become the anticipated. At this point the discovery has been completed”.176 
Notwithstanding, in stark contrast to Hegel, Kuhn declares that the 
interrelations between the paradigms cannot be sufficiently determined: 
“The normal-scientific tradition that emerges from a scientific revolution is 
not only incompatible but often actually incommensurable with that which 
has gone before”.177 The reason for this gap is “the insufficiency of 
methodological directives”,178 which leads, in turn, to a “continual 
competition between a number of distinct views of nature”. Kuhn famously 
designates these views as “incommensurable ways of seeing the world”.179 
His idea of incommensurability negates the conceptual derivability of one 
paradigm out of the other and hence any logical continuity. In this way, he 
raises the problem of the absence of logical scientific unity. He formulates 
the connections between paradigms mostly in a negative form: 
“incommensurable”, “incompatible”, “anomalous”. 
Where Kuhn diagnoses anomaly and detects incommensurability, Hegel 
rather experiences the constructive motion of well-organized contradictions 
through “determined negations” and “mediations”. The “incommensurable 
ways of seeing the world” is the foundation of Kuhn’s infamous relativism, 
about which Quine not unjustly said that it is “epistemological nihilism” 
that tends “to belittle the role of evidence and to accentuate cultural 
                                           
176 Ibid., p. 64. 
177 Ibid., p. 103. 
178 Ibid., p. 3. 
179 Ibid., p. 4. 
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relativism”.180 Hegel would have apparently stamped Kuhn’s theory of 
science as unscientific, since it led Kuhn to the skeptical conclusion that 
science is a process without any “permanent fixed scientific truth”.181 
Kuhn’s conclusion may sound for a moment like Hegel’s idea of “moments 
of truth”, but in effect Kuhn denies the very possibility of truth. In Hegelian 
terms, Kuhn understands his own theory of science as an “absolute 
negation” of the old anti-historicist analytical philosophy of science which 
he knew and which were valid at his time, but in fact, his emphasis on 
coming back to history of science is rather a “sublation” of his precedents 
and thus only a “determinate negation”, which is partly commensurable 
with traditional historicist European theorists of sciences, like Karl Marx, 
Max Weber or Franz Boas. 
 (3) The third difference between Hegel and Kuhn turns on the goal of 
science. Whereas for Hegel the goal of science is defined as spirit’s self-
recognition, for Kuhn science is an uncontrolled progress “without a 
teleological goal”.182 The problem with the term “teleological goal” is that 
it is fairly tautological and claims the same thing twice over because telos 
means an end in the sense of a purpose, ergo, goal. The conjunction 
“teleological goal” could have been conceptually distinguished from any 
other goal, for example economical goal or political goal. But Kuhn, for 
whom no goal at all exists for science, not any specific goal, not a humanist 
one, and definitely not a goal that he could call telos, does not draw any 
such distinctions. Kuhn explains his founding in a Darwinist-like tactic that 
almost became a norm in contemporary philosophy of science: he 
                                           
180 Quine, 1969, p. 87. Quine counters that in spite of Kuhn’s views, “epistemology still 
goes on” (ibid., p. 82), yet in the spirit of Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle. The idea 
of the incommensurability of paradigms was also vehemently criticized by Imre Lakatos 
and John Watkins. 
181 Kuhn, 1962, p. 173. 
182 Ibid., p. 171.  
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maintains that there is a “natural selection” among the scientific paradigms, 
like in nature’s evolutional processes. In Kuhn’s interpretation of Darwin’s 
evolution theory, natural selection is responsible for the emergence of a 
specialized organism without any goal set by the mind or god.183 
Analogously, the “natural selection” of paradigms within the process of 
science has no teleological goal set in advance by god or any other being, 
not even by nature. Kuhn is thus deeply rooted in the tradition of 
epistemological naturalism which tends to reanimalize the human being in 
various forms. The problem is that, if we decide that science principally 
does not have any purpose, we cannot justify any selection of the 
conceptual categories. This is the petitio principii in Kuhn’s theory: there is 
no proof for this alleged purposelesness of science. 
Against Kuhn’s Darwinist epistemology one can claim that it is a form 
of “biologistic naturalism”184 about concepts, and therefore a danger for 
“methodisch aufgeklärte Wissenschaft”,185 that is, for science that is fully 
conscious about its methodology and seeks to make wise use of it. 
Sufficient knowledge about methods makes science more critical because 
“the mere ‘surviving’ of contingently ‘stronger’ ideas does not show yet 
that they are reasonable”.186 A ripe philosophical method must be aware of 
the hazardous situation that some dominant traditions of knowledge, which 
are not better than others or necessarily in possession of the truth, enjoy 
overrepresentation and authority status.  
(4) The last difference to be mentioned results from Kuhn’s skeptical 
conception of the goalless science which leads him to deny the existence of 
                                           
183 Cf. ibid., pp. 171ff. 
184 Stekeler, 2014, p. 45. 
185 Ibid. 
186 Ibid: “Das bloße ‘Überleben’ zufällig ‘stärkerer’ Ideen zeigt noch nicht, dass sie 
vernünftig sind”. 
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“one, objective, true account of nature”.187 Kuhn does not deny the 
objectivity of natural science because he acknowledges instead pluralism 
of valid approaches, but because the supposedly infinitely dividable nature 
consists of countless details. Kuhn adequately identifies “an increasingly 
detailed and refined understanding of nature”188 reached by “a community 
of scientific specialists”.189 This description of natural science may be 
accurate, but due to this description Kuhn regards science itself as lacking 
any objective truth. Kuhnian textbooks on philosophy of science 
disapprove that science is a search for truth or approximation to the truth.190 
Since we purportedly cannot speak of any “single category ‘Science’”,191 
the Kuhnian followers deny a “universal conception of Science”.192 Hegel’s 
philosophy seems to provide a possible response to this distrustful thought. 
Kuhn’s naturalistic approach to science consists in his strong analogy 
between science and nature. Kuhn, the ex-physicist specializing in history 
of physics, draws all the major examples of scientific revolutions from the 
natural sciences. Science is not conceptualized by him as a generic idea, so 
that when he says “science” he uncritically refers only to that which is 
already approved as science in his times, the given phenomenon of science: 
modern empirical natural science. The aimlessness of science in Kuhn’s 
theory is his “lacuna” which probably made the nature-mind-gap in current 
philosophy of science even more unbridgeable than it was before him.  
The lacuna of the goalless science is responsible for the lacuna of the 
hermeneutical method: Kuhn himself does not confront any previous 
philosophers of science in his work, except a few historians of science. 
                                           
187 Kuhn, 1962, p. 171. 
188 Ibid., p. 170. 
189 Ibid., p. 160. 
190 Cf. Chlamers, 1982, p. 169. 
191 Ibid., p. 168. 
192 Ibid., p. 169. 
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Systematical treatment of other determinations of science and learning 
from the history of his own discipline, as Kuhn himself recommends, could 
have led him to rethink some of his discoveries. The fact that he leaves it 
undone leaves a shadow on his project which contemporary philosophy of 
science still tries to scatter. 
  
  
 
 4. Hegel’s task of scientifying philosophy 
Hegel’s deliberations on the essence of science do not aim at constructing a 
descriptive theory of science that serves only scientists or beginners in 
science, nor does he analyze existing phenomena of science only for the 
theoretical sake of their proof or critique. Rather, as this chapter will show, 
his thoughts on science have a clearly metaphilosophical role insofar as 
they supply the guidelines for the project of the scientification of 
philosophy. Hegel works on metascience, not for the sake of science, but 
for the sake of turning philosophy into science. The self-appointed task of 
scientifying philosophy is the constitutive act of his philosophy of science. 
The step Hegel wishes to take from philosophy to science is expressed in 
his step from phenomenology to logic and analogue to the step from 
Platonic philo-sophia to Aristotelian scientificity. His task came under 
suspicion of promoting scientism and led to strong reactions against his 
philosophy of science, not only within the analytic tradition, but also 
among prominent successors of German philosophy. 
 
4.1 Hegel’s task: scientism? 
Let us begin with Hegel’s words on what he has set himself to do in 
Phenomenology of Spirit. The shortest formulation of his self-given task 
stems from the “Introduction”: “die Erhebung der Philosophie zur 
Wissenschaft”.1 The literal meaning of Erhebung... zur is wide, bundling 
two perspectives of the action of heben: it means that we actively raise 
philosophy up to science from above, from the scientific point of view, but 
                                           
1 3/14. 
 207 
 
also that philosophy is passively being raised up to science, if we speak 
from the quasi ‘lower’ perspective of philosophy. Beyond the active and 
passive aspects of the description of the action, the Erhebung of the ‘non-
scientific’ philosophy means a certain qualitative alteration, becoming 
better or higher, of course not physically or geographically, but by 
reclassification as science, as a higher degree, level, status or rank. It seems 
that Hegel assumes science to be higher than philosophy, and if we 
consider what was said about the young ‘anti-scientific’ Hegel, we can 
conclude that this assumption reflects his new insights regarding the higher 
status of science to be secured in his own system of thought. Hegel’s task 
in fact takes on the dimensions of a ‘mission’: the scientification of 
philosophy. 
At least from the viewpoint of philosophy, such a mission is not 
uncontroversial, as it not only presumes that science already stands in a 
higher position than philosophy, but also that philosophy is incomplete or 
insufficient, somehow not good enough as it is and in need of being 
improved. Hegel’s words let infer that philosophy is still not science, but 
should be. Also in the Science of Logic Hegel suggests that logic and 
philosophy should be science2 and not just a doctrine. In the Encyclopaedia 
we finally encounter the first full development of the “philosophical 
sciences”, albeit in outlines. The formulation of this mission raises thus a 
difficulty: does the philosopher Hegel truly believe that science, in the 
broad Latin and German sense of the word, is higher and better than 
traditional philosophy? 
                                           
2 5/16: “Die Philosophie, indem sie Wissenschaft sein soll, kann, wie ich anderwärts 
erinnert habe, hierzu ihre Methode nicht von einer untergeordneten Wissenschaft, wie 
die Mathematik ist, borgen”. Miller misleadingly translates “sein soll” as “would be”, 
and not “should be”: “Philosophy, if it would be a science [...]” (1991, p. 4). 
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As a preliminary note, it is useful to recall that in Hegel’s times 
philosophy did not have the official status of science at the university, as it 
was mainly taught as propaedeutic to theology, for example in Tübingen,3 
and counted as the ‘handmaiden of theology’. Hegel’s vision was an 
expression for a new academic model, inspired by the Jena University and 
later by Humboldt’s plan. To be sure, the question of whether philosophy is 
or ought to be science, and to what extent, was the subject of a recurring 
debate, before and after Hegel. The very declaration of the will to scientify 
philosophy is not originally Hegel’s, but the legacy of Kant and Fichte. In 
fact, the idea of philosophy as science has a history reaching at least to 
Aristotle’s description of philosophy as ἐπιστήμην τῆς ἀληθείας, “science 
of the truth”.4 After Hegel, even the logical positivist Schlick chooses for 
himself the same Hegelian task of making philosophy more scientific.5 
While breaking with the empiricist tradition, Schlick declares the end of the 
“hostile opposition”6 between science and philosophy, however he believes 
that Hegel is co-responsible for this opposition. It is thus a matter of 
historical irony and a sign of historical ignorance when Michael Friedman, 
the great historian of philosophy of science, asserts that the history of 
modern philosophy of science begins with logical positivism, while 
ignoring Hegel’s legacy.7  
In order to reach a better understanding of Hegel’s task, we ought to 
take a closer look at its explicit formulation in the “Preface”: 
 
                                           
3 Cf. Pinkard, 2000, p. 430. 
4 Aristotle, Metaphysics, book 2, 993, b20. 
5 Cf. Schlick, 1979, p. 141. 
6 In “Is there intuitive knowledge?” from 1913 (Schlick, 1979, p. 141). 
7 Cf. Friedman, 2012, pp. 1f. 
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“The true shape in which truth exists can only be the scientific system 
of such truth. To help bring Philosophy closer to the form of Science, to 
the goal where it can lay aside the title of ‘love of knowing’ and be 
actual knowledge – that is what I have set myself to do”.8 
 
Compared with the “Introduction” which was written before the “Preface”, 
it is noticeable that, after finishing the writing of his work, Hegel’s 
statement regarding the task has slightly softened, perhaps because he was 
more circumspect and the task had seemed to become more modest: 
philosophy should now just attempt to get “closer to the form of Science”. 
Philosophy should become morphologically more scientific. As Shlomo 
Avineri notes, and later Mario Wenning, the task that Hegel announced for 
himself gave birth to a new scientific form of philosophical consciousness 
and so to a new epoch.9 For the sake of creating a new philosophical 
consciousness, Hegel holds the scientific form to be as high as it can get 
and as high as it can be, believing that it is the locus of truth. The most 
significant thing Hegel expects to expose through scientifying philosophy 
is the demonstration of truth. From his determinations of science, it is 
derivable that philosophy is for him a process of self-knowledge, a logical 
“becoming” that consists of a set of concepts and that has truth as a whole. 
This kind of knowledge leads to the cognition of the “absolute spirit”. 
As remarked before, to argue that the true locus of truth is to be found 
only in science is highly contentious: Hegel’s philosophy of science can 
come under suspicion of rampant scientism. Since the dwelling on the plan 
of scientification only adds to this growing suspicion, we need to inquire 
further into Hegel’s possible relation to scientism. Unsurprisingly, the term 
                                           
8 Hegel, 1977, p. 3; 3/14. 
9 Cf. Avineri, 1972, p. 66; Wenning, 2009, p. 45. 
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scientism originally served as a positive expression for the advantage of the 
natural sciences, namely by the French biologist Félix le Dantec.10 In the 
wake of the ideas of Wilhelm Dilthey concerning the original methods of 
the humanities, and the ideas of Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno 
concerning the critical theory of science, scientism became a pejorative 
term for the blind ideologies of positivism and naturalism. Hegel, who 
clearly does not hold such naive forms of scientism, cares about the 
scientific character of philosophy because he recognizes the link between 
the manifested truth and the rigid structures of epistemological 
systematicity. Only a knowledge that is organized as a scientific system is 
“actual” (wirklich) in the sense of having a true effect on our understanding 
of reality. “Actualized” knowledge is shared knowledge that does not only 
“appear”, but is also acknowledged as true. The systematization of 
knowledge is the process in which a certain composition of concepts 
logically exhibits its proof and so becomes “demonstrable” (dargestellt 
werden kann).11 
The task of scientifying philosophy is linked to the task of philosophy 
itself, as Hegel sees it, so that the understanding of the one task is based on 
the understanding of the other. Let us therefore illuminate the task of 
philosophy according to Hegel. 
The task of philosophy, which has been formulated for the first time in 
the Difference essay (1801), is “to overcome these finitudes [of 
consciousness] and construct the Absolute in consciousness”.12 “The 
Absolute” is here the generic name for real knowledge and real science, 
and not some utopian ideas about divine cognition, which is actually unreal 
and unreachable. Philosophy is thus involved in a modern task: the 
                                           
10 Le Dantec, 1912, p. 51. 
11 3/27. 
12 Hegel, 1977a, p. 88; 2/19. 
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treatment of the concept of consciousness in light of the concepts of truth, 
knowledge and science. “The Absolute” can be grasped in consciousness as 
the amalgamation of the objective and subjective perspectives. According 
to this task, philosophy should become scientific because science is a 
higher form of self-consciousness and hence it is exactly that which is 
capable of “constructing the Absolute in consciousness”. Science can 
construct “the Absolute in consciousness” because scientific work is the 
praxis of producing reliable generic knowledge claims. 
In the “Preface” to Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel articulates the 
difference between the ancient and modern task of philosophy as analogous 
to the difference between ancient and modern education. The goal of 
ancient education was to take natural consciousness out of sensual 
perception and bring it into the purely categorical thinking of the universal. 
It did this by asking ti to on and looking for the eternal and fixed being. 
Now it is time “to bring fixed thoughts into a fluid state” and so “to give 
actuality to the universal”.13 In what can be seen as his own idiosyncratic 
supplement, Hegel visualizes the new intellectual activity of re-
actualization as liquefaction which symbolizes free motion and high 
flexibility, organic life and liveliness in general. Hegel gives a further 
original determination of the modern task by using the rare verb 
“begeisten”, which literally means to bestow something with spirit, “to 
impart to it spiritual life”.14 The term begeisten was also used in the sense 
of “dissolve” in the chemistry of Hegel’s time.15 To re-actualize the solid 
universal categories means to dissolve them by the accession of spirit to 
                                           
13 Hegel, 1977, p. 20; 3/37. 
14 Ibid. 
15 The verb begeisten was renewed by Johann Schuster in his translation of the Latin 
work of the chemist Jakob Joseph Winterl Darstellung der vier Bestandteilen der 
anorganischen Natur (Jena: Friedrich Frommann, 1804). 
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their matter. What is required for critical scientific thought is thus not 
simply begeistern, i.e. enthusiasm, but begeisten, dissolution by 
“spiritualizing”. This act of modern science, which aims at “freeing fixed 
thoughts from their fixity”,16 manifests the emancipatory aspect of Hegel’s 
task of scientification. The spiritualizing of the fettered and captured 
categories of thought is Hegel’s version of deconstruction. In light of this 
task, philosophy should become science because science is exactly the 
cognitive instance that deals with the actuality of universal knowledge and 
its expressions in diverse lifeforms. 
In Philosophy of Right, Hegel comes once again to philosophy’s task 
which is “[t]o comprehend what is”. This time, however, he emphasizes 
that the task is not “to construct” what ought to be, because “what is is 
reason”.17 In contrast to a common criticism, Hegel consciously rejects the 
constructivist element of traditional metaphysics and sets the 
epistemological question concerning the status of philosophical knowledge 
in relation to the ontological question of the disclosure of being. He takes 
great pains to show that to develop a system of thought in evolutionary 
terms does not compulsively mean to create a construction in an arbitrary 
manner, but rather to expose a composition, which means to exhibit the 
multifaceted forms of existent thought-compositions. In light of this task, 
philosophy should become science because true science is knowledge about 
being. The phenomenon of science embodies the self-comprehending 
thinking spirit which systematically deals with the being itself in terms of 
the conditions of true cognition of what there is. 
As shown above, Hegel’s task of scientifying philosophy is entangled 
with the task of philosophy as the comprehension of what is, and it serves 
                                           
16 Hegel, 1977, p. 20; 3/37. 
17 Hegel, 1991, p. 21; 7/26. 
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this task. This scientification does not correspond to scientism in the 
common sense of preferring natural science methods, but it insists on the 
self-conscious thinking process within philosophy. The next section will 
show that Hegel’s task has its origins in the Greek conception of 
philosophy as episteme and noesis noeseos, and so his task of scientifying 
philosophy actually means its re-scientification. 
 
4.2 On the origin of Hegel’s task: episteme as noesis noeseos 
The Hegelian discourse of philosophy as Wissenschaft is rooted in the 
relation of Ancient Greek philosophy to the ideal of science as “episteme”, 
ἐπιστήμη. For Plato and Aristotle, each time a bit differently, the concept of 
science is strongly entangled with that of philosophy. Hegel’s philosophy 
of science is rigorously committed to its ancient beginning, since he holds 
that the “development of the philosophic science as science [...] begins with 
Plato and is completed by Aristotle”.18 Hegel thus repeats history in an 
analogous manner, defining philosophy, like Aristotle, as the knowledge of 
the truth, of that which is, while making a case for abandoning the idea of 
Platonic love of knowledge. In light of Hegel’s task of re-scientifying 
philosophy through the re-actualizing and Begeisten of the old fixed 
categories of thought, we shall investigate his relation to Plato’s and 
Aristotle’s concept of ἐπιστήμη. 
 
4.2.1 Scientifying philosophy begins in Plato 
According to Hegel, Plato is the one who started the process of scientifying 
philosophy, as he brought the “Socratic point of view to the scientific”.19 
                                           
18 Hegel, 1995a, p. 1; 19/11. 
19 Ibid. 
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Plato started this process by grasping both reality and thinking in “the 
movement of science, as the Idea of a scientific whole”.20 Hegel praises 
Plato’s philosophy as the “science of the universal in itself”21 and as the 
science of “ideas” that clearly contains “one spirit”.22 
Plato himself, however, does not explicitly determine philosophy as 
science, but literally as the love of wisdom, philo-sophia. Love is not 
understood here in the common sense of φιλεῖν, i.e. as love of something 
one already possesses, like in the sophist concept of wisdom, but in the 
sense of desiring (ἐρᾶν) or yearning (ἐπιθυμεῖν) for something one does not 
possess. The Platonic philosopher is not merely a philodox (φιλόδοξος), a 
“lover of opinions”,23 but rather a philomath (φιλομαθὲς), a “lover of 
learning”24 who seeks universality. Plato claims that the philosopher desires 
to reach “cognition” or “recognition” (γνῶσίς/γνώμην) of the truth, i.e. 
“gnosis” of that which is and which remains the same, including the last 
cause – the idea of the good. He believes that the human followers of 
wisdom, as finite creatures, are not “wise” (σοφοί), because only god is,25 
but they are also not “ignorant” or “unlearned” (ἀμαθες) – they are between 
both.26 
All in all, this Platonic approach seems to match the way Hegel 
understands philosophy before the Phenomenology of Spirit, that is, before 
he aspires to change the “love of knowledge” to “actual knowledge”. Still, 
Hegel, who is a philomath and not a philodox, does detect a scientific 
dimension in Plato’s philosophy, namely in his rigorous epistemological 
                                           
20 Ibid. 
21 19/38: “überhaupt Wissenschaft des an sich Allgemeinen”. 
22 19/27: “ein Geist”. 
23 Plato, Republic, 480 a. 
24 Ibid., 376 b. 
25 Cf. Plato, Phaedrus, 278 d; Cf. Plato, Symposium, 204 a. 
26 Cf. Plato, Symposium, 203 e ff. 
 215 
 
considerations. For even though Plato stresses the human finitude and the 
human nescience, he upholds knowledge as the counterpart of mere belief 
in quite the same way that Hegel’s ambition to transform the “love of 
knowledge” to “actual knowledge” leads him to look for the scientific 
element in all kinds of objects of thought. Plato’s conception of ἐπιστήμη is 
surely surrounded by some nebulosity. But what is evident and agreed is 
that he contrasts the highly appreciated ἐπιστήμη with the common doxa, 
the mere subjective intuition. Even if the doxa is true, it is an unjustified 
belief and hence clearly “outside of the sphere of knowledge”.27 Plato does 
not expressly confirm that knowledge is true doxa with a logos or “true 
opinion accompanied by reason” (μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ δόξαν),28 because the 
justification of a doxa is based on another doxa and so leads to an infinite 
regress. Knowledge is thus essentially not a doxa, and justified true belief 
also remains a mere belief. Although Plato did not state that knowledge is 
meta logou alêthê doxan this formula has come down in the history of 
thought as the traditional definition of knowledge, at least until its re-
problematization in Edmund Gettier’s essay “Is Justified True Belief 
Knowledge?” (1963). 
Like Plato, Hegel also attributes to the doxa, which he calls Vorstellung 
or Meinung, the “poorest” truth, the mere certainty of an immediate sensual 
perception. Only the truth of Wissenschaft that is directed at that which is is 
intelligible. Besides taking from Plato the rejection of the doxa, Hegel’s 
philosophy of science also took the constitutive element of the logos 
(Begriff) as a condition for being-in-truth. Moreover, when Hegel 
comments at the end of the Phenomenology of Spirit that “its path” is “the 
                                           
27 Plato, Theaetetus, 201 d. 
28 Ibid. 
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recollection of the Spirits”29 he pays tribute to Plato’s reference to the 
emergence of knowledge as “recollection” (ἀνάμνησις), as learning through 
rediscovering inner eternal truths. 
The structure of Phenomenology of Spirit echoes the task of philosophy 
in Phadeo, namely of freeing the imprisoned soul from the body and the 
senses by directing it to itself, to the “thinkable” (νοητόν), which is its 
intelligible side, and which can be rendered in German as das Geistige. 
Plato’s plan aims at the salvation of the soul through the conversion of the 
philosomatic (φιλοσώματος) human, the lover of the body, to a philological 
(φιλόλογος) one, the lover of thinking. This plan famously culminates in 
the macabre description of philosophy as learning to die. The voluntary 
dissociation from biological life is seen as the highest bliss, a longed-for 
felicity. Although Hegel also depicts the Geist as that which goes beyond 
biological nature, he actually conceives of Geist as that which is full of life 
and explicitly distances himself from the ancient task of tearing humans 
from sensuality, saying that he rather aims at the dynamization and 
revitalization of the received fixed categories of traditional thought. 
It is almost ironic that, in spite of the decisive Platonic distinction doxa-
episteme, Hegel condemns Socrates’ overstated doxology, his constant 
getting involved with the prevalent doxas, as a proof for Plato’s lack of 
“scientific exposition of philosophy”.30 Hegel criticizes Plato’s philosophy 
for not having a precise systematic form or a real scientific presentation.31 
Yet, he only explains this situation in a general-historical manner, claiming 
that Plato’s cultural era was not ready for “real scientific works” and that it 
was only in Aristotle that philosophy attained a “scientific systematic 
                                           
29 Hegel, 1977, p. 493; 3/591. 
30 Hegel, 1995a, pp. 17; 19/27. 
31 Cf. ibid., pp. 1f; 19/11f. 
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representation”.32 Let us put aside the judging of this statement and head to 
the fruit of Plato’s initial seed of philosophical science: Aristotle’s 
determination of ἐπιστήμη. 
 
4.2.2 Scientifying philosophy is completed in Aristotle 
Hegel considers Aristotle as a “scientific genius”,33 as the one who 
completed the scientification of ancient Greek philosophy. In quite the 
same manner, Hegel considered himself to be the one who should complete 
the scientification of modern philosophy, and indeed Heidegger named him 
the “completer” (Vollender) of the whole occidental metaphysics. Hegel 
takes Aristotle to be more “scientific” than Plato because, in contrast to 
Plato, Aristotle explicitly equates the theoretical knowledge of philosophy 
with wisdom and ἐπιστήμη: “philosophy is rightly called a knowledge of 
Truth” (ἐπιστήμη τῆς ἀληθείας).34 In this, Aristotle, like Hegel later, leaves 
room for the human hopes of attaining accessibility to the highest form of 
knowledge, the knowledge of being qua being, τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὄν.35 Aristotle 
conceptualizes this “looked-for knowledge” (ζητουμένη ἐπιστήμη) as “first 
philosophy” (πρώτη φιλοσοφία), since it contains the knowledge of the 
being of all beings, the first being which is the first principle, the unmoved 
mover, or “god”. This conception of “onto-theo-logy”, as Heidegger put it, 
locates Hegel rather in Aristotle’s neighborhood than in Plato’s. 
On this view, Hegel’s task of scientification aims at reenacting the 
intellectual step from Plato to Aristotle by bridging the gap between 
Platonic love of wisdom as the project of science, and Aristotelian 
                                           
32 Ibid., pp. 2, 17; 19/11, 27. 
33 Ibid., p. 117; 19/132. In the translation of Haldane and Simson: “scientific geniuses”. 
34 Aristotle, Metaphysics, book 2, 993 b20 (In Tredennicks’ translation). 
35 Ibid., book 4, 1003 a21. 
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knowledge of knowledge as the structure of science. Hegel does this with 
the help of his own metascientific apparatus and in relation to the 
epistemological problems of his time. But this does not mean that Hegel 
simply borrows Aristotelian language of categories, as there are several 
major differences between their epistemological claims. 
Firstly, Aristotle defines his prōtē philosophia as theologia (θεολογία), 
the knowledge of god qua the Supreme Being, arguing that the “most 
honorable knowledge” (τιμιοτάτη ἐπιστήμη) is the “most divine” 
(θειοτάτη), not only because theos has it, but also because it has theos as 
object of inquiry. Aristotle does this because he defines wisdom as god’s 
knowledge, following Heraclitus. Hegel’s Logic may be read as a version 
of such Heraclitean onto-theology, but the Supreme Being in Hegel is 
called “the absolute” in the sense of that which is infinite and 
unconditioned, more specifically: “absolute knowledge”, “absolute spirit” 
or “absolute idea”. It is true that Hegel mentions god, but it is undeniable 
that he does not explicitly or exclusively place god in the center or at the 
top of the system; he does not use god as a title. 
Secondly, Aristotle characterizes philosophy differently from Hegel 
insofar as he regards philosophy as the investigation of “principles and 
causes” (ἀρχὰς καὶ αἰτίας),36 whereas Hegel speaks of “shapes of spirit” 
and “determinations of thought”. Consequently, Aristotle also divides 
philosophy, as theory of science, differently from Hegel. For Aristotle, 
philosophy consists of mathematics, physics (natural philosophy as 
“secondary philosophy”) and theology (ontology as “first philosophy”).37 In 
Hegel’s program, the first philosophy is not called theology or metaphysics 
anymore, but logic, and mathematics is a part of it; there is philosophy of 
                                           
36 Aristotle, Metaphysics, book 1, 982 a. 
37 Ibid., book 6, 1026 d. 
 219 
 
spirit (as the second “secondary philosophy”) and also philosophy of 
nature; in brief, less theos, more logos and human sciences. This program 
is in fact not alien to contemporary philosophy in general, perhaps with the 
exception that since Frege and Quine, non-formal logic of abstraction à la 
Hegel is missing. Hegel’s phenomenological investigation and his lectures 
on history, art and religion cannot be found in the same dimension in 
Aristotle, on the one hand, or in analytic philosophy, in the other hand. 
Thirdly, although both agree on the emergence of knowledge through 
conceptual mediation, there is a difference in the terminology with which 
Hegel and Aristotle determine their conceptions of knowledge. Whereas 
Aristotle, like Frege, overestimates the doctrine of sound inferences by 
syllogism (συλλογισμός) and induction (ἐπαγωγή), i.e the deductively 
proven knowledge by means of demonstrative proof (ἀπόδειξις),38 Hegel 
recognizes the insufficiencies of this too formalistic approach towards 
conceptual necessity. He mocks this doctrine as a too abstract calculation 
and as a merely external justification that is mostly contingent. In addition, 
Aristotle holds that “to possess scientific knowledge” (ἐπίστασθαι), which 
can be technically rendered as “to science”, means “to know [γινώσκειν] 
the cause [αἰτίαν] on which the fact [πρᾶγμά] depends, as the cause of that 
fact and of no other, and, further, that the fact could not be other than it 
is”.39 “To science something” means then to Aristotle to identify all the 
necessary reasons for it. Yet, for Hegel, who diminishes the talk about 
cause (Urasche) and reason (Grund) within philosophical discourse and 
leaves it to natural science, “to science something” would mean to express 
its concept by demonstrating all the sublated stages and contradictions of 
the concept as a whole. He employs in his epistemology the 
                                           
38 Cf. ibid., book C 1000 a 5–8. 
39 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, book 1, chapter 2. 
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phenomenological language that distinguishes between the modes of 
“appearance” and “actuality”. 
A further difference concerns the learnability of knowledge. The 
Aristotelian episteme, as a form of knowledge attained by sound syllogistic 
inferences and induction, is one of the virtues of thinking, also called 
“dianoetic virtues” or “intellectual virtues”, next to téchne (art) and 
phrónesis (practical judgment), which are teachable and learnable, need 
experience and time, and are not by nature in humans40 – a conception that 
Hegel adopts for his Wissenschaft. Yet, for Aristotle, the other two 
intellectual virtues, sophia (wisdom) and nous (intellect), are not learnable 
or teachable, for they require a deep contemplation of the beings that have 
necessarily unchanging causes, the beings that are not capable of being 
otherwise. The Aristotelian nous cannot be acquired by every person and so 
corresponds more to Schelling’s gifted Sonntagskinder than to Hegel’s 
Geist. Since sophia, wisdom, is generated through the combination of nous 
and episteme, then wisdom remains from the beginning not accessible to 
everyone.41 To be sure, it also remains open to what extent anybody can 
acquire the Hegelian Geist that knows itself as such. The difference to 
Aristotle is that this all-accessibility is not ruled out in Hegel from the 
beginning, per definition, as it is in Aristotle. 
There is also a terminological distinction to be mentioned concerning 
the subject of knowledge: for Plato and Aristotle, it is the psyche, i.e. the 
human soul, or god, whereas for Hegel, it is consciousness or spirit. 
Hegel’s terminology is tighter: Bewusstsein is a being who has Wissen, just 
like con-scientia has scientia. Yet, the idea of the self-conscious 
consciousness clearly echoes the Aristotelian reflexive noesis noeseos 
                                           
40 Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 6, chapter 3, 1139ba–1140a. 
41 Cf. ibid., Book 2, chapter 1, 1102a–1103b. 
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noesis, if one is cautious not to interpret this kind of reflection as 
narcissism or positivism. 
The last difference to be mentioned concerns the realization of Hegel’s 
task through his phenomenology which shows the way to the “pure 
science” of the “determinations of thinking”. This “science of logic” can be 
seen as Hegel’s version of the prima philosophia. But whereas in the 
received Aristotelian corpus, the prima philosophia qua meta-physics is 
preceded by physics, Hegel takes pains to provide a different path to his 
prima philosophia. This path, this “ladder”, is the “science of the 
experience of the consciousness”, or more stenographically: 
“phenomenology”. For the sake of the realization of his task of 
scientification, Hegel renews the term “phenomenology”42 and makes it 
central to his philosophy of science. 
After dealing with the ancient sources of Hegel’s task, which show 
what inspired his idea of re-scientifying philosophy, we continue with the 
investigation of the trigger for his task: what caused him to choose this 
task? 
 
4.3 The triggers for the task 
Hegel’s task of re-scientifying philosophy was triggered by what he 
regarded as the unscientific and misguided conception of “absolute 
knowledge” as “immediate knowledge”. Hegel detects this conception 
especially in the systems of Fichte and Schelling, but also in the romantic 
figures of his era, the five Friedrichs: Friedrich Hölderlin, Friedrich 
Schleiermacher, Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, Friedrich von Hardenberg aka 
Novalis and Friedrich Schlegel. Their wish to attain “immediate knowledge 
                                           
42 As we shall see in 4.4.1 
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of the absolute” is considered by Hegel as contradictio in adjecto. In the 
“Preface” to Phenomenology of Spirit he names ten misconceptions of the 
“absolute knowledge”: “intuition” (Anschauung), i.e subjective “outlook” 
or “view”, “common sense” (Gemeinsinn), “feeling” (Gefühl), “dullness” 
(Trübheit), “being” (Sein), “edification” (Erbauung), “religion”, “ecstasy”, 
“enthusiasm” and “prophetical way of speaking”. All these interpretations 
presuppose that there is no need to use discursive conceptual schemes in 
order to reach truth. They deny the significance of logical soundness for the 
scientific integrity of philosophical thinking. Hegel’s verdict is that they 
simply “gave up” (Verzicht tun) science. 
An incorrect and non-reflective concept of the absolute is for Hegel one 
that does not take the concept of concept into consideration. In contrast to 
the misleading romantic ideas, he argues that the absolute and the truth can 
only be reached by the “labor of the concept” (Arbeit des Begriffs), that is, 
by “aspiring to reach the concept” and by “making an effort towards the 
concept” (die Anstrengung des Begriffs). This wording hints at the term 
“studying the concepts”, as sich anstrengen is the translation of the Latin 
verb studere, which means to aspire or to make an effort. Hegel demands 
from the philosopher scientific “seriousness” (Ernst), “patience” (Geduld) 
and even “pain” (Schmerz). Perhaps because of this, Schelling and 
Hölderlin gave him the nickname “the old man”.43 
The reason for Hegel’s attack on the “immediate knowledge” is his 
view that even the “sensual certainty” (sinnliche Gewissheit) about 
particular empirical objects is itself “mediated” (vermittelt) and obtained by 
general concepts like “this“, “here”, “now”, “I”. These concepts operate as 
logical categories, like kind, type or species, which refer to something we 
already know of, because otherwise we could not identify it. Here, Hegel 
                                           
43 Pinkard, 2000, p. 26. 
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agrees with the basic postulate of Quine’s critique of empiricism. Hegel 
argues that to refer to a particular we need a universal, which only seems to 
be the opposite of a particular. He claims that we “mean” a particular, but 
say a universal and so “contra-dict” (wider-sprechen) ourselves in 
language, speak “against” ourselves. Nobody can “mean” by “this” some 
real immediate sense data. The “sensual certainty” is indeed certain, but it 
is not as immediate as it thinks, for it requires concepts like “this”, and thus 
a whole framework of general forms and types. Hegel’s main claim is that 
“there is nothing in heaven or nature or spirit or anywhere else that does 
not contain just as much immediacy as mediation”.44 In fact, he criticizes 
the arbitrary principle of atomism, the alleged sense evidence, as the 
“highest externality”, both in physics and in the science of the state.45 
The trigger for Hegel’s task can also be detected after his lifetime, in 
the philosophy of Russell and Moore. Russell, who did not notice the 
problem of immediate knowledge, did not recognize Hegel’s attack on 
logical atomism avant la lettre. This led him to adopt a naive realist stance 
which holds that things are just as they are seen and hence knowledge is 
generated by acquaintance, not by inference or mediation.46 His atomistic 
theory of pure sensation data suggests that they just need “noticing” in 
order to become knowledge. The knowledge of material objects is for 
Moore also based on sense perception: “I shall speak of the direct 
apprehension of sense-data”.47 
                                           
44 Hegel, 2010, p. 46; 5/66.  
45 In Science of Logic in the chapter on the “Being-for-itself” (5/186). 
46 In chapter 5 in Russell’s work The Problems of Philosophy (1912); see also 1.2.2. 
47 Moore, 1993, p. 49. This citation stems from Moore’s essay “Sense-data”, a lecture 
written 1910, first published in 1953. 
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To understand Hegel’s task better, we shall thus deal with the main 
objects of his critique: the fallacies in the notions of science in Fichte, 
Jacobi, and Schelling, as Hegel conceives them. 
 
4.3.1 Fichte’s unsatisfactory “doctrine of science” 
The Kantian aspiration that philosophy should become a “rigorous science” 
(strenge Wissenschaft) recurs in Fichte’s “doctrine of science” 
(Wissenschaftslehre) as the task of modern philosophy, and it is central to 
the language of his project. Later, the general demand for rigorous science 
would also become the characterization of Husserl’s ideal of science. 
Fichte’s response to this task, his metascientific project in the “doctrine of 
science”, inspired Hegel in the formulation of his task, but also vastly 
differs from Hegel’s conception. Before considering the main differences 
between Hegel and Fichte, it is worth observing one of Fichte’s unique 
ideas that Hegel has adopted, modified, and made famous: the 
intersubjective character of self-consciousness. This conception, which lies 
in the heart of Fichte’s philosophy of spirit, can expose the social 
dimension of Hegel’s epistemology and of his concept of science. 
According to Fichte’s plan, the rigorous scientific study of self-
consciousness essentially belongs to the framework of rational a priori 
social study and law study. The execution of this plan takes place in his 
work Foundations of Natural Right in accordance with the Principles of 
the Wissenschaftslehre (1796/7). Fichte’s original claim in this work is that 
self-consciousness is a social phenomenon: the existence of other rational 
free subjects, along with their “summons” (Aufforderungen) to respect their 
freedom, is a necessary condition for the formation of one’s own self-
consciousness. His demonstration aims at showing that, due to the real 
presence of another self-consciousness, my own self-consciousness obtains 
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the possibility of becoming aware that it is in its essence a free individual 
too, even though it may not completely know at the beginning the details of 
what it means to be oneself. This idea of intersubjectivity was Fichte’s 
striking tactical solution to the problem of the unclarified genesis of self-
consciousness out of consciousness. This hard question of self-
consciousness was already set by Kant’s critics, Jacobi and Maimon: How 
can consciousness recognize itself among the other objects in the world? 
That is, how can consciousness become self-conscious at all if it does not 
know what consciousness is and therefore has no self-knowledge? Fichte 
pointed out a new direction to understand the modern question of freedom 
and interpersonal relationship out of the complexity of the problem of self-
consciousness. Hegel exercises a similar powerful strategy in 
Phenomenology of Spirit in the chapter “Self-Consciousness”. Later, 
Husserl develops further the analysis of intersubjectivity in his 
transcendental phenomenology. 
To return to Fichte’s task, Fichte takes the Kantian mission of making 
philosophy a principal-based rigorous science very seriously, making it his 
main life project as a philosopher. In his manifesto Concerning the Concept 
of the Wissenschaftslehre or of So-called Philosophy (1794)48 he delivers 
an early version of his metaphilosophical endeavor: to replace henceforth 
the name “philosophy” with “doctrine of science” (Wissenschaftslehre), 
“science of science” (Wissenschaft der Wissenschaft) or simply “science” 
(Wissenschaft).49 The plural term “science of sciences” (scientia 
scientarum) was not coined by Fichte himself and was ascribed at different 
times to logic, dialectic, metaphysics, theology, and at other times to 
rhetoric, music, political science and law science, as an evaluative term, 
                                           
48 Über den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre oder der sogenannten Philosophie. 
49 Fichte, 1972, p. 37 [18]. 
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namely as superlative.50 Fichte’s use of the term “science of science” is in 
fact more comprehensive, indicating universal science that encompasses all 
the particular sciences in itself. 
The motive for Fichte’s renaming is his will to erase the label of 
‘philos’ in philosophy, to ‘de-philosophy’ philosophy. He explains that his 
program aims at abandoning the flattening comparison of philosophy with 
“hobby” (Liebhaberei), perhaps due to what he regarded as the 
‘unscientific’ aspect of love in hobby, i.e. of Liebe in Liebhaberei. Fichte 
also condemns the idea that philosophy is “connoisseurship” (Kennerei), as 
he rejects the unserious and superficial Kennen in Kennerei as mere 
acquaintance, as a form of unscientific “dilettantism”. According to Fichte, 
again, more like Aristotle and less like Plato, philosophy should itself 
become wisdom, sophia, as one scientific system. Wissenschaftslehre 
became the generic name for Fichte’s system as well as for other projects in 
later theories of science, like those of Paul Oppenheim and Rudolf Carnap. 
As shown above, in the proclamation of his own task, Hegel repeats 
Fichte’s formulation almost word for word, joining the creative idea of 
redefining philosophy. Yet, going beyond Fichte, Hegel expects philosophy 
to become “real knowledge” in the sense of “actual knowledge”, a 
learnable knowledge with a historical basis, not just Fichtean “formal 
knowledge” of knowledge. Therefore, in spite of Fichte’s influence, Hegel 
never chose to call his own endeavor “doctrine of science”, but “system of 
science”. It is generally true that the form of Fichte’s system is rigorously 
philosophical-logical and his epistemology contains conceptual elements 
regarding the essence of science, such as the relation of the “I” to the “Not-
I” and back to itself, but it does not include any kind of phenomenological 
description of what historically already counts as “science” followed by a 
                                           
50 Cf. Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, vol. 12, p. 950. 
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critical-dialectical account of it. As a pure metatheory, Fichte’s work does 
not include “phenomenology of spirit”, but only the thesis of the self-
consciousness or “the absolute I”. Hegel criticizes Fichte’s philosophy for 
taking “nothing empiric”51 from the outside and thereby holding “the old 
view of science” (die alte Vorstellung der Wissenschaft)52 which means to 
begin science with inferences out of formal principles. 
The most essential difference between Fichte and Hegel is the deductive 
structure of their systems. Although both use the term “deduction” to 
characterize the inference rule they employ in their systems, it is Fichte 
who chooses to begin his main work, Foundations of the Entire 
Wissenschaftslehre (1794/5)53, the first of no less than 10 trials to define 
and reshape the Wissenschaftslehre, with the “first, absolutely 
unconditioned principal”. This first principal, this “ground sentence” 
(Grundsatz), is for Fichte the foundation of subjectivity in the form of the 
“pure I” (das reine Ich). The first stage of the Fichtean a priori I is not 
equipollent with Hegel’s version of the natural consciousness in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit or the individual natural spirit in the Philosophy 
of Spirit, because for Fichte, this “pure I” is exactly the same as the 
“absolute I”, which he also categorically labels as “being” and “identity”. 
Hegel’s concept of the “I” in Phenomenology of Spirit, defined as the 
“sensual certainty” of the “natural consciousness”, is as particular as the 
meaning of each “here” and “now”, and hence far from being absolute. In 
fact, being the departure point, this natural “I” is the most distant point 
from the absolute. Also in the Logic, Hegel’s starting point is the category 
of being, which is both immediate and undetermined, and certainly not 
identical with the absolute idea, the last stage. Methodologically, Hegel’s 
                                           
51 Hegel, 1995b, p. 486; 20/392. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre. 
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natural “I” or simply “being” is one immediate appearance of the absolute 
transindividual structure of the Geist. In contrast to Fichte, Hegel chooses 
rather to finish his work with a chapter on the metasubjective “absolute 
knowledge” or “absolute idea”. This absolute has a common root with the 
Absolvent, the graduate, as Heidegger reminds us. Therefore, Hegel 
believes that Fichte, who begins each time with the absolute, misuses this 
concept, if not abuses it, shooting it like a “pistol” and treating it hastily 
and clumsy, as Hegel bitterly comments in the “Preface” to the 
Phenomenology of Spirit. Fichte represents for Hegel another Kantian 
“subjective” transcendental idealist. 
In line with Hegel’s criticism of Fichte as being too Kantian, he 
appreciates Fichte for dismissing the Kantian concept of the mind-
independent “thing in itself” as indefensible and not including it in his 
system. In this, Fichte, and later Hegel, follows the first critics of Kant, 
Jacobi, Maimon and Schulze, who all vehemently attack this concept as 
nonsense. Hegel takes this critique a step further, insofar as he points out 
another possible meaning of the “thing in itself” in Science of Logic as “the 
possible, the thing of representation, or the thing of thought 
[Gedankending]”.54 He argues that Kant wrongly refers to the “in itself” as 
the abstraction from all determinations and determinateness, and therefore 
it becomes clearly unknowable and indeterminable per definition, whereas 
in fact the very concept of the “in itself” is our own concept and “happens” 
(fällt) in our consciousness. In contrast to Kant, Hegel defines the “thing in 
itself” as “only the product of thought, and of merely abstractive 
thought”,55 that is, “the concrete existent as the essential immediate that has 
                                           
54 Hegel, 2010, p. 423; 6/129. 
55 Ibid,, p. 41; 5/60. 
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resulted from the sublated mediation”.56 We can thus know the thing in 
itself just as we can know the content of any other thought of ours. 
For Hegel, Fichte’s “doctrine of science” was therefore a good attempt 
with an honest title, although it was essentially unsatisfactory insofar as it 
needed conceptual corrections, elaborations and historical concretizations. 
Hegel was similarly critical of Jacobi’s and Schelling’s conceptions of 
knowledge, to which we now turn. 
 
4.3.2 Two romantic conceptions of knowledge 
At the heart of Hegel’s philosophy of science lies his struggle against the 
romantic admiration of “immediate knowledge” and “intellectual intuition” 
as in the cases of Jacobi and Schelling. Let us thus consider their relations 
to Hegel’s concept of science. 
 
4.3.2.1 Jacobi’s faith in “immediate knowledge” 
Although Hegel rejects Jacobi’s position towards “immediate knowledge” 
they share several thoughts, with which we shall begin. On the whole, 
Hegel agrees with Jacobi’s critique of the Enlightenment regarding the 
abstract metaphysics mirrored in the purely categorical thought of anti-
empirical rationalism or Spinozism. In Hegel’s view, Jacobi justly 
recognizes that the purely rationalistic methods of pre-Kantian metaphysics 
were insufficient to reach knowledge about “the unconditioned”, i.e. “the 
absolute” or “god”. In spite of his sharp criticism of Jacobi, Hegel found a 
way to reconcile with him: he appreciates that Jacobi has in mind such a 
thing as Geist that has the power to eventually reach itself. Both Jacobi and 
Hegel have deep respect for the principle that the human mind is capable of 
                                           
56 Ibid., p. 423; 6/129. 
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knowing god, and Hegel even sees in such divine cognition the principle of 
the freedom of the human mind. In a review in the Heidelberger 
Jahrbücher (1817) on the occasion of the publication of the third volume of 
Jacobi’s collected works, Hegel uses soft tones to show how Jacobi was in 
effect a precursor of Hegelian idealism57 because he, like Kant, was able to 
show the “necessity of a completely altered view of the logical”.58 In 
Lectures on the History of Philosophy Jacobi surprisingly appears right at 
the beginning of the last section “Recent German Philosophy”, even before 
Kant. Hegel appreciates most of all that Jacobi, as one of the first authors 
who were dissatisfied with Kant’s “thing in itself”, illustrates the dilemma 
that “one cannot enter Kant’s system without the thing-in-itself, but with 
the latter one cannot stay in Kant’s system”.59 
In spite of this, Jacobi plays mostly a negative role in the development 
of Hegel’s concept of science. Hegel disagreed with the results of Jacobi’s 
total rejection of the Enlightenment and his abolition of the cognitive 
achievements of Vernunft. Hegelian philosophy of science can be read as a 
direct attack on Jacobi’s intuitionistic anti-conceptualist agenda. Kenneth 
Westphal is thus right when he argues that Jacobi has all along charged that 
the “consistent use of conceptual thought must ultimately repudiate the 
existence of nature, of values, of our bodies, and also of our freedom. [...] It 
would not be too much to say that the whole Hegelian philosophy amounts 
to a defense of conceptual thought against this charge”.60 
Jacobi’s influence on Hegel had already begun in Hegel’s early years 
after the publication of Jacobi’s Concerning the Doctrine of Spinoza in 
                                           
57 “Hegel, [Über] Friedrich Heinrich Jacobis Werke Dritter Band” (4/429–461). 
58 4/455: “die Notwendigkeit einer völlig veränderten Ansicht des Logischen”; Cf., 
Pinkard, 2000, p. 388. 
59 Limnatis, 2008, pp. 110f. 
60 Cf. Westphal, 1989a, p. 139. 
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Letters to Herr Moses Mendelssohn (1785).61 The philosophical 
considerations in this book led to the pantheism controversy and gave the 
young Hegel a strong impulse to go against Jacobi’s thesis of the 
impossibility of reason to reach the absolute. Hegel critically analyzes 
Jacobi’s conception for the first time in Faith and Knowledge (1802) where 
he rejects most of Jacobi’s core ideas in the aftermath of his hermeneutic 
inquiry into Jacobi’s texts. Later, in the Encyclopaedia Logic in the chapter 
“Third Attitude of Thought toward Objectivity, Immediate Knowledge” 
there is another detailed confrontation with Jacobi’s central notions, more 
in the form of a conceptual analysis. 
The object of Hegel’s criticism is Jacobi’s insistence on the necessity of 
“immediate knowledge” (unmittelbares Wissen) in the form of “faith” or 
“belief” (Glaube) regarding the cognition of god. Hegel, for his part, does 
not ignore the existence of such a thing as “immediate knowledge” or 
simply deny it. On the contrary, he acknowledges that every piece of 
knowledge can be given in the consciousness of individuals im-mediately, 
i.e. directly and without much thought, without complicated intentional 
states, without any inferences. At the same time he holds that this 
knowledge only looks immediate to us and that in truth the same 
knowledge can be given to us through “mediation” (Vermittlung) and thus 
be “mediated” (vermittelt), as a result of previous thought processes and 
based on conceptual proof. Hegel’s motto in this issue is: “That which we 
now know immediately is consequently a result of infinitely many 
                                           
61 In Jacobi, F.H., The Main Philosophical Writings and the Novell Allwill, trans. G.D. 
Giovanni (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1994) pp. 173–252. For more details 
about Jacobi, Mendelssohn and the ‘pantheism controversy’ see Beiser, F.C., The Fate 
of Reason. German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1987) pp. 44–108. 
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mediations”.62 He argues that abstract immediate knowledge is in fact only 
“natural, sensuous knowledge”63 and this can also be pointed at Quinean 
naturalized epistemology. 
Jacobi’s endorsement of immediate knowledge was his response to 
what he considered to be the skeptical outcome of Spinoza’s “atheism” and 
Kant’s limitation of reason. Famously, this was his own salto mortale, his 
leap of faith.64 Jacobi uses the term “faith” for any indemonstrable belief, 
that is, not only for uncertain and unverifiable belief, but also for axiomatic 
self-evident knowledge, like the logical or mathematical first principles of 
demonstration and justification.65 His conception of knowing god by 
“feeling” aims at saving what he regarded as the endangered Christian 
culture in Europe after the rise of Vernuftreligion in the Enlightenment. 
Hegel, in contrast, claims that the so-called divine knowledge, as the 
knowledge about the absolute, can be attained by what he calls “mediation” 
(Vermittlung) through concepts or instruction, and hence through a 
“doctrine” (Lehre). By “doctrine” Hegel does not mean dogmatism or 
catechism, but rather a systematic body of knowledge that is learnable and 
teachable. Lehre, ‘teaching’, is derived from lehren, ‘to teach’, and the 
Latin word doctrina means more or less the same. Since the term 
“doctrine” in English seems to refer to a rather dogmatic and rigid form of 
knowledge, the translator Elisabeth Haldane chose “a long continued 
culture”.66 This term, however, depends on how one understands culture 
can be very confusing, because it misses the significant issue of teachabilty 
and universality. 
                                           
62 Hegel, 1995b, p. 421; 20/328. 
63 Ibid., p. 420 (20/326). 
64 Cf. Beiser, 1987, p. 91. 
65 Cf. ibid. 
66 Hegel, 1995b, p. 421; 20/326. 
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Hegel’s criticism is that Jacobi’s concept of immediate knowledge, his 
idea of faith, knows much less that it thinks it knows, for it knows about 
god only that there is god, just as any immediate knowledge knows only 
about the sheer being of something. Faith is not tantamount to cognition or 
conceptualization which relate to determined content and to universal 
determination. Hegel thus refers to immediate knowledge as very “meager” 
(dürftig) and to Jacobi’s philosophy as “poor” (arm). He also expresses 
doubts regarding the role Jacobi gave to the “heart” (Herz) in the cognition 
of the good, because the “heart” of an individual is too subjective.67 
Although Hegel’s analysis detects skepticism in all the various forms of 
“subjective idealism”, in Kant, Fichte and Jacobi, he emphasizes that 
Jacobi’s philosophy of faith is nothing but pure “scepticism”68 which 
principally allows only for belief, not knowledge. Hegel points out that 
Jacobi’s strategy justifies only the “absoluteness of the finite”69 and the 
“subjectivity of knowledge”.70 Hence, Jacobi devotes himself to the 
problematic “formal knowledge”, that is, the empirically verifiable 
positivistic theses generated by the causality-based Verstand. Jacobi 
connects reality and thought without concepts, i.e. “in some inconceivable 
way”71, for he believes that every true demonstration of knowledge has 
only to do with “similarities”, not “reasons”.72 In his critique of Jacobi 
Hegel advocates a thoroughly rationalistic approach to science. 
The core of Hegel’s critique of Jacobi is the following: Jacobi lacks 
“Wissenschaftlichkeit”,73 i.e. scientificity, because he uses the language of 
                                           
67 In the review in the Heidelberger Jahrbücher (4/446ff). 
68 Hegel, 1977b, p. 64; 2/298. 
69 Ibid., p. 104; 2/341. 
70 Ibid., p. 97; 2/333. 
71 Ibid.; 2/334. 
72 Ibid. 
73 2/356, 376 
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“speculative ideas”74 to describe the empirical realm. In this, Jacobi 
performs a classical category mistake. His anti-philosophical “empty 
thinking”75 remains only “music” and “sound”; it does not mature and does 
not become “the articulated scientific word (Logos)”.76 Hegel is so 
dissatisfied with Jacobi’s anti-logical approach that he equates the 
introducing of faith to philosophy with the getaway of reason “down” to 
finite subjectivity, the typical move of a “non-philosophical”77 
consciousness that only has “immediate certainty”78 regarding particular 
beings, never universals. To sum it up, one of the main reasons for Hegel’s 
task was the widespread epistemological belief in “finite” subjectivism. 
 
4.3.2.2 Schelling’s “intellectual intuition” and his “Sunday’s children” 
With the same vehemence that Hegel attacks Jacobi’s “faith” in 
“immediate knowledge” as inappropriate for science, he criticizes 
Schelling’s admiration of “intellectual intuition” and his concept of the 
absolute. Cynically enough, he describes Schelling’s concept of the 
absolute as “the night, in which [...] all cows are black”79, in which “all is 
one”80 and lacks any distinction. This criticism was directed against their 
shared youthful motto hen kai pan, “one and all”, and particularly against 
Schelling’s view of the absolute as the “indifference point” between two 
poles. However, the young Hegel and Schelling did share some views 
about science and philosophy, with which we shall begin. 
                                           
74 Ibid., p. 115; 2/354. 
75 Ibid., p. 110; 2/348. 
76 Ibid., p. 115; 2/354. 
77 Ibid., p. 142; 2/382. 
78 Ibid., p, 141; 2/382. 
79 Hegel, 1970, p. 9; 3/13. 
80 Ibid. 
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Like Hegel, the young Schelling regards philosophy as a science and 
science as a system.81 Given Kant’s impact on Fichte, and Fichte’s on 
Schelling, it is not a coincidence that Schelling, just like Hegel later, holds 
such views in his early years. Schelling expresses his commitment to the 
Kantian und Fichtean task of scientifying philosophy by explicitly referring 
to philosophy as “the science of all sciences”. Like Hegel, he criticizes 
Fichte’s system for having merely created a “formal science” and even 
“superstitions”.82 Hegel openly cherishes in the Difference essay 
Schelling’s inspiring novel conceptions and his original critique of 
Fichteanism. Even later, Schelling still unmistakably promotes and 
celebrates the status of philosophy as one great system set against a 
primordial chaotic state of logical contradictions.83 He originally calls this 
pre-philosophical state “Asystasie”, derived from α-σύστατον, and he 
compares it with the state of disharmony prevailing among too different 
contradicting systems. Hegel can also be said to have worked against such 
“asystasy”, albeit in a different dialectical manner. Finally, Schelling’s 
Naturphilosophie impressed the young Hegel to the extent that it showed 
him a possible way to do later his own Naturphilosophie, as well as what 
not to do. 
Yet, in contrast to Hegel, in System of Transcendental Idealism (1800), 
the young Schelling refers to the true universal organ of philosophy as art 
(Kunst) and philosophy of art, not science. Later, again, unlike Hegel, 
Schelling would declare that philosophy is a science in the way that 
                                           
81 In the lecture “On the Absolute Concept of Science” (“Über den absoluten Begriff 
der Wissenschaft”), the first of Lectures on the Methods of the Academic Study from 
1803 (Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums). 
82 In Schelling’s essay “Darlegung des wahren Verhältnisses der Naturphilosophie zu 
der verbesserten fichte'schen Lehre” (Sämtliche Werke vol 7, 1860, p. 26) 
83 In one of his Erlangen Lectures (Erlanger Vorträge) in 1821 entitled “On the Nature 
of Philosophy as Science” (“Über die Natur der Philosophie als Wissenschaft”). 
 236 
 
mathematics is, insofar as both are “Vernunftwissenschaften”, i.e. “sciences 
of reason” or “rational sciences”, the common name at his time for formal 
science or a priori science. In both references, we detect a major difference 
between the basic determination of Hegel’s notion of science and 
Schelling’s 
Furthermore, Hegel entertains grave doubts about the scientificity and 
originality of Schelling’s Naturphilosophie. He denies its status as a new 
science, because he believes that there exists already a similar kind of 
rational Aristotelian physics. The only original thing in it is the rendering 
of some new contemporary categories of thought, like magnetism, for the 
sake of a more creative language of logical inferences.84 Hegel does not 
identify any particular problem with the contents of Schelling’s 
Naturphilosophie, but on the whole, since Schelling’s system emphasizes 
too strongly the naturalist element in the human knowledge, it actually 
neglects the “other side”,85 namely the “philosophy of spirit”86 and thereby 
the priority of spirit in the epistemological question of the sociality of self-
knowledge. The lack of equilibration between nature and spirit is described 
as nothing less than the “banishment” of all “scientificity”.87 Schelling’s 
unscientific “formalism” in his Naturphilosophie is said to be worse than 
Hume’s empiricism and to bring philosophy into contempt. To some 
extent, Hegel’s philosophy of science is supposed to be the correction of 
Schelling’s inclination to naturalism. 
Hegel judges the scientific form of Schelling’s system as “unripe”, for it 
never presents “a completely executed whole”; it is not a well-organized 
                                           
84 20/426. 
85 20/451. 
86 Ibid. 
87 20/452. 
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“scientific whole”.88 He complains that Schelling, a bit like Fichte, always 
starts his works anew, makes only general developments, and never comes 
to completeness. Hegel gives a psychological interpretation for the origin 
of this problem: Schelling is always “unhappy” with his previous results. 
Concerning the scientific content of Schelling’s system, Hegel makes the 
critical comment that the long beginning of Schelling’s system is mostly 
guided in its early years too stubbornly by the Fichtean principal of the “I” 
which is misleading because it refers both to the universal “absolute I” and 
to one’s own “particular I”. This problem led Hegel to neglect the idea that 
the “I” is the epicenter of the genuine philosophical system of thought and 
to rather adopt the concept of “consciousness” as the immediate 
phenomenon of “spirit”. 
The most severe problem that Hegel detects in Schelling’s 
understanding of knowledge is the too high priority he ascribes to the 
method of “intellectual intuition” (intellektuelle Anschauung) since his 
Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature (1797/1803). Anschauung, i.e. ‘looking 
at’ or ‘watching’, is the standard German rendering of the scholastic term 
intuito, an ‘immediate’, non-discursive and non-conceptual grasp that is 
supposed to be as evident as direct sensual perception. For Hegel, such 
“intuition” is insufficient as a method of inquiry because it combines a 
higher level of subjective certainty with a lower level of objective 
justification. For Schelling, in contrast, although “intellectual intuition” 
belongs to the power of imagination, not to the logical method, it can lead 
to nothing less than the full cognition of the absolute. Hegel reads 
Schelling’s endorsement of the imaginative faculty within the metaphysical 
question of the absolute as a skeptical result of Kant’s epistemology which 
stresses the cognitive limitations of the human mind. Schelling’s system 
                                           
88 20/421ff. 
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gives the highest value to art, as the original sphere of “intellectual 
intuition”, and later to religious mythology, but not to philosophy as a 
whole. Hegel argues that Schelling makes out of “intellectual intuition” 
nothing less than the ultimate “organ of all transcendental thought”, while, 
in fact, “intellectual intuition” is only one kind of knowledge, namely 
poietic knowledge that creatively “produces” for itself its own object. Hegel 
accuses Schelling of wrongly taking this form of knowledge to be as valid 
as “cognition” (Erkenntnis), while in reality this knowledge is “arbitrary” 
and “coincidental”, deduced out of reasons that are too “comfortable”. 
The crucial point of Hegel’s critique is the basic paradox inherent in 
“intellectual intuition”: “intellectual intuition” itself cannot be proven by 
any means, because one must intuitively believe in intuition as in an 
“assertion” of an “oracle”. Hegel holds that true cognition is not generated 
through art, but through a set of logical categories, like the “idea” or 
“spirit”.89 The problem with the epistemological commitment to 
“intellectual intuition” is that not everybody can have the “artistic talent” 
and “genialness” of intellectual intuition. In Schelling’s world, not 
everybody has the potential capability of conceiving the absolute, only 
“Sunday’s children”, as Hegel ironically notes.90 The reason for this is that 
for Schelling philosophical knowledge is not learnable and teachable. In 
opposition to the elitist Schelling, Hegel believes that everybody has at 
least the right to ask for a “guide” to the scientific point of view and by 
means of a truly scientific Lehre can reach cognition of the absolute. 
Hegel’s position can be thus read as representing a more democratic 
understanding of philosophical knowledge. 
                                           
89 20/434. 
90 Ibid., p. 261; 20/428. 
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Hegel attacks Schelling’s position as unscientific insofar as he does not 
insist on a rigorously scientific presentation of the absolute by conceptual 
demonstration and logical proof. Schelling’s concept of science does not 
come close enough to Hegel’s because he does not estimate the 
philosophical necessity of establishing a discipline such as “science of 
logic” that would provide logical tools for proofing the truth of “intellectual 
intuition”. Hegel argues that the truth of Schelling’s first principal, namely 
that the absolute is the identity of subjectivity and objectivity, remains an 
unproven “immediate truth”, an axiom; and not the dialectical result of 
Aufhebung. Even when Schelling makes an effort to demonstrate his 
assertions in his Journal of Speculative Physics (1800-1801), he provides 
only formal proofs in a geometrical Spinozist manner. 
Last but not least, there is an essential difference between Hegel’s and 
Schelling’s concept of science concerning the national character of science. 
This difference is due to Schelling’s ideal of “German science”. We can 
retrospectively learn about this crucial issue from Schelling’s unpublished 
fragment “On the Essence of German Science” (1807)91 of which Hegel 
was likely unaware, and if he had been, he would have barely shared 
Schelling’s views there. This speech is, concerning the contents, a song of 
praise for “German science”. Schelling speaks in a zealous tone of 
“German science” as the “heart” of the “German nation”, who is deeply 
“religious” and has a special love of “metaphysical investigations”. 
“German science” is presented as a historical product of the “German 
spirit” whose unique task since Luther is the “rebirth of religion”. The most 
significant feature of “German science” is the acknowledgement of nature, 
not as a dead mechanism, but as “divine”, “uncreated” and “lively”. This is 
                                           
91 “Ueber das Wesen deutscher Wissenschaft”, Fragment (Sämmtliche Werke vol 8, 
1861, pp. 1–18). 
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notably nothing other than a form of Spinozism, yet “German science” 
rejects all “theories” and “empiricism”. Schelling recognizes in science a 
religious-metaphysical turn, and at the same time he promotes a vitalistic 
view. What is particularly striking is the discovering of the national aspect, 
the ‘German turn’. The German character of this science is not reduced to a 
language community or even a social phenomenon, but rather stands for 
some eternal primordial “fate” (Schicksal). 
Schelling’s nationalistic eulogy can be read historically as an apologetic 
attempt to react against Napoleon’s victory over the Prussians at Jena, 
although, in his younger years, Schelling, like Hegel, was known to be a 
Francophile pro-revolutionary. Hegel, who continued to see himself more 
as a European, argued against particularistic political structures. He did not 
suddenly praise “German science” and “German spirit” to the skies, but 
rather universal “philosophical science” and “world-spirit”. As a matter of 
fact, in his “Anthropology” in the Encyclopaedia Hegel does not hold back 
criticism of “the Germans” as “unclear thinkers” tending to “formalism”.92 
Moreover, “Hegel characterized those who wish to celebrate Deutschtum as 
Deutschdumm (or, roughly, those who celebrate participating in authentic 
‘Germandom’ as the ‘Germandumb’). Phony ‘Germanism’ seemed to him 
both silly and dangerous”.93 What we can positively take out of this 
fragment is that Schelling’s approach towards the national spirit, alongside 
his anti-empiricism and his unscientific Naturphilosophie, can perhaps 
explain why some contemporary readers of Schelling’s philosophy of 
science, especially naturalists, are less inclined to look for their roots in 
Schelling, and prefer Hegel. 
                                           
92 10/69. 
93 Pinkard, 2000, p. 311. 
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After analyzing the various triggers for Hegel’s task of scientifying 
philosophy, let us briefly observe two different realizations of the task. 
 
4.4 On the realization of the task 
Hegel set himself the task of overcoming the problem he detected in the 
philosophy of his era: the lack of a “speculative” logical approach towards 
the absolute. He offers to fulfill this task by establishing a science that 
leads to the logical “pure science” and that he calls “phenomenology”. The 
scientification through phenomenology consists in the denaturalization of 
our knowledge claims that became authoritative for us. The unpublished 
system drafts, the Jena Realphilosophy, were the first attempt to fulfill the 
task by developing a theory of the absolute within a wider dimension of an 
alternative theory of science. In the Science of Logic the task reaches a 
further level of fulfillment. Eventually, in the aftermath of new 
considerations in “Philosophy of Right”, which led to the “Objective 
Spirit” in “Philosophy of Spirit”, and the acknowledgement of the need to 
present a systematic “Philosophy of Nature”, the task reaches its fulfillment 
for the first time in the Encyclopaedia from 1817. 
The realization of Hegel’s task has thus two aspects: the renewal of the 
term “phenomenology” as a general theory of science and the presentation 
of both “pure” and “real” philosophical sciences. The following is a short 
outlining of these aspects. 
 
4.4.1 First realization: the renewed concept of phenomenology 
“Phenomenology of spirit” became the official title for the first part of 
Hegel’s “system of science”. Its objects of inquiry are the stages of the 
development of Geist as the evolution of the collective self-consciousness 
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of mankind. This evolution is presented as a set of knowledge claims about 
various forms of knowledge experienced in the highest forms of reflective 
practices: religion, art and philosophy. Yet, the reason for Hegel’s choice 
of the term “phenomenology” is unclear, as he mentions it only four times 
in the whole book and always in the phrase “phenomenology of spirit”.94 
Without checking the history of the term, it is obvious that phenomenology 
means doctrine of appearances (Erscheinungslehre), for phainomenon 
means appearance (Erscheinung). Yet, unlike Reinhold and Fichte, Hegel 
himself does not use the title Erscheinungslehre, and we do not find in this 
book anything that resembles a conventional theory of appearance, but 
rather a topical reflection on the realities of “spiritual” Entäußerungen, 
institutions, schools of thought, religions and arts. To understand Hegel’s 
use of this concept, we have to turn to its origin and observe its two 
equiprimordial roots that virtually co-determine Hegel’s reinvention of 
phenomenology: the controversial theologian of Württemberg in Hegel’s 
times, Friedrich Christoph Oetinger, who was known mostly in Germany, 
and the mathematician and logician of the Enlightenment, Johann Heinrich 
Lambert, who made the term popular in Europe .95 
Oetinger was the first to introduce the concept of “phenomenological 
way of thinking” (phænemenologische Denckungs-art) to the methodology 
of natural science.96 This way of thinking stands in contrast to both the 
geometrical-deductive way of thinking and the mechanical-causal. 
                                           
94 The phrase “phenomenology of spirit” appears in the title, twice in the “Preface”, 
once at the end of the book (3/31, 39, 589) and once in the abstract (Anzeige). 
95 The following cannot be a full analysis of the term. For more details, see Bokhove N., 
‘Phänomenologie’: Ursprung und Hintergrund des Terminus im 18. Jahrhundert (1991) 
and Krouglov A., “Zur Vorgeschichte des Begriffs der Phänomenologie” (2008). 
96 In the dedication to his work Die Philosophie der Alten (Frankfurt and Leipzig: 
1762). Oethinger already used the term Phänomenologie in his unpublished diaries in 
1736 (Cf. Bokhove, 1991, pp. 139, 148). 
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“Phenomenological investigations” consist in direct observations of nature, 
using solely the immediate senses, and not microscopic, telescopic or 
anatomic investigations. In the dedication to his work Die Philosophie der 
Alten (1762) he refers to the works of physicians like Hippocrates, Herman 
Boerhaave and Johan Baptista van Helmont as “phenomenological”. 
Oetinger’s final goal is Pietistic: to show that all forms of biological life 
stems directly from god. For this reason, his phenomenological method is 
not empirical in the common sense of the term. In his view, chemistry is 
the phenomenological science per se, because it is capable of exposing the 
“vital power” (Lebenskraft) in every natural entity. The transcendental-
theological conception of Oetinger’s vitalist phenomenology let god 
ubiquitously appear as the idea of “life” and so strongly echoes the 
Böhmean school of thought. 
Hegel does not mention Oetinger in his writings and it is possible that 
he neither encountered his writings nor was he exposed to his teaching. 
Yet, Oetinger taught in the Tübingen Stift and it is likely that Hegel was 
familiar with his doctrines.97 His concept of phenomenology apparently had 
an impact on Hegel’s methodological approach, the careful Zusehen, our 
paying attention to the experience of consciousness while “watching” it. 
Thus, Oetinger’s approach may seem prima facie to be of the same kind of 
Hegelian speculative-holistic approach. However, Hegel renews the term 
insofar as his phenomenological investigation concerns the area of 
philosophy of consciousness, not only of nature. He repudiates such 
theological views that apotheosize nature and thus renounces the 
fundamental idea of Oetinger’s vitalist theo-phenomenology. 
                                           
97 Oetinger’ doctrines were popular in Würtmeberg at Hegel’s time (cf. Jensen, 2012, 
pp. 19ff). 
 244 
 
In contrast to Oetinger, in Lambert’s general doctrine of science, his 
New Organon (1764), “phenomenology” loses its theological purpose and 
gains an epistemological-logical character, being defined as a “theory of 
seemingness [Schein] and of its influences on the correctness and 
incorrectness of the human cognition [Erkentniß]”.98 In this version of 
logic, the Schein is characterized as a “medium thing” (Mittleding), a 
“thing in the middle” between true and false. Schein exists, but it is always 
“false shine”.99 In order to discern between truth and what only seems like 
truth, Lambert plans a “transcendental optics”,100 a metaphysical science 
that presents Schein as Schein, including the causes of Schein and the 
means to overcome it. 
Whether Hegel directly encountered Lambert’s writings on 
phenomenology or not is unknown. He only mentions Lambert a few times, 
and in a dismissive way, as the “trocken verständige” algebraist101 or as the 
mathematical logician who reduces logic to abstract inferences and 
mechanical calculations.102 What is more relevant to Hegel’s choice of the 
term “phenomenology” is the use of the term by Kant and his followers. 
Kant, who knew Lambert’s concept of phenomenology, wrote to Lambert 
in 1770 about his own view of phenomenology as a science that rather 
prepares for metaphysics and for the question of the limits of sensuality.103 
The pre-metaphysical sciences according to Kant are dialectics as “Logik 
des Scheins” and analytics as “Logik der Wahrheit”.104 The Kantian 
“transzendentaler Schein” is a Schein not caused by sensual or 
                                           
98 Lambert, 1965, vol. 2, p. 228. 
99 Ibid., p. 217. 
100 Ibid., p. 220. 
101 6/293. 
102 17/363. 
103 Cf. Krouglov, 2008, p. 18f. 
104 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 170. 
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psychological reasons, like in Lambert, but by “reason” itself.105 Kant 
explicitly used the term “phenomenology” in his Metaphysical 
Foundations of Natural Science (1786) in the title of the fourth chapter: 
“Metaphysical Foundations of Phenomenology”. In his “universal” and 
“pure” natural science, phenomenology is the “pure doctrine of movement” 
that deals with the transformation of movements into objects of 
experience.106 In the legacy of Lambert and Kant, Reinhold entitled his 
essay about the “philosophy of the empirical” Elemente der 
Phänomenologie107 and this inspired Fichte to name the second part of his 
Wissenschaftslehre “Phänomenologie: Erscheinungs- und Scheinlehre”.108 
While continuing this tradition in his own way, Hegel’s Phenomenology 
of Spirit completely modifies the conception of phenomenology. Firstly, in 
distinction to his precursors, Hegel’s intention is not to design 
phenomenology of nature, like the Reinholdian “reine Naturphilosophie”109 
that investigates purely natural objects, but rather phenomenology of spirit 
that investigates forms of self-knowledge. As a re-scientification program, 
Hegelian phenomenology demonstrates the process of denaturalizing our 
knowledge-claims about knowledge. Secondly, Hegel does not aim at 
designing a general theory about what is Schein or Erscheinung per se as 
Reinhold’s and Fichte’s phenomenology do. Whereas for the purpose of 
representing untrue shared knowledge claims, Reinhold distinguishes 
between Schein and “true experiences”,110 Hegel aims, for the same 
purpose, at the epistemological destruction of both Erscheinung and 
                                           
105 Cf. Krouglov, 2008, p. 23. 
106 Cf. Kant, Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, A136. 
107 Cf. Weckwerth, 2000, p. 97. 
108 Hegel apparently did not have the chance to hear Fichte’s lectures which were held 
in Berlin in 1804 (Cf. Bonsiepen, 2011, p. XVI; Krouglov, 2008, p. 24f). 
109 Bonsiepen, 2011, p. XIV; Krouglov, 2008, p. 24. 
110 Weckwerth, 2000, p. 98. 
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Schein. For this reason, Hegel employs, almost interchangeably, the terms 
Erscheinung as “mere appearance” and Schein as “false” or “empty 
appearance”. Hegel’s use of the term “phenomenology” is indeed original, 
to some even baffling,111 since he does not use the term phenomenon112 and 
does not explain exactly what Schein or Erscheinung is. 
The ultimate motive for Hegel’s choice of the term “phenomenology” 
may remain veiled and unknown. However, a little light can be shed on this 
question by pointing out that his phenomenology, as a scientific 
investigation, neither appeals to appearances as chemical appearances of 
matter, nor to the category of appearance in general, but instead to 
appearances of knowledge structures which consciousness forms when it 
relates to worldly objects as to itself. Phenomenology investigates the 
immanent deficiencies of these structures, which are embodied in past 
schools of thought and shared ways of thinking, and shows a set of 
difficulties and contradictions. Such a set exhibits as a whole a form of 
Denken that aims at exposing a language-oriented logic-based truth. At the 
same time, as the act of denken, it is essentially and thoroughly historical in 
the sense of geschichtlich, multilayered. The Geschichtlichkeit of the truth 
of the being corresponds to the self-realization of the Geist. Insofar as the 
immediate natural consciousness, the not-absolute I, means to Hegel an 
embodiment of the spirit, the meaning of appearance goes beyond the mere 
appearance of sensual entities, of things that are appearable in themselves. 
Instead, it indicates the appearance of that which does not appear, of the 
sensually unperceivable. The phenomenology expounds the series of the 
                                           
111 Krouglov takes the question of Hegel’s use of the term phenomenology to be one of 
Hegel’s biggest “enigmas” and “unresolved” problems (2008, p. 30). 
112 At the time before Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel was also affected by Goethe’s 
idea of Urphänomenon, i.e. pure phenomenon or primal phenomenon, from his 
“doctrine of colors” (Farbenlehre), as Hegel attended some of his experiments (Cf. 
Bonsiepen, 2011, p. XIV). 
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Gestaltungen des Geistes as the series of only-appearing, erscheinende, and 
hence insufficient sequences within the framework of Geist as a whole. 
In the Encyclopaedia, Hegel’s second realization of his task, the 
“phenomenology” loses the function of being only a science towards 
science, as it becomes a part of “philosophy of spirit” which does not 
necessarily precede the Logic. Still, the concept of phenomenology in the 
Encyclopaedia preserves the basic meaning that Hegel attributed to it, 
namely as being the science of the Geist as erscheinend, ergo as containing 
untrue moments. Hegel explicitly refers to phenomenology as “the part of 
science” that no longer deals with the “natural spirit”, as in his 
“Anthropology”, but presents the “appearing spirit” in its self-relationality. 
The denaturalization of spirit is completed only after the chapter on 
“Phenomenology”, namely in the “Psychology”, where the spirit becomes 
the spirit as spirit in its whole and hence “actual spirit”. 
 
4.4.2 Second realization: “pure” and “real” science 
The Encyclopaedia is Hegel’s second comprehensive realization of his task 
and hence its re-fulfillment. In these lectures, Hegel presents the division of 
the “philosophical sciences”, the metasciences, into (a) logic as “pure 
science”, the science of categories of thought insofar as they are grounded 
and articulated in the practical use of language, and (b) two “real sciences” 
(Realwissenschaften), (1) science of nature, including mechanics, physics, 
biology, meteorology, geology, and (2) science of spirit, including 
anthropology, phenomenology, psychology, along with the sciences of 
moral, law, state, art, religion, and philosophy. The method of these 
metasciences, as second-order sciences, applies the same kind of 
justification based on logical laws of thought, and not a first-order analysis 
of the given. 
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Hegel’s division, however, raises the obvious problem of the much-
debated, allegedly unsolved dualism about the two “sciences of the real”. If 
there is not any essential methodological difference, and if there are not 
two different substances, then why should there be two differentiated types 
of sciences? The answer is the following: nature is what happens 
independently of our actions, whereas spirit is the form of self-conscious 
action including the form of knowledge about nature and spirit. On the 
horizon of this problem we encounter the Hegelian concept of the self-
realization of the idea: spirit is not a thing in the material-physical sense, 
but a concretization of “the idea”, a purposive organization of relevant 
categories of thought and their “presentation” (Darstellung). Science as 
project and process is the collective conceptual development of ideas. 
Categories like being, nothing, reality, something, idea etc. are treated by 
Hegel as a chain of successive solved contradictions leading from one to 
the other. Hegel calls this movement the “self-motion” (Selbstbewegung) of 
the logical determinations, a form of “liveliness” (Lebendigkeit). Hegelian 
metascience presents thus a version of the physics of ideas. 
The realization of Hegel’s task in the Encyclopaedia seems to carry 
typical outlines of modern metascience to the extent that Hegel can count 
as the avatar of modernity in philosophy of science. This is how Jean-
François Lyotard, for example, interprets it. In The Postmodern Condition 
(1979) he claims that the Hegelian task of philosophy, as realized in the 
Encyclopaedia, is to produce “a language game that links the sciences 
together as moments in the becoming of spirit”, a “rational narration, or 
rather a metanarration”.113 For him, this metanarrational task is too 
bombastic and dangerous; nothing less than the “project of totalization”.114 
                                           
113 Lyotard, 1984, pp. 33f. 
114 Ibid., p. 34. 
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This general postmodern worry about Hegel’s quasi totalizing metascience 
stems, on the one hand, from what is perceived as the all-encompassing 
compelling structure of the Encyclopaedia, and on the other, from 
skepticism about how a book or a lecture can turn anything into science. 
Therefore, from another perspective, it was argued against Hegel that the 
formation of consciousness into science “is not merely the task of a 
philosophical work”, but “a result of the cultural history of mankind”.115 
Lyotard himself prefers to talk about the particular sciences, as he knows 
nothing about the generic “concept” of science. Therefore, he does not 
understand why such scientification is necessary at all. 
The understanding of Hegel’s task can be deepened by addressing 
plausible objections to his task, as we shall do in the next section. 
 
4.5 Criticisms of Hegel’s task 
Hegel’s idea of philosophy as a systematic science has become 
controversial and attracted criticisms, not only from the analytic 
philosophy, has also from German philosophy. It is now generally accepted 
that the last great philosophical system to appear as science was 
constructed by Hegel. Simultaneously, one tends to reject the very idea of 
philosophical system as a mere construction and as a relic of Hegel’s era. 
In opposition to Hegel’s task it was asserted that we now need “less 
philosophy” or that philosophy has died. In the following we will deal with 
exemplary post-Hegelian rejections of Hegel’s task. 
 
                                           
115 Siep, 2000, p. 60. 
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4.5.1 Philosophy is not science 
One of the strongest oppositions to Hegel’s program to turn philosophy into 
a science is the advocating of the diametrically opposed view, namely that 
philosophy is not a science in any respect, not even a metascience. One of 
the major proponents of such view, who has explicitly, recurrently and 
zealously reacted against Hegel’s task, is Heidegger. We pay attention to 
Heidegger’s criticism, as we are reminded by his words that “a thinker is 
more essentially effective where he is opposed than where he finds 
agreement”.116 After withdrawing from the Kantian-Fichtean-Hegelian-
Husserlian idea of shaping philosophy into a rigorous science, Heidegger 
states in several lectures that philosophy is not a science, in “Introduction 
to Philosophy” (1928/29),117 in “The Fundamental Question of Philosophy” 
(1933)118 and in “What is called Thinking?” (1951/52).119 What has led him 
to this antithetical position? 
The origin of Heidegger’s view can be found in Nietzsche’s critique of 
modern science in his “Attempt at a Self-Criticism” in The Birth of 
Tragedy (1886). Nietzsche states there that in his early years he dealt with 
“a new problem”, namely “the problem of science itself, science considered 
for the first time as problematic, as questionable”.120 By problematizing the 
idea of science in general, Nietzsche also intends to put philosophy’s pride 
as a self-assured science in a severe crisis. Since Heidegger takes rather the 
Nietzschean problematization of science – and not the Hegelian – to be the 
grounding act of the critique of modern science, it is obvious that Hegel’s 
task of scientifying philosophy would take quite a beating. Retrospectively, 
                                           
116 In “What Is Called Thinking?” (Heidegger, 1968, pp. 39f). 
117 Cf. Heidegger, 2001, p. 18. 
118 Cf. Heidegger, 2010, p. 7. 
119 Cf. Heidegger, 1968, p. 8. 
120 Nietzsche, 1967, p. 18. 
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one can say that it was Heidegger who made sure that the damage 
Nietzsche’s thought sustained to the positive status of science in Hegel’s 
task will be unforgettable. 
Relying on the Nietzschean critical fundament, Heidegger undertakes 
the task of demonstrating exactly the opposite of Hegel’s task, namely that 
“Philosophie ist keine Wissenschaft”, neither in Hegelian sense, nor 
Husserlian. Drawing on the fundamentals of Greek philosophy, Heidegger 
refers to philosophy as a search and research. Like in Aristotle’s “first 
philosophy” or in the Platonic “love” of wisdom, philosophy is “a 
questioning [...] concerned with all beings”.121 Heidegger explicitly 
attempts to go, in his thinking of thinking, beyond Hegel by means of a 
“historical confrontation with Hegel”.122 What Hegel supposedly forgets, 
the un-thought in his project, is that “science does not think”,123 whereas 
philosophy does, because “[p]hilosophers are the thinkers par excellence. 
They are called thinkers precisely because thinking properly takes place in 
philosophy”.124 Heidegger’s dictum that the “Wissenschaft denkt nicht” is 
only comprehensible, if one seriously takes his strict thought that 
Wissenschaft essentially weiß and only Denken essentially denkt and so on. 
In his offensive against Hegel, Heidegger prophesizes that the “thinking 
that is to come can no longer, as Hegel demanded, set aside the name ‘love 
of wisdom’ and become wisdom itself in the form of absolute 
knowledge”.125 As a matter of fact, Heidegger confuses here the title “love 
of wisdom” with the phrase Hegel himself used, “love of knowledge”. In 
this way he reminds us that Hegel sets great value upon the question of 
                                           
121 In the lecture “The Fundamental Question of Philosophy” (Heidegger, 2010, p. 7). 
122 Ibid., p. 11. 
123 In What is called Thinking? (Heiddegger, 1968, p. 8). 
124 Ibid., pp. 4f. 
125 In “Letter on Humanism” from 1946 (Heidegger, 1998, p. 276). 
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knowledge, and perhaps too little upon the question of translation. Even if 
we cannot be sure if Hegel was fully aware of his imprecise translation, 
Heidegger’s own imprecise citation can at least tell us something concrete 
about his skeptical approach to science. The motive for Heidegger’s 
critique is his wish “to break the habit of overestimating philosophy and of 
thereby asking too much of it”.126 He suggests: “What is needed in the 
present world crisis is less philosophy, but more attentiveness in thinking; 
less literature, but more cultivation of the letter”.127 
Heidegger is however aware of the radicality of his own verdict 
concerning the ‘unthinking’ science, sensing that it might fully cut off 
philosophy from science. He thus clarifies his argument: “Philosophy is 
indeed the origin [Ursprung] of science, but for this very reason it is not 
science – not even a primal science [Ur-wissenschaft]”.128 This means that 
Heidegger in fact also believes that philosophy is necessary for science and 
even constitutive of it. In Heidegger’s figurative logic of origins, pre-
Socratic philosophy is the oldest origin (Ursprung) of science, so that 
science ‘sprang’ out of philosophy. Obviously, at the moment he became 
rector of the Freiburg University, he felt the need to justify the scientific 
status of philosophy and therefore he even argued that: “All science is 
philosophy, whether it knows and wills it or not. All science remains bound 
to that beginning of philosophy”.129 The genesis of science out of 
philosophy lies in philosophy’s inceptive experience of the being as a 
whole. Heidegger even uses the predicates ‘science’ and ‘scientific’ as 
positive properties: “Phenomenology is more of a science than natural 
                                           
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid. 
128 In “Einleitung in die Philosophie” (Heidegger, 2001, p. 18). 
129 In “Rectorship Adress: The Self-Assertion of the German University” from 1933 
(Heidegger, 2009, p. 110). 
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science is”130 and “philosophizing qua transcending” is even “more 
scientific than any science can ever be”.131 This shows that, in spite of his 
critique of Hegel, Heidegger himself does acknowledge in philosophy an 
undeniable basic link to the essence of science. This goes so far that he 
declares that the term “scientific philosophy” is superfluous and 
misleading, just like that of a “round circle”.132 
For Wittgenstein too, philosophy is not science because “philosophy is 
not a doctrine [Lehre] but an activity”.133 For Hegel, philosophy, as the 
self-knowing of the spirit, is an activity too, but this does not contradict the 
fact that over time doctrines emerge in philosophy, for philosophy, as 
Lehre, is essentially teachable (lehrbar). However, in order of course not to 
become dogmatic, such doctrines ought to be investigated, criticized, 
altered and reshaped by philosophy itself. This would be a desirable act of 
self-reflection. Therefore, Hegel deals with doctrines such as the “doctrine 
of concept” and the “doctrine of judgment”. The seeming contradiction 
between doctrine and activity can be overcome by acknowledging that the 
praxis of constructing and reflecting over doctrines, whether one agrees 
with them or not, is a form of cognitive activity in the broad sense, of 
theoretizing and thinking. 
For Wittgenstein, Philosophy is not science either, because philosophy 
is occupied with the most trivial things, whereas science teaches “new 
facts”.134 His disenchanted view of the task of philosophy is expressed in a 
modest tone: “Philosophy is not, like science, building a house. Nor are we 
even laying the foundations of a house. We are merely ‘tidying up a 
                                           
130 In Zollikon Seminars from 1966 (Heidegger, 2001a, p. 211). 
131 In “Einleitung in die Philosophie” (Heidegger, 2001, p. 219). 
132 Ibid.; cf. ibid.,  pp. 16, 221. 
133 In his Tractacus (Wittgenstein, 2010, p. 44, 4.112). 
134 In Cambridge Lectures from 1930–32 (Wittgenstein, 1980, p. 26). 
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room’”.135 This epistemological-realistic thought is, however, not directed 
against Hegel, but against the traditional positivism of the so-called 
scientific philosophy and its general theory of science within the legacy of 
Helmholtz and Mach, Schlick and the Vienna Circle.  
In distinction to this criticism, Eugen Fink’s ontological-
phenomenological interpretation of Phenomenology of Spirit reasonably 
wishes to remind us that Hegel’s idea of philosophy as science does not 
mean “the orientation of philosophy towards the methodological style of 
existing sciences, but rather the radicalization of philosophy itself, a 
decisive and harder devotion to its essence as world wisdom”.136 Fink is 
certainly right, but, if it is to be precise, it should simply read: wisdom, not 
only world-wisdom, i.e. not only worldly wisdom, but also wisdom about 
the world as a whole. Perhaps he did not know this place in the text where 
Hegel himself explicitly rejects the conception of philosophy as only 
“world wisdom” and prefers the conception of “divine” wisdom because 
for Hegel the object of philosophy, like that of religion, is “God and 
nothing but God” and thus: “Philosophy is not world wisdom, but cognition 
of the nonworldly [...], of what is eternal, of what god is”.137 As Fink 
plausibly interprets, Hegel rejects any one-sided interpretation of being as 
only that which remains (das Bleibende) or as only that which becomes 
(das Werdende), because Hegel thinks of the entanglement of both.138 But 
this is because Hegel treats philosophy as the question of being as a whole, 
not only as inner-world being. Worldly knowledge (Weltwissen), as a first-
order science, as Sachwissenschaft, must be distinguished from the content 
                                           
135 Ibid. 
136 Fink, 1977, p. 15. 
137 In Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (Hegel, 1988, p. 77; 16/28). 
138 Cf. Fink, 1977, p. 40. With Heidegger in his mind, Fink reads Hegel’s philosophy as 
developing the question of the being (das Sein). 
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of metascience, as knowledge about what the world is from the so-called 
god perspective. Fink thus rightly concludes that Hegel’s task does not aim 
at positivistic science, for it is not “a merely subsequent thinking-together 
of already pre-thought thoughts-of-being”, i.e. not “a compilation of 
antique and modern ontologisms”.139 Hegel himself declares that 
Phenomenology of Spirit is not about leading a non-knower “to an already 
existing knowledge” (zu einem schon vorhandenen Wissen) and thereby its 
“Introduction” is not like an introduction to a particular science.140 Finally, 
to close a circle, Fink finds an original way to interlink Hegel with 
Nietzsche, suggesting that Hegel’s task ought to be read in a rather 
Nietzschean light, as “productively developing a new problem, a new shape 
of the old question of the thinking humanity”.141 
Another contemporary way to justify that philosophy is not science, and 
hence to attack Hegel’s task, is to argue that philosophy belongs to the 
humanities and that the humanities is not science. Let us thus observe this 
argument. 
 
4.5.2 Humanities is not science  
The Hegelian program of philosophy as science can be dismissed on the 
basis of the dualistic terminology humanities/science that lets philosophy 
fall under humanities and at the same time locates the humanities outside 
science per definition. This conceptual distinction, which is taken for 
granted by the common doxa of science, is more evident in the English 
language than in German or French, where both terms contain the word 
science: Geisteswissenschaft and Naturwissenschaft, sciences humaines 
                                           
139 Fink, 1977, p. 35. 
140 Cf. ibid. 
141 Cf. ibid., p. 33. 
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and sciences naturelles.142 The sharp humanities/science division conceals 
the epistemological possibility of the humanities to be characterized by the 
mediating concept of science, so that the disciplines of the humanities 
dealing with languages, literature, religion and philosophy are at best 
designated as soft sciences or branches of study. In this way, the humanities 
appear to be epistemologically inferior. 
I suggest that in this distinction lies one of the conceptual origins of the 
ongoing, existential humanities crisis which intensified in recent decades 
due to the declaration of the “two-culture gap”143 and the “science wars”.144 
As we have seen, Hegel’s concept of science, understood correctly, can be 
taken as a possible response for this conceptual crisis, because Hegel does 
not simply exclude and tear the human and the spiritual from the realm of 
science, but considers both the natural and the human/spiritual as 
appropriate objects of philosophical-scientific inquiry. He was able to 
ground their logical unity and bring them together in a meaningful way. In 
his terminology, they principally both form together an “identity of identity 
and non-identity”. The proper way to understand the general meaning of 
science is neither monism nor dualism, but rather mono-dualism or dual-
monism. 
The concrete problem behind this terminological division is that, 
whereas the so-called STEM (sciences, technology, engineering and 
                                           
142 However, the use of the term humanities spreads out rapidly. The Freie Universität 
Berlin, for example, accommodates, since 2008, the “Dahlem Humanities Center”. 
143 Charles Percy Snow coined this term in The Two Cultures and the Scientific 
Revolution (London: Cambridge University Press, 1959). Unsurprisingly, one popular 
response to his thesis that the split into the two cultures is an obstacle for solving the 
world’s problems was Edward Osborne Wilson’s thoroughly naturalistic attempt to 
unify them in Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge (New York: Random House, 1998). 
144 The “Science wars” between supporters of “objective truth” and those of “social 
construction” culminated in the “Sokal-Affair” (1996) with the faked article of the 
physicist Alan Sokal in Social Text; cf. Jay Labinger’s and Harry Collins’ The One 
Culture? A Conversation about Science (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 2001). 
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mathematics) enjoy great success and popularity inside and outside 
academia, the humanities stands accused of not increasing the national 
income, like science does, and thus of being socially superfluous and 
unworthy of support.145 However, the reason for this crisis is not purely 
financial. The reason is the naturalistic ideology that does not acknowledge 
the part of the humanities in the inquiry into the basic cognitive elements of 
thought. The humanities partly create preconditions and frameworks for the 
language and structure of the particular sciences. They investigate that 
which makes positive science possible in the first place and suggest a 
critical or contemplative way to do self-reflection in order to reach 
understanding of meaning, not just explanations of the natural world. 
The problem with the sciences that call themselves ‘humanities’ is that 
they partly do not take themselves to be science for various reasons, 
namely for their allegedly non-empirical method, their subjectivity, 
inexactness and uncertainty. The humanities crisis is thus brought on, at 
least partly, by the concept humanities itself as well as by the 
misunderstanding of the concept science. Per definition, the object of the 
inquiry of the humanities is the human condition, not nature, but also not 
“being as such” and not “absolute spirit”. Geisteswissenschaft that reduces 
itself only to “humanities” is thus already forlorn. The distinction 
humanities/science reveals a rupture in thought. What is actually at stake 
here is the question of truth. The common view holds that only the 
empirical scientific method can reach the objective truth, which is the ‘real’ 
truth, whereas the humanities reach only a non-scientific subjective truth in 
the form of interpretations. If philosophy belongs only to humanities, then 
it deals only with the truth of the human condition or presupposes only the 
                                           
145 One embodiment of this crisis is the immense budget-shortage in the UK in 2010 as 
a result of the privatization of the humanities in publicly funded universities. 
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human viewpoint and therefore cannot count as a proper science of the 
truth as a whole. In this case, Hegel was simply wrong. But if philosophy 
goes beyond this, then it does not appertain only to the humanities, but to 
another category such as phenomenological science, universal ontology or 
speculative logic. In the horizon of Hegelian understanding of science, the 
two perspectives of the human/non-human compose one unity, as they are 
only two different manifestations of the one and the same idea. 
Now, if we only direct our gaze towards academia and university, we 
might think that science and philosophy only exist there. This conclusion 
contradicts the fact that some philosophers were not professors – a fact that 
is believed to speak against the objective of Hegel’s task, as we will see in 
the next section. 
 
4.5.3 Some philosophers are not professors 
Pinkard suggests that Hegel’s task of turning philosophy into science, and 
that means for him academic science, contradicts Hegel’s own perspectives 
on philosophy. He argues that Hegel’s conclusion is that “the final end of 
life as philosophy is not that of being a philosophy professor”, but 
“something like contemplation”,146 and that therefore “[...] this conclusion 
runs at odds with Hegel’s own program of turning philosophy into a 
Wissenschaft, that is, into the kind of specialized discipline that can be 
pursued only by university professors”.147 To prove his point, Pinkard 
mentions the historical fact that there are philosophers who were not 
philosophy professors like Benedict Spinoza, David Hume, Moses 
Mendelssohn and Joh Stuart Mill.148 In support of Pinkard, one can say that 
                                           
146 Pinkard, 2012, p. 108. 
147 Ibid., p. 114, remark 48. 
148 Ibid, pp. 108f. 
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there are only few significant extra-universitary scientific institutions. The 
existence of modern science indeed depends on a special form of 
institutional recognition that evolves through the formation of the many 
universities which copy the generic systems and methods and pass them on. 
However, Hegel has never claimed that philosophy has always been 
done by university professors and he included many non-academic 
philosophers in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy. To say that 
philosophy ought to be taught at university does not imply in any respect 
that every individual ought to teach it. To be sure, Hegel honors the 
scientific project of the modern university, but his system in the 
Encyclopaedia can be read a master plan for changing the structure of the 
sciences that are taught at university. He has subscribed himself for the 
Humboldtian ideal of “teaching and research” as a unity, but he had also 
developed influential ideas regarding the reform of teaching philosophy in 
High School which he shared as a headmaster with Friedrich Immanuel 
Niethammer, the Central Commissioner of Education in Bavaria. Even 
though university is for Hegel the organ that regulates and canonizes 
science publicly and for the public, it would be completely misleading to 
conclude that to make philosophy scientific means to him – the 
philosopher, not the person – to become a “philosophy professor”. 
 
4.5.4 Hegel’s Eurocentrism 
Several recent Hegel scholars accuse him of Eurocentrism.149 Whereas 
some are partly aware of their creeping anachronism and claim that his 
                                           
149 Althaus, Hegel: An Intellectual Biography (2001); Tibebu, Hegel and Anti-Semitism 
(2008) and Hegel and the Third World: The Making of Eurocentrism in World-History 
(2011); Pinkard, Hegel’s Naturalism: Mind, Nature, and the Final Ends of Life (2012): 
Kimmerle, “Hegel’s Eurocentric Concept of Philosophy” (2014). 
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allegedly Eurocentric worldview was not his alone, for it reflected the basic 
views of the received western philosophy, some accuse him of being the 
father of modern Eurocentrism, if not the Eurocentrist per se. Horst 
Althaus, for example, designates Hegel as being “thoroughly 
Eurocentric”150 and Teshale Tibebu dedicates a whole work to prove 
Hegel’s Eurocentrism. Tibebu also wrote on Hegel’s racism151 and he 
mentions works on Hegel’s sexism.152 Likewise, Pinkard argues that 
although Hegel understood that: 
 
“[...] philosophy, as Wissenschaft, can no longer concern itself 
exclusively with specifically European matters. [...] his own efforts are 
clearly marred both by his own lack of understanding about the ways of 
life of China, Africa, India, and Japan and equally by his own ill-
formed prejudices about all of them”.153 
 
Heinz Kimmerle suggested that Hegel’s Eurocentric concept of philosophy 
is “typical of the European-Western philosophy as a whole” and must be 
contrasted with an “intercultural concept of philosophy”.154 These authors 
raise serious doubts as to the universal character of Hegel’s concept of 
science, which is presupposed by his task of scientifying philosophy. They 
contest whether Hegel could even fulfill his task at all, if he had prejudices 
about non-western cultures. 
Undoubtedly, the issues of racism and sexism must be thoroughly 
investigated and seriously condemned. Yet, the accusation of Hegel being 
                                           
150 Althaus, 2000, p. 175. 
151 In his Hegel and Anti-Semitism (Pretoria: University of South Africa Press, 2008). 
152 Tibebu, 2011, p. xiii. 
153 Ibid., pp. 194f.  
154 Kimmerle, 2014, p. 117. 
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an Eurocentrist about science can correspond to a problematic form of 
anachronism, as it stands to question whether Hegel could be Eurocentric 
in the sense that we attribute to this term today. Individuals who lived in a 
different cultural era cannot have exactly the same values one shares 
nowadays. Being one of the first philosophers to speak of the emergence of 
one world-history out of the activity of one world-spirit, Hegel is in fact 
much more a Universalist than an exclusionist Eurocentric. He does not 
praise only European thinkers in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy. 
Is he then a ‘false universalist’? His conception of philosophy is universal 
enough to contain some horizon of understanding from which it is possible 
to grasp humanity as a whole. Although the question of anti-universalist 
Eurocentrism cannot be marginalized and pushed aside, one can claim, as 
Andrew Buchwalter does in his response to this issue, that Hegel’s account 
of history, although it assigns priority to Western culture, “also challenges 
one-sided views of European modernity”.155 This means that Hegel does 
not simply cherish everything that comes out of Europe, but looks for the 
universal ideas in it. 
The “universal” in Hegel is not global in the geographical or statistical 
sense, a sense which is perhaps legitimate under certain circumstances in 
some disciplines of natural science. The picture of the world as a globe 
certainly seems to make the idea of the universal more perceptible. But 
“general knowledge” (allgemeines Wissen) in Hegel’s terminology does 
not mean universal knowledge in the sense of a certain property that is 
attributed to all persons or all particular things on earth. It rather means 
general knowledge in the sense of generic and categorical, as it has a wide 
logical validity and is acknowledged as a conceptual norm. Every thinking 
being can potentially have this kind of knowledge and it is supposed to be 
                                           
155 Buchwalter, 2009, p. 88. 
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accessible to anyone because it appeals to the common normal case.156 This 
universality is expressed in the ability to share knowledge and think 
together with other thinking beings, that is, in the accessibility of thought to 
foreign minds and foreign languages. The essence of the “universal” ought 
to be grasped beyond the context-dependence of any specific 
spatiotemporal existence, because the universal form of thought, which 
reveals the essence of beings and their material existence, can become 
intelligible and hence accessible to self-conscious beings. Even standard 
definitions of science do not demand that each science must deal with the 
whole globe, but stress that the universal character of science consists in its 
global validity claim, which means, like Hegel thinks, that science is a 
“systematic search for knowledge whose validity does not depend on the 
particular individual but is open for anyone to check or rediscover”.157 
Even if we do not agree with much of what Hegel wrote about the 
history of cultures and races, it does not mean that philosophy itself cannot 
be a science. Hegel perhaps did not completely fulfill his plan, but this 
alone still does not imply that he was wrong about the choice of his task. 
The fact that we can reject some parts of Hegel’s theory only affirms for us 
that we are dealing with fallible scientific sentences.  
 
4.5.5 The death of philosophy 
A last, but not least, typical response to Hegel’s task is a bad combination 
of one-sided scientism and one-sided naturalism that leads to the belief that 
only natural science matters and philosophy is superfluous. Consistent 
                                           
156 Cf. Stekeler, 2014, pp. 348f. 
157 Hansson, S.O., “Science and Pseudo-Science” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ed. E.N. Zalta (www.plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/pseudo-
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naturalistic theory of science tends to declare that “philosophy is dead”.158 
The purported natural death of philosophy is a result of sophisticated self-
termination due to a naturalistic ideology. A physicist who relinquishes 
philosophy seems “like somebody who has seen thousands of trees but has 
never seen a forest”.159 But not only naturalists declare the death of 
philosophy. In the aftermath of Hegel, Dilthey also states that he stands in 
front of the “ruins of philosophy”.160 The contemporary diagnosis that 
“philosophy is dead” truly reflects the state of philosophy in the faculties in 
which naturalism is celebrated as the guide line for philosophy of science. 
The concealed true problem is that the particular sciences are merely 
positive sciences that inexplicitly and uncritically presuppose a set of 
already philosophically processed concepts, so to say, a whole received 
metaphysic. It is precisely for that reason that Heidegger ventures to 
embrace Aristotle’s physics as a still-relevant philosophical work.161 
The absolutely naturalist point of view, the “natural consciousness”, 
holds that there is no need for further philosophical thinking and hence for 
going beyond any already existing scientific answers given to the 
                                           
158 Hawking, 2010, p. 13: “How does the universe behave? What is the nature of 
reality? [...] Traditionally these are questions for philosophy, but philosophy is dead. 
Philosophy has not kept up with modern developments in the sciences, particularly 
physics”. 
159 Albert Einstein insists on the significance of philosophy: “So many people today – 
and even professional scientists – seem to me like somebody who has seen thousands of 
trees but has never seen a forest. A knowledge of the historic and philosophical 
background gives that kind of independence from prejudices of his generation from 
which most scientists are suffering” (cited in: Howard, 2006, p. 67, from a letter to 
Robert Thornton, 07.12.1944, Einstein Archive, Hebrew University, Jerusalem). 
160 Dilthey, 1960, p. 5. Original: 1887. 
161 In The Principle of Reason from 1955/56 (Heidegger, 1991, pp. 62f): “The Physics is 
a lecture in which he seeks to determine beings that arise on their own, τὰ φύσει ὄντα, 
with regard to their being. Aristotelian ‘physics’ is different from what we mean today 
by this word, [...] Aristotle's ‘physics’ is philosophy, whereas modern physics is a 
positive science that presupposes a philosophy.” 
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fundamental philosophical questions. This is the basic thought of 
positivism. The sciences appear to it neither as an essential part of 
philosophy in the broadest sense, nor as the offspring of philosophy, but as 
some given entity totally separable from philosophy, the orphan of 
philosophy. In this mode of givenness, the fact that lively philosophy no 
longer exists does not seem to bother the other sciences or to cause their 
own death. Rather, it only affirms the being alive and the supposedly high 
necessity of some particular sciences. The real tone of the popular maxim 
“philosophy is dead” is in truth much less concerned with the problems of 
philosophy than with the glorification of the natural sciences. It attempts to 
constitute another maxim, namely ‘physics is alive’ and ‘physics is the 
queen of the faculties’, exposing thus its own true fear about its mortal 
future, a lucid basic angst about its being, an existential fear of a kind that 
physics, even if it is already a senior science, must not have. 
The extremeness of such a positivistic position, of such rampant 
scientism, posits itself outside of philosophy of science, for if philosophy 
is, from this point on, a dead body, then the organ ‘philosophy of science’ 
must be dead as well. As such, the thinker of the death of philosophy has 
rightly proclaimed at least his own philosophical ‘natural death’. The self-
position against philosophy makes one’s own science a merely positive 
science that adopts traditional metaphysical terms, even though the 
physicalist scientists surely would not think of themselves as 
metaphysicians. The possibility of philosophy as science confronts us thus 
with a need for rethinking the goal set for philosophy of science. I have 
attempted to reach such rethinking by a critical deliberation on the 
Hegelian approach to philosophy of science. Now it is time for final 
thoughts. 
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5. Final thoughts 
This study set out to explore the character of Hegel’s philosophy of 
science. The results show that Hegel develops philosophy of science avant 
la lettre, yet ‘philosophy of science’ not in the common sense of genitivus 
obiectivus that refers to science as some given object of inquiry, but rather 
in genitivus subjectivus referring to the inquiry science performs with itself, 
to knowledge about knowledge, to self-knowledge. Such speculative 
science of science takes science, including modern science, to be a self-
thinking thought, a form of noesis noeseos. In contrast to other modern 
theories of science, Hegel’s metascience is unique insofar as it is neither 
descriptive, nor prescriptive, neither purely empirical, nor purely 
rationalist. Its goal is to scientify the romantic philosophy of his time which 
believes in the simple immediacy of knowledge, while denying the 
necessity of the hard work on the development of concepts, of eide, 
Begriffe. His version of philosophy of science stresses that scientificity is a 
quality philosophizing ought to achieve. Wissenschaft does not contain 
only empirical object-oriented assembly of data, but essentially categorical 
forms of self-consciousness. Such epistemology, if it is to be a progressive 
form of non-scholastic metaphysics, is possible only as non-formal logic.  
In this respect, Hegel’s possible response to the positivistic-naturalistic 
approach vastly differs from the three later responses of Popper, Kuhn and 
Quine, as it rejects any theory of science that is based, retrospectively, on 
(1) the mathematical methods of statistics and probability theory, on (2) 
Darwinist-like natural selection of scientific paradigms or on (3) 
epistemology as empirical psychology that reanimalizes the human 
thinking subject, the mind. Systematicity in science is for Hegel not a 
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formal condition, but a key philosophical concept which refers to the most 
concrete and most developed form of self-consciousness. 
Notwithstanding, contemporary Hegelian literature exhibits various 
naturalistic readings which are not without problems. Obviously, the wrong 
way to attack the naturalistic claims would be to appeal to some kind of 
mystical spiritualism or principal skepticism about the interrelations 
between the natural and the mental. At the base of the naturalistic 
interpretation lies a problematic conception according to which there is a 
way to show that the mind is essentially natural and therefore our 
epistemic faculties are unfortunately empirically limited. This reading 
forgets that for Hegel Geist, as the collective self-thinking mind, went out 
of the limited sphere of nature and is beyond nature, that is, “infinitive”. 
The naturalism controversy within Hegelian study reflects thus an inherent 
question in the gap between philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. 
The absence today of phenomenological approaches towards theories of 
knowledge and consciousness goes hand in hand with the discrediting of 
hermeneutical methods of text interpretation. The naturalistic 
interpretations insist on an insufficient common-sense understanding of 
central concepts such as nature, knowledge, science, spirit and idea. Future 
readings need be aware of distorting Hegel’s perspectives while recruiting 
him for one’s own interests; and this goes for any thinker. Hegel has often 
been recast to fit the needs of his readers who filter him for the things they 
find useful, like positivism, naturalism, historicism or pragmatism, and then 
throw back the rest, namely phenomenology of self-consciousness and the 
non-formalistic logical inquiry into the generic forms of being, essence and 
concept. 
The outcome of this work acknowledges that the arguments of Hegel’s 
philosophy of science are in fact an attack on the ideology of naturalism 
which suffers under its own premises and should be called into question. In 
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the future, adequate Hegel research ought not to leave so much room for 
the faith of naturalism in nature and in the alleged naturality of the mind. 
Rethinking the so-called speculative notion of science, one is confronted 
with the basic recurring Hegelian argument that the authentic form of true 
science, the knowledge of knowledge, should be understood as the self-
knowledge of a generic subject, and not as some natural process of 
gathering information about the empirical world. My inquiry has intended 
to hint at the wide scope of this insight. With the understanding attained by 
this work, Hegelian philosophy of science can be seen as offering a series 
of relevant thoughts to this discipline today in its broad meaning, so that a 
historical mistake, namely not to consider Hegel as a proper or relevant 
philosopher of science, can be hopefully corrected in this way. The 
discipline called philosophy of science is still capable of coming to a new 
stage, not just Neo-Hegelian in name and style, but one that is truly 
affected from Hegel’s radical metascientific deliberations discussed here. 
Only in this vein can Hegel be read as one of the pioneers of modern 
philosophy of science and one of the makers of the modern university. His 
fundamental thoughts on science must be taken into consideration when 
one thinks of the justification of philosophy of science, its history, as well 
as its future. Hegelian thought supplies a framework for dealing with the 
same fundamental problem that any theory of science deals with, namely 
the demarcation problem, especially the one that results from the 
supposedly insurmountable dualism of contemporary science and 
humanities. 
The conclusion is that Hegel was a passionate thinker of science. Yet, 
his approach was not only opposed in the tradition of the so-called analytic 
philosophy, but also in that of continental philosophy. From Nietzsche, 
who took science to be principally problematic, through Husserl who 
criticized Hegel’s overly emphasized anti-naturalism, to Heidegger’s 
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decisive statement that “philosophy is not science”, the continental post-
Hegelian philosophy has its difficulties with Hegel’s love for science and 
his view of science as the main reasonable institution that regulates and 
canonizes the truth. This critical line of thought, however, does not 
represent a mere abolition of Hegel’s thought or indifference to it, but, just 
like analytic philosophy, a kind of evolutionary approximation towards the 
speculative core of Hegel’s notion of scientificity in philosophy. The 
ubiquitous opposition has made Hegel’s original version of continental 
scientism essentially effective, more than one would presume. It seems that 
modern thinkers of science, even the postmodern Lyotard who firmly 
rejects Hegel’s “totalitarian” thought of philosophy as systematical science, 
still has to position themselves in relation to Hegel’s system. 
Interestingly, the intensive secondary literature on Hegel, the ‘science 
of Hegel’, clearly bears witness to how philosophy investigates itself. In 
Hegelian terms, it expresses the self-knowledge of philosophy as a science 
on its own. While referring to Hegel literature, however, one should be 
careful not to become too philological or scholastic, like the medieval 
Aristotelianism, nor to blindly focus on the issue of pseudo expertise. One 
should not take Hegel mainly as an object of historical inquiry, as his ‘life’, 
that is, to analyze and compare his thought only as his own. Rather, one 
ought to deliberate on Hegel himself as a subject of thought as well, i.e. on 
his use of concepts and on what he really does or does not do with his 
words. Undoubtedly, ideal-typical ‘Hegelogists’ do not have to be 
Hegelians or even post-Hegelians, but they ought to be able to put 
themselves in such positions and to walk a few miles in such shoes. In my 
inquiry, the object was thus not Hegel research in historical or social terms 
of investigation and the intention was not to investigate all the trends and 
movements in it, but to show that the core argument for naturalism in 
Hegel is not only forlorn and hopeless, but also highly self-destructive. 
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Finally, although the recent laudable scholarship of Rorty and Brandom 
took pains in showing the pragmatic side of Hegel, the pragmatic reading 
should be careful not to instrumentalize the theory-ladenness of 
observations and to show them only as serving the satisfaction of our needs 
as single living creatures. The question of Hegel’s possible response to 
American pragmatism should be dealt with in the future in more detail. It 
seems to me that, in spite of the effort of the pragmatist program, it can be 
especially misleading when it comes to interpretations of the main 
character of Hegelian philosophy of science. The manifestations of 
discursiveness constituted by self-consciousness cannot be said to be 
exhausted in mere social contacts between particular individuals, for they 
reflect more than that. They namely expose the transpersonal typical forms 
of actions that are expressed through the Geist as a whole, as what Hegel 
means by the “absolute spirit”: universal forms of self-reflective 
knowledge. 
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